A rating formulation for ordered response categories

A rating response mechanism for ordered categories, which is related to the traditional threshold formulation but distinctively different from it, is formulated. In addition to the subject and item parameters two other sets of parameters, which can be interpreted in terms of thresholds on a latent continuum and discriminations at the thresholds, are obtained. These parameters are identified with the category coefficients and the scoring function of the Rasch model for polychotomous responses in which the latent trait is assumed uni-dimensional. In the case where the threshold discriminations are equal, the scoring of successive categories by the familiar assignment of successive integers is justified. In the case where distances between thresholds are also equal, a simple pattern of category coefficients is shown to follow.This work was conducted in part in the first half of 1977 while the author was on study leave at the Danish Institute for Educational Research. The Institute provided required research facilities while The University of Western Australia provided financial support.     

The Effect of Evidential Impact on Perceptual Probabilistic Judgments

In a series of three behavioral experiments, we found a systematic distortion of probability judgments concerning elementary visual stimuli. Participants were briefly shown a set of figures that had two features (e.g., a geometric shape and a color) with two possible values each (e.g., triangle or circle and black or white). A figure was then drawn, and participants were informed about the value of one of its features (e.g., that the figure was a “circle”) and had to predict the value of the other feature (e.g., whether the figure was “black” or “white”). We repeated this procedure for various sets of figures and, by varying the statistical association between features in the sets, we manipulated the probability of a feature given the evidence of another (e.g., the posterior probability of hypothesis “black” given the evidence “circle”) as well as the support provided by a feature to another (e.g., the impact, or confirmation, of evidence “circle” on the hypothesis “black”). Results indicated that participants’ judgments were deeply affected by impact, although they only should have depended on the probability distributions over the features, and that the dissociation between evidential impact and posterior probability increased the number of errors. The implications of these findings for lower and higher level cognitive models are discussed.     

Alterations in shock-induced fighting and locomotor activity following intracerebroventricular injection of hydrocortisone in the rat

Three experiments were conducted in an attempt to clarify the facilitatory influence of hydrocortisone on shock-induced fighting in rats. Results of the first experiment indicated a biphasic, dose-dependent action of intraventricularly-administered hydrocortisone. Low (25 μg) and intermediate (50 μg) doses both facilitated fighting whilst the high (100 μg) dose exerted a potent suppressant effect. Two control tests were performed to determine whether alterations in pain reactivity or locomotor activity could have accounted for the observed changes in fighting behaviour. None of the treatments altered shock thresholds (Experiment 2) but whilst neither low nor intermediate doses affected activity measures, the high dose preferentially reduced vertical activity (Experiment 3).     

A Fuzzy Goal Programming Formulation with Multiple Target Levels

The essential activity of a manager is decision making, which is becoming more and more complex, mainly in the multi‐criteria problems. Multi‐choice goal programming (MCGP) is considered as a robust tool in operational research to solve this type of problem. However, in real world problems, determining precise targets for the goals is a difficult task. To deal with such situation, Tabrizi introduced and used in 2012 the concept of membership functions in the MCGP model in order to model the targets fuzziness of each goal. In their model, they considered just only one type of functions (triangular form), which does not reflect adequately the decision maker's preferences that are considered as an essential element for modelling the goal's fuzziness. Their model is called Fuzzy MCGP. In this paper, new ideas are presented to reformulate MCGP model to tackle all types of functions by introducing the (decision maker's) preferences. The concept of indifference thresholds is used in the new formulation for characterizing the imprecision and the preferences associated with all types of the goals. The proposed formulation provides useful insight about the solution of a new class of problems. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity and strength of the new formulation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Development of Different Forms of Skill Learning Throughout the Lifespan

The acquisition of complex motor, cognitive, and social skills, like playing a musical instrument or mastering sports or a language, is generally associated with implicit skill learning (SL). Although it is a general view that SL is most effective in childhood, and such skills are best acquired if learning starts early, this idea has rarely been tested by systematic empirical studies on the developmental pathways of SL from childhood to old age. In this paper, we challenge the view that childhood and early school years are the prime time for skill learning by tracking age‐related changes in performance in three different paradigms of SL. We collected data from participants between 7 and 87 years for (1) a Serial Reaction Time Task (SRT) testing the learning of motor sequences, (2) an Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task testing the extraction of regularities from auditory sequences, and (3) Probabilistic Category Learning in the Weather Prediction task (WP), a non‐sequential categorization task. Results on all three tasks show that adolescence and adulthood are the most efficient periods for skill learning, since instead of becoming less and less effective with age, SL improves from childhood into adulthood and then later declines with aging.     

Satisfiability Decay along Conjunctions of Pseudo-Random Clauses

k-SAT is a fundamental constraint satisfaction problem. It involvesS(m), the satisfaction set of the conjunction of m clauses,each clause a disjunction of k literals. The problem has manytheoretical, algorithmic and practical aspects. When the clauses are chosen at random it is anticipated (butnot fully proven) that, as the density parameter m/n (n thenumber of variables) grows, the transition of S(m) to beingempty, is abrupt: It has a "sharp threshold", with probability1 – o(1). In this article we replace the random ensemble analysis by apseudo-random one: Derive the decay rule for individual sequencesof clauses, subject to combinatorial conditions, which in turnhold with probability 1 – o(1). This is carried out under the big relaxation that k is not constantbut k = log n , or even r log log n . Then the decay of S isslow, "near-perfect" (like a radioactive decay), which entailssharp thresholds for the transition-time of S below any givenlevel, down to S = .     

Prior distributions for random choice structures

We study various axioms of discrete probabilistic choice, measuring how restrictive they are, both alone and in the presence of other axioms, given a specific class of prior distributions over a complete collection of finite choice probabilities. We do this by using Monte Carlo simulation to compute, for a range of prior distributions, probabilities that various simple and compound axioms hold. For example, the probability of the triangle inequality is usually many orders of magnitude higher than the probability of random utility. While neither the triangle inequality nor weak stochastic transitivity imply the other, the conditional probability that one holds given the other holds is greater than the marginal probability, for all priors in the class we consider. The reciprocal of the prior probability that an axiom holds is an upper bound on the Bayes factor in favor of a restricted model, in which the axiom holds, against an unrestricted model. The relatively high prior probability of the triangle inequality limits the degree of support that data from a single decision maker can provide in its favor. The much lower probability of random utility implies that the Bayes factor in favor of it can be much higher, for suitable data.     

Decision Making with Uncertain Reinforcement in Children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

Reward-related processes are impaired in children with ADHD. Whether these deficits can be ascribed to an aversion to delay or to an altered responsiveness to magnitude, frequency, valence, or the probability of rewards still needs to be explored. In the present study, children with ADHD and normal controls aged 7 to 10 years performed a simple probabilistic discounting task. They had to choose between alternatives where the magnitude of rewards was inversely related to the probability of outcomes. As a result, children with ADHD opted more frequently for less likely but larger rewards than normal controls. Shifts of the response category after positive or negative feedback, however, occurred as often in children with ADHD as in control children. In children with ADHD, the frequency of risky choices was correlated with neuropsychological measures of response time variability but unrelated to measures of inhibitory control. It is concluded that the tendency to select less likely but larger rewards possibly represents a separate facet of dysfunctional reward processing, independent of delay aversion or altered responsiveness to feedback.     

A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and conditional probabilistic reasoning

Hindsight bias is a mistaken belief that one could have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. Choi and Nisbett (2000 Choi, I. and Nisbett, R. E. 2000. Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 890–905. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) reported that Koreans showed stronger hindsight bias than Americans, and explained the results using the distinction between analytic cognition (Westerners) and holistic cognition (Easterners). The purpose of the present study was to see whether hindsight bias is stronger among Easterners than among Westerners using a probability judgement task, and to test an “explicit–implicit” hypothesis and a “rule-dialectics” hypothesis. We predicted that the implicit process is more active among Easterners to generate hindsight bias, and that Easterners are more dialectical thinkers, whereas Westerners are more rule-based thinkers. French, British, Japanese, and Korean participants were asked to make probabilistic judgements in a Good Samaritan scenario (Experiment 1) and in a scenario including conditional probabilistic judgement (Experiment 2). In both Experiments, we presume that the implicit revision of causal models is made just by being given unexpected outcome information, and that explicit revision is made by being asked to point out possible factors for an unexpected outcome. In the results Easterners showed greater hindsight bias generally and it was greater in the Good Samaritan scenario. We conclude that the reason why hindsight bias was lower among Westerners is primarily that they tried to follow a rule to suppress the bias.     

Keep or trade? Effects of pay-off range on decisions with the two-envelops problem

The “two-envelops” problem has stimulated much discussion on probabilistic reasoning, but relatively little experimentation. The problem specifies two identical envelopes, one of which contains twice as much money as the other. You are given one of the envelopes and the option of keeping it or trading for the other envelope. Variables of interest include the possible amounts of money involved, what is known about the process by which the amounts of money were assigned to the envelopes, and whether you are allowed to know how much money is in the envelope in hand before deciding whether to keep or trade. In an earlier study, Butler and Nickerson found that when participants were allowed to know how much was in the envelope in hand, they generally elected to trade if that amount was small relative to the range of possibilities and to keep otherwise. The present experiments showed that this propensity was independent of the amount of money in the envelopes. Participants made decisions with a strong bias for avoiding the risk of losing by trading, particularly when the amount in hand was known and large relative to the range of possible amounts, regardless of the absolute value of the gamble. The results illustrate the dependence of thinking on the context in which it occurs, and demonstrate a tendency to treat quantities that are large or small relative to a particular context in which they are encountered as though they were large or small in a more general sense.