Arguing about definitions

What are the implications of taking seriously Chaïm Perelman's proposition that “definitions are rhetorical”? Efforts to find Real Definitions are dysfunctional to the extent they direct argumentation toward pseudo “is” claims and away from explicit “ought” claims about how words are to be used. Addressing definitional disputes explicitly as propositions ofought rather thanis could put on the agenda the pragmatic concerns of definitional choice that might otherwise remain tacit.     

De Re Language,De Re Eliminability,and the Essential Limits of Both

De re modality is eliminable if there is an effective translation of all wffs into non-de re equivalents. We cannot have logical equivalence unless logic has odd theses, but we can have material equivalence by banning all essences, something the non-de re facts let us do, or by giving everything such humdrum essences as self-identity and banning the more interesting ones. Eliminability cannot be got from weaker assumptions, nor independent ones of even modest generality. The net philosophical import is that, quite apart from the merits of essentialism, de re language has scant utility.     

Evolving research misconduct policies and their significance for physical scientists

Scientific misconduct includes the fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism (FFP) of concepts, data or ideas; some institutions in the United States have expanded this concept to include “other serious deviations (OSD) from accepted research practice.” It is the absence of this OSD clause that distinguishes scientific misconduct policies of the past from the “research misconduct” policies that should be the basis of future federal policy in this area. This paper introduces a standard for judging whether an action should be considered research misconduct as distinguished from scientific misconduct: by this standard, research misconduct must involve activities unique to the practice of science and must have the potential to negatively affect the scientific record. Although the number of cases of scientific misconduct is uncertain (only the NIH and the NSF keep formal records), the costs are high in terms of the integrity of the scientific record, diversions from research to investigate allegations, ruined careers of those eventually exonerated, and erosion of public confidence in science. Existing scientific misconduct policies vary from institution to institution and from government agency to government agency; some have highly developed guidelines that include OSD, others have no guidelines at all. One result has been that the federal False Claims Act has been used to pursue allegations of scientific misconduct. As a consequence, such allegations have been adjudicated in federal courts, rather than judged by scientific peers. The federal government is now establishing a first-ever research misconduct policy that would apply to all research funded by the federal government regardless of which agency funded the research or whether the research was carried out in a government, industrial or university laboratory. Physical scientists, who up to now have only infrequently been the subject of scientific misconduct allegations, must nonetheless become active in the debate over research misconduct policies and how they are implemented since they will now be explicitly covered by this new federal wide policy. Disclaimer: The authors are grateful for the support for conduct of this research provided by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and were formed and expressed without reference to positions taken by DOE or the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The views of the authors are not intended either to reflect or imply positions of DOE or PNNL.     

The American experience: Lessons learned

This paper discusses ten lessons learned since 1989 about handling allegations of scientific misconduct involving biomedical and behavioral research supported by the U. S. Public Health Service. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct: An International Perspective, organised by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of Research Integrity, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, or any other federal agency.     

创新和知识经济与促肝细胞生长素的研制

创新是一个民族进步的灵魂,是科研工作的核心,是知识经济对知识的根本要求。促肝细胞生长素是治疗肝炎的有效药物,该药物研制成功的关键在于创新。纵观其研制过程的创新思路与实践,将有助于我们更新科研观念,增加创新意识。     

Psychological Essentialism and Nationalism as Determinants of Interethnic Bias

ABSTRACT

The present study examined whether individuals without strong national identity (i.e., low nationalism) would be susceptible to temporarily elicited essentialism to alter their mental representations of ethnic boundaries, and thus increase interethnic bias. To test these ideas we experimentally induced essentialist beliefs among Japanese subjects about the boundary between Japanese and Chinese ethnicities, while measuring the strength of nationalism as an individual variable. The results were generally consistent with predictions, suggesting that the activation of essentialist beliefs can strengthen interethnic biases among people without strong nationalism.     

群际接触减少偏见的机制：一项整合的研究

以321名少数民族大学生为被试,考察了民族接触（与汉族）、交往态度、民族认同、民族本质论、民族刻板印象和群际焦虑等变量,以整合的视角探讨了民族接触促进民族交往的机制问题。研究结果表明：民族接触通过降低群际焦虑和民族认同、减弱消极刻板印象和民族本质论而间接促进了民族交往,民族认同在民族接触和民族本质论之间、消极刻板印象在民族接触和群际焦虑之间存在中介作用。这项整合的研究理论上丰富了群际接触减少偏见的机制研究,发现了新的中介变量,对促进民族交往的实践具有指导意义。     

What kind of kind is intelligence?

The model of human intelligence that is most widely adopted derives from psychometrics and behavioral genetics. This standard approach conceives intelligence as a general cognitive ability that is genetically highly heritable and describable using quantitative traits analysis. The paper analyzes intelligence within the debate on natural kinds and contends that the general intelligence conceptualization does not carve psychological nature at its joints. Moreover, I argue that this model assumes an essentialist perspective. As an alternative, I consider an HPC theory of intelligence and evaluate how it deals with essentialism and with intuitions coming from cognitive science. Finally, I highlight some concerns about the HPC model as well, and conclude by suggesting that it is unnecessary to treat intelligence as a kind in any sense.     

WHY I AM AN ACCOMMODATIONIST AND PROUD OF IT

There is a strong need of a reasoned defense of what was known as the “independence” position of the science–religion relationship but that more recently has been denigrated as the “accommodationist” position, namely that while there are parts of religion—fundamentalist Christianity in particular—that clash with modern science, the essential parts of religion (Christianity) do not and could not clash with science. A case for this position is made on the grounds of the essentially metaphorical nature of science. Modern science functions because of its root metaphor of the machine: the world is seen in mechanical terms. As Thomas Kuhn insisted, metaphors function in part by ruling some questions outside their domain. In the case of modern science, four questions go unasked and hence unanswered: Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the foundation of morality? What is mind and its relationship to matter? What is the meaning of it all? You can remain a nonreligious skeptic on these questions, but it is open for the Christian to offer his or her answers, so long as they are not scientific answers. Here then is a way that science and religion can coexist.