Quantum Mechanics and "Song of Myself": Getting a Grip on Reality

Most recent writing linking science and literature has concerned itself with challenges to the epistemological status of scientific knowledge in an attempt to demonstrate its contingency, arguing in the more radical efforts that the structures of science are no more than useful fictions. This essay also includes an epistemological comparison between science and literature, but instead of making grand or meta–statements about the nature of knowing generally in the two fields, mine is a much narrower aim. My exploration entails two tasks. First, I provide a close–up look at a particular type of experiment, called the delayed–choice experiment, which clearly reveals the strangeness of the quantum world. In connection with this experiment, I discuss wave functions—mathematical expressions used by physicists to describe quantum behavior and predict the outcome of experiments involving quanta. Second, I look at Walt Whitman's “Song of Myself” focusing on the meaning of the “self” in the poem. My aim is to treat the object of study in each field as a “text” and to assert and demonstrate a parallel in the strategies of thought and response between physicists (“readers”) pondering the meaning and status of a wave function and poem readers pondering the meaning and status of the poem's self. In Whitman's “Song” we find an attempt to understand complex aspects of human experience that are said to transcend ordinary reality, an effort for which I believe there are parallels in the attempts of modern physicists to understand complex, nonintuitive aspects of the subatomic world. While not making the kind of broad claims eschewed above, I do suggest that this focused study has interesting implications since both the wave function and the poem's self force their respective sets of “readers” to confront questions of ultimacy—to consider, that is, epistemological and ontological issues of more than passing interest to students of science as well as those of metaphysics and theology.     

Interaction of a dislocation with an elliptical hole in icosahedral quasicrystals

The interaction between a dislocation and an elliptical hole in icosahedral quasicrystals is considered. An explicit expression for the complex potential is derived using the extended Stroh formalism. Based on the conformal mapping method and a perturbation technique, closed-form solutions are obtained. The field intensity factors at a crack tip and the image forces on the dislocation arising from the crack are calculated. The effects of phonon–phason elastic coupling on the mechanical behavior are also observed.     

The Correspondence between Human Intelligibility and Physical Intelligibility: The View of Jean Ladrière

This article seeks to explain the correspondence between human intelligibility and that of the physical world by synthesizing the contributions of Jean Ladrière. Ladrière shows that the objectification function of formal symbolism in mathematics as an artificial language has operative power acquired through algorithm to represent physical reality. In physical theories, mathematics relates to observations through theoretic and empirical languages mutually interacting in a methodological circle, and nonmathematical anticipatory intention guides mathematical algorithmic exploration. Ladrière reasons that mathematics can make the physical world comprehensible because of the presence of a rational principle in both kinds of intelligibility.     

Music and the Representation of Emotion

The claim that many musical works are representational is highly controversial. The formalist view that music is pure form and without any, or any significant, representational content is widely held. Two facts about music are, however, well-established by empirical science: Music is heard as resembling human expressive behaviour and music arouses ordinary emotions. This paper argues that it follows from these facts that music also represents human expressive behaviour and ordinary emotions.     

Games,Rules, and Practices

We present and defend a view labeled “practiceism” which provides a solution to the incompatibility problems. The classic incompatibility problem is inconsistency of: 1. Someone who intentionally violates the rules of a game is not playing the game.

2. In many cases, players intentionally violate the rules as part of playing the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

The problem has a normative counterpart: 1’. In normal cases, it is wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.

2’. In many normal cases, it is not wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

According to both formalism and informalism, the rules of the game include the formal rules of the game. Both traditional positions avoid the incompatibility problems by rejecting 1 and 1'. Practiceism rejects 2 and 2’: it maintains that the rules are the rules manifested in playing the game, not the formal rules.

Practiceism presents two theses: (a) the real rules of the game are the rules players follow: the practice determines the rules, and not vice versa. (b) the (first order) rules of a game determine what is legitimate within the game.     

Introduction to the Special Issue “Phenomenological Studies in Multidimensional Views”

How should Scheler’s critique of Kant’s ethics be interpreted? This paper focuses on two aspects of Scheler’s critique of Kant’s ethics: 1) the problem of “formalism” in Kant’s ethics, and 2) the problem of the “ethics of autonomy” and “ethics of heteronomy.” Generally speaking, Scheler’s project has a “modern” starting point; that is to say, his work starts with the rejection or critique of Kant and Aristotle. Most essentially, Scheler’s “material ethics of values” (ethics of person) must stay autonomous. Following Kant, Scheler takes Aristotle’s theory as an “ethics of heteronomy,” and then competes with Kant within the “ethics of autonomy” and further develops his own “ethics of personal autonomy.”     

Structure Disclosed. Replete Moments and Aesthetic Experience in Reading Novels

ABSTRACT

Despite the huge interest in different philosophical questions surrounding literature, particularly analytic philosophers have had relatively little to say about literature’s specifically aesthetic character. Peter Kivy has developed this antiaesthetic tendency furthest, ultimately denying that the reading of prose literature has any deep aesthetic content. Building on Alan Goldman’s and John Dewey’s work on aesthetic experience, I argue that a key literary feature of novels I single out – what I term a replete moment – has the potential to trigger in readers significant aesthetic experiences. Along with revealing aesthetic aspects in reading that Kivy’s position does not cover, my account shows that contemplation of the overall structure of the novel is not the sole, more substantial form aesthetic experience can take in the case of reading, as Kivy’s formalistic literary aesthetics assumes. This conclusion is argued to be significant also for the general philosophical discussion on aesthetic experience. An analysis of a key passage in John Irving’s A Prayer for Owen Meany is an important part of the view of literary aesthetic experience put forth.     

A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES: COMMENT

Abstract. The educational controversies that Martin Eger discusses regarding moral education and the teaching of "creationism" arise from taking a single aspect of moral education and making it the whole, and from taking a single aspect of scientific work and assuming that it is the whole. The distinction between teaching science as application and teaching it as education is crucial in confronting these problems.     

Wie Natürlich ist das System der Natürlichen Deduktion?

How natural is natural deduction?– Gentzen's system of natural deduction intends to fit logical rules to the effective mathematical reasoning in order to overcome the artificiality of deductions in axiomatic systems (¶ 2). In spite of this reform some of Gentzen's rules for natural deduction are criticised by psychologists and natural language philosophers for remaining unnatural. The criticism focuses on the principle of extensionality and on formalism of logic (¶ 3). After sketching the criticism relatively to the main rules, I argue that the criteria of economy, simplicity, pertinence etc., on which the objections are based, transcend the strict domain of logic and apply to arguments in general (¶ 4). (¶ 5) deals with Frege's critique of the concept of naturalness as regards logic. It is shown that this concept means a regression into psychologism and is exposed to the same difficulties as are: relativity, lack of precision, the error of arguing from `is' to `ought' (the naturalistic fallacy). Despite of these, the concept of naturalness plays the role of a diffuse ideal which favours the construction of alternative deductive systems in contrast to the platonic conception of logic (¶ 6).