Effect of elasto-plastic compatibility of grains on void-initiation criteria in low-carbon steel

The present study provides evidence for the role of ferrite-grain-size distributions on the occurrence of void initiation in a low-carbon steel. Various thermomechanical treatments were undertaken to create ultrafine, bimodal and coarse distributions of ferrite grain sizes. A two-parameter characterisation of probable void initiation sites is proposed, namely an elastic modulus difference and a difference in Schmid factor of the grains surrounding the void. All microstructures were categorised based on the ability to facilitate or resist void nucleation. For coarse grains, the elastic modulus and the Schmid factor differences are the highest, while they are intermediate for ultrafine grains and the lowest for the bimodal microstructure.     

Moral Evil,Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.     

Crystallographic orientation dependence of nanoindentation hardness in austenitic phase of stainless steel

ABSTRACT

This paper presents the indentation hardness evolution in different in-plane directions of austenite grains whose {111} planes are parallel to the sample surface determined by nanoindentation tests and electron back scattering diffraction (EBSD) analysis. A scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of the indentation surface around one of the indents indicated the activation of two sets of slip planes with respect to each of the three indenter surfaces for a Berkovich tip. The identification of the slip traces by EBSD data analysis is in accord with Schmid`s law. We therefore proposed a new approach for defining the orientation parameter to interpret the indentation hardness. The orientation parameter was shown to be the minimum value of the three maximum Schmid factors on the secondarily activated slip planes in three directions for a Berkovich tip. Indentation hardness increased with the decrease in the orientation parameter and was dependent on in-plane orientation.     

Shared emotions

Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of “straightforwardly shared” emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants’ shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism of emotions, while the question about “straightforward sharing” is argued to be of secondary importance.