Representation and working memory in early arithmetic

Working memory has been implicated in the early acquisition of arithmetic skill, but the relations among different components of working memory, performance on different types of arithmetic problems, and development have not been explored. Preschool and Grade 1 children completed measures of phonological, visual-spatial, and central executive working memory, as well as nonverbal and verbal arithmetic problems, some of which included irrelevant information. For preschool children, accuracy was higher on nonverbal problems than on verbal problems, and the best and only unique predictor of performance on the standard nonverbal problems was visual-spatial working memory. This finding is consistent with the view that most preschoolers use a mental model for arithmetic that requires visual-spatial working memory. For Grade 1 children, performance was equivalent on nonverbal and verbal problems, and phonological working memory was the best predictor of performance on standard verbal problems. For both age groups, problems with added irrelevant information were substantially more difficult than standard problems, and in some cases measures of the central executive predicted performance. Assessing performance on different components of working memory in conjunction with different types of arithmetic problems provided new insights into the developing relations between working memory and how children do arithmetic.     

Young children's sensitivity to probabilistic phonotactics in the developing lexicon

A series of three experiments examined children's sensitivity to probabilistic phonotactic structure as reflected in the relative frequencies with which speech sounds occur and co-occur in American English. Children, ages 212 and 312 years, participated in a nonword repetition task that examined their sensitivity to the frequency of individual phonetic segments and to the frequency of combinations of segments. After partialling out ease of articulation and lexical variables, both groups of children repeated higher phonotactic frequency nonwords more accurately than they did low phonotactic frequency nonwords, suggesting sensitivity to phoneme frequency. In addition, sensitivity to individual phonetic segments increased with age. Finally, older children, but not younger children, were sensitive to the frequency of larger (diphone) units. These results suggest not only that young children are sensitive to fine-grained acoustic-phonetic information in the developing lexicon but also that sensitivity to all aspects of the sound structure increases over development. Implications for the acoustic nature of both developing and mature lexical representations are discussed.     

A process ontology for persons and their development

Persons are socio-cultural emergents—emerging progressively in the bio-psychological development of the individual. Persons are special kinds of agents, crucially characterized by their abilities to participate in the constitution of emergent social ontologies. I will present a model of these special bio-cultural relationships, and argue that modeling these relationships requires revisions in conceptions about the ontology of social realities, the relationships between agency and cognition, and naturalism and normativity.     

Representations in dynamical embodied agents: re-analyzing a minimally cognitive model agent

Understanding the role of 'representations' in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as 'standing in,' and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a first experiment, no representation can be found, but the relevance of the task is undermined by the fact that agents with no internal states can reach high performance. A simple modification makes the task more "representationally hungry," and in this case, agents' internal states are found to qualify as representations. I conclude by discussing the benefits of reconciling the embodied-dynamical approach with the notion of representation.     

Toddlers benefit from labeling on an executive function search task

Although labeling improves executive function (EF) performance in children older than 3 years, the results from studies with younger children have been equivocal. In the current study, we assessed performance in a computerized multistep multilocation search task with older 2-year-olds. The correct search location was either (a) not marked by a familiar picture or given a distinct label, (b) marked by a familiar picture but not given a distinct label, (c) marked by a familiar picture and labeled by the experimenter, or (d) marked by a familiar picture and labeled by the participant. The results revealed that accuracy improved across conditions such that children made the fewest errors when they generated the label for the hiding location. These findings support the hierarchical competing systems model, which postulates that improved performance can be explained by more powerful representations that guide search behavior.     

Number of sense effects of Chinese disyllabic compounds in the two hemispheres

The current study manipulated the visual field and the number of senses of the first character in Chinese disyllabic compounds to investigate how the related senses (polysemy) of the constituted character in the compounds were represented and processed in the two hemispheres. The ERP results in experiment 1 revealed crossover patterns in the left hemisphere (LH) and the right hemisphere (RH). The sense facilitation in the LH was in favor of the assumption of single-entry representation for senses. However, the patterns in the RH yielded two possible interpretations: (1) the nature of hemispheric processing in dealing with sublexical sense ambiguity; (2) the semantic activation from the separate-entry representation for senses. To clarify these possibilities, experiment 2 was designed to push participants to a deeper level of lexical processing by the word class judgment. The results revealed the sense facilitation effect in the RH. In sum, the current study was in support of the single-entry account for related senses and demonstrated that two hemispheres processed sublexical sense ambiguity in a complementary way.     

从数量表征到数表征：具身认知视角下的人类数能力获得

数能力是数学认知的基本成分。与动物所具有的基本数能力不同,人类不仅具备数量表征能力,更重要的是还拥有对数概念进行表征的数表征能力。虽然具身认知与离身认知都对数概念的表征问题进行了解释,但二者却存在明显理论分歧。具身认知观点主要从具身数量表征和数能力发展的具身认知机制两方面为人类独特数能力的获得提供了理论支撑及实证证据。这启示人们需要重视具身学习在数能力形成实践中的关键作用,重视具身数量表征在数学教学中的作用,仍需进一步揭示其内在的心理和神经基础。     

从表征和认知过程上看表象与知觉、记忆的关系

表象、知觉和记忆是一个整合的认知系统。由于知觉和记忆提供了表象生成的材料,因而三者共享相似的表征,并激活广泛而相似的脑区。然而在认知加工过程上三者存在一定的差异。与知觉相比,表象的编码方式更抽象、更依赖过去经验的参与且处理细节能力更弱;与记忆相比,表象更容易受无关信息的干扰。未来对三者关系的研究应关注不同来源和不同类型的表象与知觉、记忆之间的关系,以及工作记忆在三者关系中所起的作用。     

Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context‐Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects

According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory‐motor features activate sensory‐motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a word's meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a word's meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a word's meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.