Reducing demand for ineffective health remedies: overcoming the illusion of causality

Abstract

Objective: We tested a novel intervention for reducing demand for ineffective health remedies. The intervention aimed to empower participants to overcome the illusion of causality, which otherwise drives erroneous perceptions regarding remedy efficacy.

Design: A laboratory experiment adopted a between-participants design with six conditions that varied the amount of information available to participants (N?=?245). The control condition received a basic refutation of multivitamin efficacy, whereas the principal intervention condition received a full contingency table specifying the number of people reporting a benefit vs. no benefit from both the product and placebo, plus an alternate causal explanation for inefficacy over placebo.

Main outcome measures: We measured participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for multivitamin products using two incentivized experimental auctions. General attitudes towards health supplements were assessed as a moderator of WTP. We tested generalisation using ratings of the importance of clinical-trial results for making future health purchases.

Results: Our principal intervention significantly reduced participants’ WTP for multivitamins (by 23%) and increased their recognition of the importance of clinical-trial results.

Conclusion: We found evidence that communicating a simplified full-contingency table and an alternate causal explanation may help reduce demand for ineffective health remedies by countering the illusion of causality.     

Priors in perception: Top-down modulation,Bayesian perceptual learning rate,and prediction error minimization

I discuss top-down modulation of perception in terms of a variable Bayesian learning rate, revealing a wide range of prior hierarchical expectations that can modulate perception. I then switch to the prediction error minimization framework and seek to conceive cognitive penetration specifically as prediction error minimization deviations from a variable Bayesian learning rate. This approach retains cognitive penetration as a category somewhat distinct from other top-down effects, and carves a reasonable route between penetrability and impenetrability. It prevents rampant, relativistic cognitive penetration of perception and yet is consistent with the continuity of cognition and perception.     

Mistaking randomness for free will

Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be more freely chosen if it consisted of a random sequence of actions than if it consisted of a deterministic sequence; this was true even when the degree of randomness in agents’ behavior was largely a product of their environments. Together, these findings suggest that randomness in behavior—one’s own or another’s—can be mistaken for free will.     

Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.     

Emotional and motivational reactions to failure: the role of illusions of control and explicitness of feedback

Previous research has found that illusions of control (IOC) can buffer against the emotional consequences of failure and may increase persistence in the face of failure. Theoretical analyses suggest that IOC are most closely related to a better mood and higher motivation if failure feedback is open to reinterpretation. Two experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that explicitness (vs. ambiguousness) of failure feedback moderates the consequences of IOC following a failure experience. In accord with predictions, it was found that IOC were subsequently related to a better mood (Study 1) and higher persistence (Study 2) if individuals received ambiguous task-inherent failure feedback. In contrast, explicit failure feedback seemed to neutralize the beneficial effects of IOC. These results are discussed with respect to the adaptiveness of IOC.

Cognitive biases in aggressive drivers: Does illusion of control drive us off the road?

Anger has been shown to be a motivating factor in aggression and it is widely accepted that driving anger may lead to aggressive driving. However, the link between anger and aggressive driving is likely to be mediated by drivers’ pre-existing cognitive biases and the subsequent situational evaluations made. This study investigated the extent to which optimism bias, illusion of control beliefs and driver anger predict self-reported hostile driving behaviours. A total of 220 licensed drivers (106 men; 114 women) completed a self-report questionnaire measuring trait driving anger, optimism bias, illusion of control and driving behaviour. Structural Equation Modelling showed that trait driving anger and illusion of control beliefs account for 37% of the variance in hostile driving behaviour scores. Optimism biases were unrelated to hostile driving behaviours. Thus, driving anger propensities and feelings of control over the situation, but not a general tendency to underestimate the likelihood of adverse outcomes, predict aggressive driving.     

The Flushtration Count Illusion: Attribute substitution tricks our interpretation of a simple visual event sequence

When faced with a difficult question, people sometimes work out an answer to a related, easier question without realizing that a substitution has taken place (e.g., Kahneman, 2011, Thinking, fast and slow. New York, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux). In two experiments, we investigated whether this attribute substitution effect can also affect the interpretation of a simple visual event sequence. We used a magic trick called the ‘Flushtration Count Illusion’, which involves a technique used by magicians to give the illusion of having seen multiple cards with identical backs, when in fact only the back of one card (the bottom card) is repeatedly shown. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that most participants are susceptible to the illusion, even if they have the visual and analytical reasoning capacity to correctly process the sequence. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that participants construct a biased and simplified representation of the Flushtration Count by substituting some attributes of the event sequence. We discussed of the psychological processes underlying this attribute substitution effect.     

Using optical illusions in the shoulder of a cycle path to affect lateral position

An important factor in single-sided accidents of older cyclists is that they ride off the cycle path onto the verge. Two experiments were performed to assess the feasibility of using virtual 3D objects in the verge to affect the lateral position of bicyclists. In the first experiment, different virtual objects were placed in the shoulder and 1150 passing bicyclists were observed using a fixed camera. The (standard deviation of the) lateral position and speed in four conditions with virtual objects differing in colour, structure, or 3D effect were compared with a control condition in which no virtual objects were applied. In a second experiment, the behaviour of 32 bicyclists aged 50 years or older was measured by mounting two digital action cameras with GPS on the participants’ bicycles. The participants cycled a route of approximately 12 km in which several locations were passed, one of these contained 15 virtual objects similar to the ones used in the first experiment placed in the shoulder of the cycle path. Cyclist behaviour was compared with behaviour at a control location consisting of a solitary two-way cycle path with a grass shoulder. Results indicate that the virtual objects in the tested format had little overall effect on cyclists’ behaviour. However, bicyclists were positioned closer to the virtual objects and the shoulder when they looked at the objects or when they reported that they saw them while cycling. This suggests that the overall visibility of the object design may have been too conservative.     

Let me take the wheel: Illusory control and sense of agency

Illusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with skilful situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalized illusory control in terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration of the relationship between these definitions, or the broader construct of agency. This study used a novel card-guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the relationship between subjective and behavioural illusory control. We compared trials in which participants (a) had no opportunity to exercise illusory control, (b) could exercise illusory control for free, or (c) could pay to exercise illusory control. Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed explicit and implicit sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, confidence was higher when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. In a complementary model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their confidence was high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the Contingency Judgment task, but were not significantly related to Intentional Binding. These results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory control and locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency.