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Jody Graham 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):397-423
Abstract Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ‘Propositional Account’. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non‐propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a ‘non‐conciliatory’ attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non‐propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non‐propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense. 相似文献
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Jeff McMahan 《The Journal of Ethics》2005,9(3-4):353-380
This paper defends “moral individualism” against various arguments that have been intended to show that membership in the
human species or participation in our distinctively human form of life is a sufficient basis for a moral status higher than
that of any animal. Among the arguments criticized are the “nature-of-the-kind argument,” which claims that it is the nature
of all human beings to have certain higher psychological capacities, even if, contingently, some human beings lack them, and
various versions of the idea that there is a special form of life that all human beings share but of which no animal can be
a full participant. The paper concludes that none of these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that there are moral reasons
to permit animals to be treated less well than members of our own species whose psychological capacities and potential are
no higher than those of the animals. 相似文献
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