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‘Abd al-Rasul ‘Ubudiyyat 《Topoi》2007,26(2):201-212
It would not be an overstatement to say that Mulla Sadra’s metaphysical system—commonly known as transcendent philosophy or transcendent wisdom (hikmat muta‘aliyyah)—is founded on the fundamentality of existence and the subjectivity of quiddity or whatness. I will begin this essay by drawing
a rather simple picture of this principle under the title “A Common Error.” Then I will proceed by explaining its background
and the reasoning supporting it, while offering a more detailed elucidation of the problem. The essay will end by examining
two recent interpretations that have gone to extremes in describing quiddity’s subjective nature.
This article was written in Farsi specifically for this edition of Topoi and was translated by D. D. Sodagar and Muhammad Legenhausen.
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Michael Rescorla 《Synthese》2009,169(1):175-200
I argue that maps do not feature predication, as analyzed by Frege and Tarski. I take as my foil (Casati and Varzi, Parts and places, 1999), which attributes predication to maps. I argue that the details of Casati and Varzi’s own semantics militate against
this attribution. Casati and Varzi emphasize what I call the Absence Intuition: if a marker representing some property (such as mountainous terrain) appears on a map, then absence of that marker from
a map coordinate signifies absence of the corresponding property from the corresponding location. Predication elicits nothing
like the Absence Intuition. “F(a)” does not, in general, signify that objects other than a lack property F. On the basis of this asymmetry, I argue that attaching a marker to map coordinates is a different mode of semantic composition
than attaching a predicate to a singular term. 相似文献
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