Emotions and adulterous love in 19th century Paris: The letters of Adèle Schunck and Aimé Guyet de Fernex (1824–1849)

In Paris, between 1824 and 1849, Adèle Schunck and Aimé Guyet de Fernex had an illicit relationship in perfect secrecy. This article discusses the place of emotion in the 1500 letters of the two lovers. Analysis, in their words, of the experience and epistolary expression of feelings of love and of the deep emotional turmoil that this generates, leads to describe them as characteristic figures of the Romantic rhetoric. Because of society's disapproval of their love, they are not allowed to express their emotions openly: hence, it is in Nature that the lovers find a link to their feelings.     

Higher Pantheism

Romantic sensibility and political necessity led Humphry Davy, Britain's most prominent scientist in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, to pantheism: nature worship, involving for him a fervent belief in the immortality of the soul. Rapt with a vision of sublimity, from mountain tops or balloons, men of science in succeeding generations also found in pantheism a reason for their vocation and a way of making sense of their world. It should be seen as an alternative both to active participation in church life (like Faraday's) and to a gritty agnosticism (like Huxley's), indicating again how subtle and complex relationships were between science and religion in the nineteenth century.     

The Romantic Absolute

In this article I argue that the Early German Romantics understand the absolute, or being, to be an infinite whole encompassing all the things of the world and all their causal relations. The Romantics argue that we strive endlessly to know this whole but only acquire an expanding, increasingly systematic body of knowledge about finite things, a system of knowledge which can never be completed. We strive to know the whole, the Romantics claim, because we have an original feeling of it that motivates our striving. I then examine two different Romantic accounts of this feeling. The first, given by Novalis, is that feeling gives us a kind of access to the absolute which logically precedes any conceptualisation. I argue that this account is problematic and that a second account, offered by Friedrich Schlegel, is preferable. On this account, we feel the absolute in that we intuit it aesthetically in certain natural phenomena. This form of intuition is partly cognitive and partly non-cognitive, and therefore it motivates us to strive to convert our intuition into full knowledge.     

Nature and Nationhood: Danish Perspectives

In this paper, I shall discuss Danish perspectives on nature, showing the interdependence of conceptions of ‘nature’ and ‘nationhood’ in the formations of a particular cultural community. Nature, thus construed, is never innocent of culture and cannot therefore simply be ‘restored’ to some pristine, pre-lapsarian state. On the other hand, invocations of nature are effectively calls to action, often of a sort that involves a degree of (limited) restoration and conservation.     

Style in Philosophy: Parts II and III

The essential task of the philosophy of style is to uncover the irreducibility of the singular to any kind of universal, static structure or metalinguistic code. Style is not only a surplus element that exceeds propositional meaning, but also a clue of the ineradicable contingency of "intersubjective"-communicational relationships. The receiver must respect the unique individuality of the sender's style as what demonstrates the cognitive inexhaustibility of the world. Consequently, philosophy can no longer regard literature as foreign and incorrigible by asserting a radical difference of genre and thereby reserving truth exclusively for itself. Rather, I go on to argue, the difference is merely one of quantity . The picture of the world drawn by literature is simply fuller and richer than any comparatively monochromatic system of philosophical propositions. However, within the history of philosophy, there have been instances when the philosophical import of literature has been accorded its due. One example is the dialogical approach of early German Romanticism. The other example is a writer most frequently considered the purest thinker of philosophical sense and meaning – namely, Ludwig Wittgenstein. I conclude by reading Wittgenstein as a philosopher concerned, above all, with the ineffable that style reveals.     

Uncommon Schools: Stanley Cavell and the Teaching of Walden

Thoreau’s Walden is a text that has been misinterpreted in various ways, one consequence of which is a failure to appreciate its significance as a perfectionist and visionary text for education. This paper explores aspects of what might be called its teaching, especially via the kind of teaching that is offered by Stanley Cavell’s commentary, The Senses of Walden. Walden is considered especially in the light of its conception of language as the “father-tongue” and of the ideas of continual rebirth and departure that are associated with this. References to teaching and learning abound in the book, but it is Thoreau’s specific reference to the need for “uncommon schools” that provides a focus for the present discussion. Paul Standish is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Sheffield. His recent books include The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Education (2003), co-edited with Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers and Richard Smith. He is Editor of the Journal of Philosophy of Education and Co-editor of the online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education.     

The Unnatural Nature of Nature and Nurture: Questioning the Romantic Heritage

From a cultural-historical perspective, nature and nurture (and thus education) are contested concepts. The paper focuses on the nature/nurture debate in the work of William Shakespeare (influenced by Montaigne) and in the Romantic tradition (evidenced by Rousseau and Wordsworth), and argues that while our Romantic inheritance (still highly influential in education) problematises nurture, it tends to mystify nature. Given that conceptions of nature are culturally driven, there is an urgent educational challenge to problematise nature as well as nurture.

Romantic Longings,Moral Ideals,and Democratic Priorities: On Richard Rorty's Use of the Distinction Between the Private and the Public

Abstract

The heart of Richard Rorty's philosophy is his distinction between the private and the public. In the first part of this paper, I highlight the profound influence that the inherited vocabularies of Romanticism and Moralism have had on Rorty's understanding of both the distinction and the problems he intends to solve with it. I also suggest that Rorty shares with Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche philosophical habits that cause him to treat two importantly different problems as one. Once the moral problem is disentangled from the political, it becomes clear that Rorty's distinction is unnecessary to the former and inadequate for the latter. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Rorty's non‐foundationalist pragmatism supports the view that the political problem is best resolved by what I call a democratic mechanism of arbitration. It is the lingering influence of Romanticism and Moralism, I suggest, that is the cause of Rorty's reluctance to embrace fully the political priority of democratic consensus. Finally, I discuss why this analysis of Rorty's liberalism may have implications for the general question of how best to resolve political disputes in pluralist societies.     

Making sense of the study of spirituality: late modernity on trial

ABSTRACT

In this article I offer a meta-theoretical mapping of spirituality studies and its many controversies. I begin by distinguishing between two projects that together constitute the field: the study for and the study of spirituality. I argue a good deal of the confusion surrounding ‘spirituality’ is the result of scholars failing to make this distinction. Next, I outline the few areas of agreement within the study of spirituality in order to illuminate what I consider the issue that defines the field: the merits and shortcomings of late modernity. By late modernity I mean the current era, whose origins can be traced roughly to the 1960s. I then offer a meta-theoretical analysis of the social-cum-political theoretical frameworks commonly used to study spirituality, delineating them according to their assessments of the contemporary epoch. I contend this is a useful and much-needed means of dispelling some of the fuzziness that characterizes the field.