感知到亲子间面孔相似性对亲子虐待的影响：一个双重调节模型

由于体内受精,父亲面临着父亲身份不确定性的风险,亲子间面孔相似性是辨别父亲身份的一个常用的有效线索,因此,父亲往往依据亲子间面孔相似性程度调整着亲子投资。而中国传统文化强调重男轻女,因此,父子间面孔相似性比父女间面孔相似性对父亲的亲子投资的预测效应更强。本研究采用自我报告的方法测量了212名中学生感知到亲子间面孔相似性、亲子虐待以及人口学变量。结果表明:（1）感知到的亲子间面孔相似性与亲子虐待中的精神虐待存在显著的相关,与身体虐待的相关没有达到显著水平;（2）父母的性别显著地调节着感知到亲子间面孔相似性对精神虐待的预测,具体而言, 父子（女）间面孔相似性显著地预测父亲的精神虐待,而母子（女）间面孔相似性对母亲精神虐待的预测没有达到显著水平;（3）进一步的分析表明,子女的性别显著地调节着感知到父子（女）间面孔相似性对父亲精神虐待的影响,具体而言,父子间面孔相似性显著地预测父亲对儿子的精神虐待,但父女间面孔相似性对父亲对女儿的精神虐待的预测没有达到显著水平。研究结果支持并拓展了父亲身份不确定性假设。     

Remarks on Grandi’s Comments

This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”

Challenging the importance of vision for the development of an extrinsic spatial framework: evidence from the blind and sighted

Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its computational credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation-no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine what might be regarded as the "conventional" account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks are not genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks.     

Intentions vs. resemblance: Understanding pictures in typical development and autism

Research has debated whether children reflect on artists’ intentions when comprehending pictures, or instead derive meaning entirely from resemblance. We explore these hypotheses by comparing how typically developing toddlers and low-functioning children with autism (a population impaired in intentional reasoning) interpret abstract pictures. In Experiment 1, both groups mapped familiar object names onto abstract pictures, however, they related the same representations to different 3-D referents. Toddlers linked abstract pictures with intended referents they did not resemble, while children with autism mapped picture-referent relations based on resemblance. Experiment 2 showed that toddlers do not rely upon linguistic cues to determine intended referential relations. Experiment 3 confirmed that the responding of children with autism was not due to perseveration or associative word learning, and also provided independent evidence of their intention-reading difficulties. We argue that typically developing children derive meaning from the social-communicative intentions underlying pictures when resemblance is an inadequate cue to meaning. By contrast, children with autism do not reflect on artists’ intentions and simply relate pictures to whatever they happen to resemble.     

感知到亲子间面孔相似性对亲子虐待的影响：一个双重调节模型

由于体内受精,父亲面临着父亲身份不确定性的风险,亲子间面孔相似性是辨别父亲身份的一个常用的有效线索,因此,父亲往往依据亲子间面孔相似性程度调整着亲子投资。而中国传统文化强调重男轻女,因此,父子间面孔相似性比父女间面孔相似性对父亲的亲子投资的预测效应更强。本研究采用自我报告的方法测量了212名中学生感知到亲子间面孔相似性、亲子虐待以及人口学变量。结果表明:（1）感知到的亲子间面孔相似性与亲子虐待中的精神虐待存在显著的相关,与身体虐待的相关没有达到显著水平;（2）父母的性别显著地调节着感知到亲子间面孔相似性对精神虐待的预测,具体而言, 父子（女）间面孔相似性显著地预测父亲的精神虐待,而母子（女）间面孔相似性对母亲精神虐待的预测没有达到显著水平;（3）进一步的分析表明,子女的性别显著地调节着感知到父子（女）间面孔相似性对父亲精神虐待的影响,具体而言,父子间面孔相似性显著地预测父亲对儿子的精神虐待,但父女间面孔相似性对父亲对女儿的精神虐待的预测没有达到显著水平。研究结果支持并拓展了父亲身份不确定性假设。     

An axiomatization of family resemblance

We invoke concepts from the theory of hypergraphs to give a measure of the closeness of family resemblance, and to make precise the idea of a composite likeness. It is shown that for any positive integer m, for any general term possessing any extent of family resemblance strictly greater than m, there is a taxonomical representation of the term whereby each subordinate taxon has an extent of family resemblance strictly greater than m.     

Hume’s naturalistic theory of representation

Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds.     

How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive

Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because conception is a suggestible faculty, Berkeley’s arguments actually made it the case that he himself couldn’t conceive of mind-independent bodies.

Remarks on Smalligan Marusic’s Comments

The author defends attributing to Berkeley the thesis that we can't conceive of extension in a mind-independent body against criticism from Smalligan Marusic. The author also specifies the resemblance requirements that Berkeley places on conceivability, concedes that the principle that ideas can only be like other ideas is not, strictly speaking, a premise in the Master Argument, and clarifies his views on the relation between possibility and conceivability.