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When branches of a fault tree are pruned, subjects do not fully transfer the probability of those branches to the ‘all other’ category. This underestimation of the catch-all probability has been interpreted as an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ form of the availability bias. The present work replicates this underestimation bias with professional managers. It then demonstrates the effectiveness of a corrective tactic, extending the tree by generating additional causes, and also reveals that more easily retrieved short-term causes dominate the generation process. These results do not differ across managers' culture, education or experience. After evaluating such alternative explanations as category redefinition, we conclude that availability is a major cause, though possibly not the sole cause, of the underestimation bias. 相似文献
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Melissa McBay Merritt 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(3):478-501
For Kant, ‘reflection’ (Überlegung, Reflexion) is a technical term with a range of senses. I focus here on the senses of reflection that come to light in Kant's account of logic, and then bring the results to bear on the distinction between ‘logical’ and ‘transcendental’ reflection that surfaces in the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although recent commentary has followed similar cues, I suggest that it labours under a blind spot, as it neglects Kant's distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic. The foundational text of existing interpretations is a passage in Logik Jäsche that appears to attribute to Kant the view that reflection is a mental operation involved in the generation of concepts from non-conceptual materials. I argue against the received view by attending to Kant's division between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic, identifying senses of reflection proper to each, and showing that none accords well with the received view. Finally, to take account of Kant's notion of transcendental reflection I show that we need to be attentive to the concerns of applied logic and how they inform the domain-relative transcendental logic that Kant presents in the first Critique. 相似文献
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Markus Kohl 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):90-114
This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom. 相似文献
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Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
相似文献
Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
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Louis E. Loeb 《Synthese》2006,152(3):321-338
Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference is justified is part of the data to be explained. Bad argument is therefore excluded as the cause of inductive inference; and there is no good argument to cause it. Does this reinstate the problem of induction, undermining Hume’s own assumption that induction is justified? It does so only if justification must derive from “reason”, from the availability of a cogent argument. Hume rejects this internalist thesis; induction’s favorable epistemic status derives from features of custom, the mechanism that generates inductive beliefs. Hume is attracted to this externalist posture because it provides a direct explanation of the epistemic achievements of children and non-human animals—creatures that must rely on custom unsupplemented by argument. 相似文献
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James DiCenso 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):161-179
This paper engages Freud’s relation to Kant, with specific reference to each theorist’s articulation of the interconnections
between ethics and religion. I argue that there is in fact a constructive approach to ethics and religion in Freud’s thought,
and that this approach can be better understood by examining it in relation to Kant’s formulations on these topics. Freud’s
thinking about religion and ethics participates in the Enlightenment heritage, with its emphasis on autonomy and rationality,
of which Kant’s model of practical reason is in many ways exemplary. At the same time, Freud advances Kantian thinking in
certain important respects; his work offers a more somatically, socially, and historically grounded approach to the formation
of rational and ethical capacities, and hence makes it more compatible with contemporary concerns and orientations that eschew
the pitfalls of ahistorical idealist orientations. 相似文献
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Motohide Saji 《Human Studies》2009,32(2):201-223
This article examines Kant’s discussion of the division between reason and unreason in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. On the one hand, Kant says that there is a normative, clear, and definite division between reason and unreason. On the other
hand, Kant offers three arguments showing that we cannot draw such a division. First, we cannot explain the normative grounds
for the division. Second, both reason and unreason are present in everyone to varying degrees in different ways. Third, Kant
invalidates the division as such by characterizing what should be more incomprehensible than an extreme case of unreason as
also being a rational way of life.
相似文献
Motohide SajiEmail: |
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Owen Anderson 《Sophia》2008,47(2):201-222
In ‘The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology’ I argue that there are four important presuppositions
behind John Hick’s form of religious pluralism that successfully support it against what I call fideistic exclusivism. These
are i) the ought/can principle, ii) the universality of religious experience, iii) the universality of redemptive change,
and iv) a view of how God (the Eternal) would do things. I then argue that if these are more fully developed they support
a different kind of exclusivism, what I call rational exclusivism, and become defeaters for pluralism. In order to explain
rational exclusivism and its dependence on these presuppositions I consider philosophers J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig,
and Alvin Plantinga, who offer arguments for their forms of exclusivism but I maintain that they continue to rely on fideism
at important points. I then give an example of how knowledge of the Eternal can be achieved.
相似文献
Owen AndersonEmail: |