Qualities of reflection: using Saul’s (2001) On Equilibrium to restore humanity to reflection in healthcare

Reflection features strongly in health and care work as a tool for personal and professional development and can support us as practitioners to be critical and self-aware in practice, of practice and the impact on clients and patients. Its power to transform learning and practice, however, has been watered down through recipe-following in reflective recording and through the avoidance of recording uncertainty or practice that might not measure against professional codes. Drawing on the humanist philosophy of John Ralston Saul, I suggest using Saul’s ‘six qualities’ as themes for reflective questions. I reflect on the influence of reason through codes of practice and offer suggestions for questions to restore an awareness of Self in work with clients and patients. Finally, from my experience as a counselling student and healthcare educator, I argue that we should have a greater appreciation of the power of uncertainty in reflective recording.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward,Smilansky, and Perry

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account.

Impaired ranking of semantic attributes in dementia

The present work explored the loss of semantic attributes that is said to occur in dementia. In the first two experiments, subjects had to select attributes that went with concepts like airplane and church. The finding that demented subjects maintained high levels of accuracy when selecting attributes suggested that the semantic content of their concepts was relatively well preserved. The organization of the content was explored in a third experiment by having subjects order attributes according to their relative importance in defining concepts. While demented subjects performed better than chance, they did not rank attributes as well as healthy aged subjects, suggesting a disruption in organization whereby the importance of central attributes is reduced. The hypothesized disruption in organization is viewed in relation to the learning and memory deficit that is the hallmark of the dementias.     

The Cards that are Dealt You

Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsible. I follow Feinberg in rejecting various "inflated' demands on "origination,' "initiation,' or ultimate sourcehood.     

Looking for Whitehead

Saul Kripke in his revolutionary and influential series of lectures from the early 1970s (later published as the book Naming and Necessity) famously resurrected John Stuart Mill's theory of proper names. Kripke at the same time rejected Mill's theory of general terms. According to Kripke, many natural kind terms do not fit Mill's account of general terms and are closer to proper names. Unfortunately, Kripke and his followers ignored key passages in Mill's A System of Logic in which Mill enunciates a sophisticated and detailed theory of natural kind terms that anticipates and is in some ways superior to Kripke's.     

Morally,We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky

In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way.     

Kripke's sole route to the necessary a posteriori

In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity (NN). He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I argue that the alleged second argument is not in NN. I identify the mistakes that lead to Soames' misinterpretation.     

Locus of control and the learning of an artificial language

An experiment was conducted to explore the cognitive processes associated with locus of control beliefs. Internal and external subjects were instructed to remember as much as they can from an array of 21 letter strings generated from a finite state grammar. Although internals and externals did not significantly differ in their ability to recall these items, internals were better able to discriminate grammaticality and nongrammaticality in a new set of letter strings. Thus, although both groups attended to the exemplars, internals extracted more invariance and hence learned more about the underlying structure than externals. These results were discussed in relation to those of Wolk and DuCette (1974) on I-E and incidental learning.