Audience Design in Multiparty Conversation

How do speakers design what they say in order to communicate effectively with groups of addressees who vary in their background knowledge of the topic at hand? Prior findings indicate that when a speaker addresses a pair of listeners with discrepant knowledge, that speakers Aim Low, designing their utterances for the least knowledgeable of the two addressees. Here, we test the hypothesis that speakers will depart from an Aim Low approach in order to efficiently communicate with larger groups of interacting partners. Further, we ask whether the cognitive demands of tracking multiple conversational partners' perspectives places limitations on successful audience design. We find that speakers can successfully track information about what up to four of their partners do and do not know in conversation. When addressing groups of 3–4 addressees at once, speakers design language based on the combined knowledge of the group. These findings point to an audience design process that simultaneously represents the perspectives of multiple other individuals and combines these representations in order to design utterances that strike a balance between the different needs of the individuals within the group.     

Les théories implicites de l’intelligence : une question de perspectives ?

IntroductionImplicit theories of intelligence are beliefs that people form regarding the malleability of intelligence. The so-called “growth” and “fixed” mindsets respectively view intelligence as a characteristic that can or cannot be changed. Psychology, as a science, also offers diverging responses. The developmental and differential traditions in the study of intelligence merely provide different answers because they do not focus on the same sources of variability nor on the same dimensions of intelligence.ObjectivesThe research question that guided the present studies was: Are people's naïve theories influenced by the same factors that drive developmental and differential psychologists to different conclusions?MethodIn Study 1, we first assessed participants’ (n = 509) reference norm orientation (i.e. whether they tend to focus on individual or social comparison), using a task in which they had to predict the school results of an hypothetical child. Then we administered a French version of Dweck's (2007) mindset scale. In study 2, we first asked participants (n = 530) to choose between two definitions of intelligence focusing either on its fluid or crystalized dimensions. Then we administered the French Mindset Scale and asked participants to justify their conclusion.ResultsBoth variables of interest (reference norm orientation and preferred definition of intelligence) had a significant effect on the participant's incremental beliefs.ConclusionThe results of the two studies as well as the qualitative analysis of participants’ arguments suggest that mindsets, like scientific theories, partly stem from the fact that the same question regarding intelligence malleability can be approached with two different perspectives.     

Unit price as a useful metric in analyzing effects of reinforcer magnitude.

In this paper, we applied the behavioral-economic concept of unit price to the study of reinforcer magnitude in an attempt to provide a consistent account of the effects of reinforcer magnitude on behavior. Recent research in the experimental analysis of behavior and in behavioral pharmacology suggests that reinforcer magnitude interacts with the schedule of reinforcement to determine response rate and total consumption. The utility of the unit-price concept thus stems from its ability to quantify this interaction as a cost-benefit ratio (i.e., unit price = characteristics of the schedule of reinforcement divided by magnitude of reinforcement). Research employing the unit-price concept has shown that as unit price increases, a positively decelerating function exists for consumption (i.e., a function with an increasingly negative slope, when plotted on log coordinates) and a bitonic function exists for response rate. Based on these findings, the present analysis applied the unit-price concept to those studies of reinforcer magnitude and drug self-administration that examined the effects of reinforcer magnitude on response rate using simple schedules of reinforcement (e.g., fixed-ratio schedule). This resulted in three findings: (a) Reinforcer-magnitude manipulations and schedule manipulations interact in a manner that can be quantified in terms of unit price as benefit and cost factors, respectively; (b) different reinforcer-magnitude manipulations are functionally interchangeable as benefit factors in the unit-price ratio; and (c) these conclusions appear warranted despite the differences in reinforcers (food or drug), species (dogs, monkeys, or rats), and schedules (interval or ratio), and despite the fact that these studies were not designed for a unit-price analysis. In methodological terms, these results provide further evidence that employing the unit-price concept is a parsimonious method for examining the effects of reinforcer magnitude. In theoretical terms, these results suggest that a single process may underlie the effect of combined reinforcer-magnitude and schedule manipulations.     

Behavioral economics of drug self-administration. II. A unit-price analysis of cigarette smoking.

In behavioral economics, the ratio of response requirement to reinforcer magnitude is referred to as unit price. Previous research with nonhuman subjects has demonstrated that (a) comparable amounts of food are consumed at the same unit price even though different response requirements and reinforcer magnitudes comprise that unit price and (b) increases in unit price decrease food consumption in a positively decelerating fashion. The present study assessed the generality of these findings to the cigarette smoking of 5 human volunteers. During approximately 18 3-hr sessions, various combinations of response requirement (fixed-ratio 200, 400, and 1,600) and reinforcer magnitude (1, 2, and 4 puffs per bout) were arranged. Consumption (i.e., the number of puffs) generally was comparable at the same unit price independent of the response requirement and reinforcer magnitude comprising that unit price. In addition, increasing unit price generally decreased consumption in a positively decelerating fashion. These results extend the generality of the unit-price analysis to human cigarette smoking. Moreover, these results further support the position that reinforcer magnitude and response requirement are functionally equivalent and interact to determine consumption. The concept of unit price, by integrating and summarizing the effects of those two operations, provides a more parsimonious explanation of the results than do separate evaluations of the effects of response requirement and reinforcer magnitude.     

MORPHINE TOLERANCE AS A FUNCTION OF RATIO SCHEDULE: RESPONSE REQUIREMENT OR UNIT PRICE?

Key pecking by 3 pigeons was maintained by a multiple fixed-ratio 10, fixed-ratio 30, fixed-ratio 90 schedule of food presentation. Components differed with respect to amount of reinforcement, such that the unit price was 10 responses per 1-s access to food. Acute administration of morphine, l-methadone, and cocaine dose-dependently decreased overall response rates in each of the components. When a rate decreasing dose of morphine was administered daily, tolerance, as measured by an increase in the dose that reduced response rates to 50% of control (i.e., the ED50 value), developed in each of the components; however, the degree of tolerance was smallest in the fixed-ratio 90 component (i.e., the ED50 value increased the least). When the l-methadone dose-effect curve was redetermined during the chronic morphine phase, the degree of cross-tolerance conferred to l-methadone was similar across components, suggesting that behavioral variables may not influence the degree of cross-tolerance between opioids. During the chronic phase, the cocaine dose-effect curve shifted to the right for 2 pigeons and to the left for 1 pigeon, which is consistent with predictions based on the lack of pharmacological similarity between morphine and cocaine. When the morphine, l-methadone, and cocaine dose-effect curves were redetermined after chronic morphine administration ended, the morphine and l-methadone ED50s replicated those obtained prior to chronic morphine administration. The morphine data suggest that the fixed-ratio value (i.e., the absolute output) determines the degree of tolerance and not the unit price.     

Compensating for an Inattentive Audience

The common ground that conversational partners share is thought to form the basic context for language use. According to the classic view, inferences about common ground, or mutual knowledge, are guided by beliefs about the physical, cognitive, and attentional states of one's communicative partners. Here, we provide a first test of the attention assumption for common ground, the proposal that common ground for a co‐present entity—such as an object or an utterance—can only be formed if a person has evidence that his or her partner has also attended to it. In three experiments, a participant speaker and two partners learned names for novel monster pictures as a group. The speaker was then asked to describe the monsters to each partner separately in a referential communication task. The critical manipulation was the (in)attentiveness of one partner at different points in the study. Analysis of the speaker's referring expressions revealed that speakers assumed their partner shared common ground for the monster names only when that partner exhibited engaged attention as the names were learned. These findings provide key and novel support for the classic proposal that formation of common ground critically depends on assumptions about the attentional state of one's conversational partner.     

Producing Pronouns and Definite Noun Phrases: Do Speakers Use the Addressee’s Discourse Model?

We report two experiments that investigated the widely held assumption that speakers use the addressee's discourse model when choosing referring expressions (e.g., Ariel, 1990; Chafe, 1994; Givón, 1983; Prince, 1985), by manipulating whether the addressee could hear the immediately preceding linguistic context. Experiment 1 showed that speakers increased pronoun use (and decreased noun phrase use) when the referent was mentioned in the immediately preceding sentence compared to when it was not, even though the addressee did not hear the preceding sentence, indicating that speakers used their own, privileged discourse model when choosing referring expressions. The same pattern of results was found in Experiment 2. Speakers produced more pronouns when the immediately preceding sentence mentioned the referent than when it mentioned a referential competitor, regardless of whether the sentence was shared with their addressee. Thus, we conclude that choice of referring expression is determined by the referent's accessibility in the speaker's own discourse model rather than the addressee's.     

The use of visual context during the production of referring expressions

Most theories of reference assume that a referent's saliency in the linguistic context determines the choice of referring expression. However, it is less clear whether cognitive factors relating to the nonlinguistic context also have an effect. We investigated whether visual context influences the choice of a pronoun over a repeated noun phrase when speakers refer back to a referent in a preceding sentence. In Experiment 1, linguistic mention as well as visual presence of a competitor with the same gender as the referent resulted in fewer pronouns for the referent, suggesting that both linguistic and visual context determined the choice of referring expression. Experiment 2 showed that even when the competitor had a different gender from the referent, its visual presence reduced pronoun use, indicating that visual context plays a role even if the use of a pronoun is unambiguous. Thus, both linguistic and nonlinguistic information affect the choice of referring expression.