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E. J. Lowe 《Axiomathes》2008,18(3):273-288
A personal view is presented of how metaphysics and ontology stand at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the light
of developments during the twentieth. It is argued that realist metaphysics, with serious ontology at its heart, has a promising
future, provided that its adherents devote some time and effort to countering the influences of both its critics and its false
friends.
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E. J. LoweEmail: |
2.
Jessica Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):397-405
In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to
the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten
the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened
by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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Jessica BrownEmail: |
3.
Matthew Walker 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(5):879-901
On the one hand, Hume accepts the view – which he attributes primarily to Stoicism – that there exists a determinate best and happiest life for human beings, a way of life led by a figure whom Hume calls ‘the true philosopher’. On the other hand, Hume accepts that view – which he attributes to Scepticism – that there exists a vast plurality of good and happy lives, each potentially equally choiceworthy. In this paper, I reconcile Hume's apparently conflicting commitments: I argue that Hume's ‘Sceptical’ pluralism about the character of the happiest life need not conflict with his ‘Stoic’ advocacy of the supreme happiness of the true philosopher, given Hume's flexible understanding of how one might live as a true philosopher. 相似文献
4.
Stephen Hetherington 《Philosophia》2006,34(3):303-310
It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.
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Stephen HetheringtonEmail: |
5.
Stephen Hetherington 《Synthese》2009,168(1):97-118
This paper undermines a paradigmatic form of sceptical reasoning. It does this by describing, and then dialectically dissolving,
the sceptical-independence presumption, upon which that form of sceptical reasoning relies. 相似文献
6.
Duncan Pritchard 《Synthese》2007,158(3):277-297
In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against
the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck
epistemology can be developed in new directions. 相似文献
7.
John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s
commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where
our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal
empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences.
This commitment is prone to sceptical attacks and waters down McDowell’s holism. We propose to retain McDowell’s partial re-enchantment
of nature—without appealing to McDowell’s Kantian conception of experience—, and argue that it is sufficient to avoid the
oscillation and to make sense of the objectivity of thought.
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Manuel Pinedo-Garcia (Corresponding author)Email: |
8.
Duncan Pritchard 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):283-307
G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying extents, this Moorean thesis. On the one hand, there are those who endorse an externalist version of contextualism, such as Keith DeRose, who have claimed that there must be some contexts in which Moore is right. More radically still, Ernest Sosa has expanded on this externalist thesis by arguing that, contra DeRose's contextualism, Moore may be right in all contexts. In this paper I evaluate these claims and argue that, suitably modified, one can resurrect the main elements of the Moorean anti-sceptical thesis. 相似文献
9.
Henry Jackman 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(1):25-41
Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's beliefs and applications. Holists will thus be coherentists about how one's usage is justified: showing that one's usage of a term is justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's beliefs and applications. Semantic reductionists, on the other hand, will understand such justification in a classically foundationalist fashion. Now Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of scepticism about meaning and the possibility of demonstrating the correctness of one's usage. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands justification in classically foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments, if good, lead not to a type of scepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about the justification of our usage, and thus a holist about semantic facts. 相似文献
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