The neurotic paradox and self-punitive behavior in humans

Human subjects learned a key-pressing response in order to avoid or escape shock. The reinforcement contingencies were then changed to punishment or to regular nonpunished extinction. The locus of shock onset and offset was systematically varied during the punishment phase. More subjects reported awarencess of the change in the nonpunished extinction group. By inference, the punished groups responded more, and thus the results appear analogous to animal studies on vicious circle, self-punitive responding. Discriminability of change from acquisition to extinction appeared to affect detection of the change.     

Maintenance and generalization of a semantic rehearsal strategy in educable mentally retarded children

Two groups of 11- to 12-year-old educable mentally retarded children, equated on the basis of a free recall pretest, were given a series of lists for free recall. Approximately half the subjects were trained in the use of a strategy designed to induce deeper level semantic encoding and the discovery of categorical relationships and half constituted a “no-training” control group with standard free recall instructions. The subjects received either related or unrelated lists during the training phase and related or unrelated lists during two post-tests, immediately following and 1 week after training. There was evidence not only that the semantic strategy was maintained over the 1-week delay, but that it also generalized to word lists unlike those used during training. The degree of generalization was greater for those subjects receiving related lists during training.     

Style in Philosophy: Part I

In this article, I attempt to restore the philosophical significance of that nonformalizable, noniterable, "singular' element of natural language that I call "style." I begin by critically addressing the exclusion of such instances of natural language by both semantics-oriented logical analysis and a restricted variation of structuralist linguistics. Despite the obvious advantages – with regard to style – of "pragmatic"approaches to language, such pragmatism merely returns to rule-determination in the guise of "normativity." Although style by definition resists any kind of rule-determination – whether posed in terms of semantics or intersubjective regulations of speech-acts – there can be no consideration of language that ignores the persistence of style in natural language. In terms of cognition, any discursive agent understands more than allowed by either semantics or speech-act theory. I ascribe this element of excessive signification to the role of style. My principal thesis is twofold: (1) a hermeneutic approach (exemplified by Schleiermacher) to literature should reveal the heuristically decisive role played by style in philosophy; and, more radically still, (2) style, in fact, may be crucially determinative of philosophical discourse in general. I suggest that a closer scrutiny of the lesser-known works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, conventionally regarded as having dreamt of a "philosophy without style," may consolidate the restoration of style's philosophical import.     

What is the Accordion Effect?

In "Action and Responsibility,' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion effect is supposed by Feinberg to be, on differences between Feinberg's understanding of this idea and that of Donald Davidson, and on the interaction between Feinberg's discussion of the accordion effect and his critique of the voluntary intervention principle.     

Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk‐Psychological Explanation

Abstract

Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively becaue of one reason. Folk psychology appears to allow for this phenomenon. However, appreciation of ‘rationalization’ as a form of contrastive explanation reveals the existence of the Davidsonian possibility to the problematic. Claims that ‘I did it because of R₁, not because of R₂’ are entertained in folk psychology, and may be sincere or insincere. But as reports of conscious practical reasoning, even when sincere, they are not authoritative about the mechanism of motivation.     

Rorty's Debt to Sellarsian Metaphysics

Rorty regards himself as furthering the project of the Enlightenment by separating Enlightenment liberalism from Enlightenment rationalism. To do so, he rejects the very need for explicit metaphysical theorizing. Yet his commitments to naturalism, nominalism, and the irreducibility of the normative come from the metaphysics of Wilfrid Sellars. Rorty's debt to Sellars is concealed by his use of Davidsonian arguments against the scheme/content distinction and the nonsemantic concept of truth. The Davidsonian arguments are used for Deweyan ends: to advance secularization and anti‐authoritarianism. However, Rorty's conflation of theology and metaphysics conceals the possibility of post‐theological metaphysics. The key distinction lies between “metaphysics” and “Metaphysics.” The former provisionally models the relations between different vocabularies; the latter continues theology by other means. Sellars shows how to do metaphysics without Metaphysics. This approach complements Rorty's prioritization of cultural politics over ontology and his vision of Enlightenment liberalism without Enlightenment rationalism.     

Trying in some way

Most discussions about trying assume that the expression ‘person P's trying to ?’ refers to a particular of some sort. These discussions then differ amongst themselves about to which metaphysical type these particulars belong: mental particulars, brain states, or physical actions are three of the most obvious candidates. This paper examines that assumption and in particular considers an argument of Davidsonian inspiration that might be used in its favour, which is based on the fact that the verb ‘try’ appears to take adverbial modification. Reasons are offered for rejecting this Davidsonian line of argument. A further argument for rejecting the assumption that ‘P's trying to ?’ is a genuinely referring expression is modelled on Jonathan Bennett's discussion of event names.     

Soames on Quine and Davidson

A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II.