Color-object interference: Further tests of an executive control account

Young children are slower in naming the color of a meaningful picture than in naming the color of an abstract form (Stroop-like color-object interference). The current experiments tested an executive control account of this phenomenon. First, color-object interference was observed in 6- and 8-year-olds but not in 12- and 16-year-olds (Experiment 1). Second, meaningful pictures did not interfere in 5- to 7-year-olds’ manual sorting of objects on the basis of color (Experiment 2) or in their naming the number of colored objects in the display, that is, subitizing (Experiment 3). These findings provide support for the view that color-object interference results from the children’s immature inhibition of the prepotent but irrelevant task of object naming.     

Experience with malleable objects influences shape-based object individuation by infants

Infants’ ability to accurately represent and later recognize previously viewed objects, and conversely, to discriminate novel objects from those previously seen improves remarkably over the first two years of life. During this time, infants acquire extensive experience viewing and manipulating objects and these experiences influence their physical reasoning. Here we posited that infants’ observations of object feature stability (rigid versus malleable) can influence the use of those features to individuate two successively viewed objects. We showed 8.5-month-olds a series of objects that could or could not change shape, then assessed their use of shape as a basis for object individuation. Infants who explored rigid objects later used shape differences to individuate objects; however, infants who explored malleable objects did not. This outcome suggests that the latter infants did not take into account shape differences during the physical reasoning task and provides further evidence that infants’ attention to object features can be readily modified based on recent experiences.     

Learning to Manipulate and Categorize in Human and Artificial Agents

This study investigates the acquisition of integrated object manipulation and categorization abilities through a series of experiments in which human adults and artificial agents were asked to learn to manipulate two‐dimensional objects that varied in shape, color, weight, and color intensity. The analysis of the obtained results and the comparison of the behavior displayed by human and artificial agents allowed us to identify the key role played by features affecting the agent/environment interaction, the relation between category and action development, and the role of cognitive biases originating from previous knowledge.     

Against the Compositional View of Facts

It is commonly assumed that facts would be complex entities made out of particulars and universals. This thesis, which I call Compositionalism, holds that parthood may be construed broadly enough so that the relation that holds between a fact and the entities it ‘ties’ together counts as a kind of parthood. I argue, first, that Compositionalism is incompatible with the possibility of certain kinds of fact and universal, and, second, that such facts and universals are possible. I conclude that Compositionalism is false. What all these kinds of fact and universal have in common is a violation of supplementation principles governing any relation that may be intelligibly regarded as a kind of parthood. Although my arguments apply to Compositionalism generally, I focus on recent work by David Armstrong, who is a prominent and explicit Compositionalist.     

Holistic processing of shape cues in face identification: Evidence from face inversion,composite faces,and acquired prosopagnosia

According to a classical functional architecture of face processing (Bruce & Young, 1986), sex processing on faces is a parallel function to individual face recognition. One consequence of the model is thus that sex categorization on faces is not influenced by face familiarity. However, the behavioural and neuro-psychological evidences supporting this dissociation are yet equivocal. To test the independence between sex processing on faces and familiar face recognition, familiar (learned) faces were morphed with new faces, generating facial continua of visual similarity to familiar faces. First, a pilot experiment shown that subjects familiarized with one extreme of the face continuum roughly perceive one half of the continuum (60 to 100% of visual similarity to familiar faces) as made of familiar faces and the other part as unfamiliar. In the experiment proper, subjects were familiarized with faces and tested in a sex decision task made on faces at the different steps of the continua. Subjects were significantly quicker at telling the sex of faces perceived as familiar (60-100%), and the effect was not observed in a control (untrained) group. These results indicate that familiar face representations are activated before sex categorization is completed, and can facilitate this processing. The nature of the interaction between sex categorization on faces and familiar face recognition is discussed.     

Form follows function: Learning about function helps children learn about shape

Object functions help young children to organize new artifact categories. However, the scope of their influence is unknown. We explore whether functions highlight property dimensions that are relevant to artifact categories in general. Specifically, using a longitudinal training procedure, we assessed whether experience with functions highlights shape as important for categorization. Seventeen-month-olds were provided experience with novel categories of similarly shaped objects. In Study 1, the function group learned about the objects’ shape-based functions; a control group did not. In Study 2, 17-month-olds were trained on the same categories, but the objects’ shapes and functions were no longer causally related. Only the function group in Study 1 subsequently used shape reliably when categorizing novel objects. These results suggest that function is instrumental in establishing a ‘shape bias’ in early categorization and that it does so via conceptually based processes.     

Frames of reference for the light-from-above prior in visual search and shape judgements

Faced with highly complex and ambiguous visual input, human observers must rely on prior knowledge and assumptions to efficiently determine the structure of their surroundings. One of these assumptions is the 'light-from-above' prior. In the absence of explicit light-source information, the visual system assumes that the light-source is roughly overhead. A simple, low-cost strategy would place this 'light-from-above' prior in a retinal frame of reference. A more complex, but optimal strategy would be to assume that the light-source is gravitationally up, and compensate for observer orientation. Evidence to support one or other strategy from psychophysics and neurophysiology has been mixed. This paper pits the gravitational and retinal frames against each other in two different visual tasks that relate to the light-from-above prior. In the first task, observers had to report the presence or absence of a target where distractors and target were defined purely by shading. In the second task, observers made explicit shape judgements of similar stimuli. The orientation of the stimuli varied across trials and the observer's head was fixed at 0, +/-45 or +/-60 degrees . In both tasks the retinal frame of reference dominated. Visual search behaviour with shape-from-shading stimuli (SFS) was modulated purely by stimulus orientation relative to the retina. However, the gravitational frame of reference had a significant effect on shape judgements, with a 30% correction for observer orientation. In other words, shading information is processed quite differently depending on the demands of the current task. When a 'quick and dirty' representation is required to drive fast, efficient search, that is what the visual system provides. In contrast, when the task is to explicitly estimate shape, extra processing to compensate for head orientation precedes the perceptual judgment. These results are consistent with current neurophysiological data on SFS if we re-frame compensation for observer orientation as a cue-combination problem.     

Overvaluation of shape and weight in binge eating disorder, bulimia nervosa, and sub-threshold bulimia nervosa

Increasing empirical evidence supports the validity of binge eating disorder (BED), a research diagnosis in the appendix of DSM-IV, and its inclusion as a distinct and formal diagnosis in the DSM-V. A pressing question regarding the specific criteria for BED diagnosis is whether, like bulimia nervosa (BN), it should be characterized by overvaluation of shape and weight. This study compared features of eating disorders in 436 treatment-seeking women comprising four groups: 195 BED participants who overvalue their shape/weight, 129 BED participants with subclinical levels of overvaluation, 61 BN participants, and 51 participants with sub-threshold BN. The BED clinical overvaluation group had significantly higher levels of specific eating disorder psychopathology than the three other groups which did not differ significantly from each other. Findings suggest that overvaluation of shape and weight should not be considered as a required criterion for BED because this would exclude a substantial proportion of BED patients with clinically significant problems. Rather, overvaluation of shape and weight warrants consideration either as a diagnostic specifier or as a dimensional severity rating as it provides important information about severity within BED.     

Reproducibility and a unifying explanation: Lessons from the shape bias

The goal of science is to advance our understanding of particular phenomena. However, in the field of development, the phenomena of interest are complex, multifaceted, and change over time. Here, we use three decades of research on the shape bias to argue that while replication is clearly an important part of the scientific process, integration across the findings of many studies that include variations in procedure is also critical to create a coherent understanding of the thoughts and behaviors of young children. The “shape bias,” or the tendency to generalize a novel label to novel objects of the same shape, is a reliable and robust behavioral finding and has been shown to predict future vocabulary growth and possible language disorders. Despite the robustness of the phenomenon, the way in which the shape bias is defined and tested has varied across studies and laboratories. The current review argues that differences in performance that come from even seemingly minor changes to the participants or task can offer critical insight to underlying mechanisms, and that working to incorporate data from multiple labs is an important way to reveal how task variation and a child’s individual pathway creates behavior—a key issue for understanding developmental phenomena.