Empowering Muslim children’s spirituality in Malay Archipelago: integration between National Philosophical Foundations and Tawakkul (trust in God)

Multiple studies indicated that children raised to be spiritual were found to be happier, have more resilience and positive outlook towards life events. This paper attempts to explore and integrate the value of spirituality and religious practices. It is approached through the understanding and application of the tawakkul (trust in God) concept, as perceived from an Islamic viewpoint. This aspect is explored through the consolidation of the ‘believing in God’ component, as highlighted in the National Philosophical Foundations in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia to tawakkul. It will further seek to find the prospect of empowering Muslim children’s spirituality through such integration. This theoretical paper is based on the Islamic foundations and characteristics; its implementation and implications. The outcome illustrates indication of ‘divine involvement’ as the main essence of tawakkul; resulting sustainable religious, spiritual and moral enhancement. Moreover, an internalised and implicit form of tawakkul should be encouraged to promote self-understanding.     

In the Vicinity of the Human

Abstract

Beginning with the situated character of the question concerning the human, this paper argues that the problem of the human is itself inextricably bound to the problem of situation or place. Consequently, any genuine philosophical anthropology must take the form of a philosophical topology. This line of argument is developed through the work Abraham Heschel, Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber, and also Helmut Plessner.     

Not Always Enslaved,Yet Not Quite Free: Philosophical Challenges from the Underside of the New World

This article is the keynote address of the University of the West Indies at Cave Hill, Barbados, philosophy symposium in celebration of the 200th Anniversary of the British outlawing the Atlantic Slave Trade. The paper explores questions of enslavement and freedom through challenges of philosophical anthropology, philosophy of social change, and metacritical reflections posed by African Diasporic or Africana philosophy. Such challenges include the relevance and legitimacy of philosophical reflection to the lives of racialized slaves and concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for an understanding of the “face” of political life and the importance of the concept of “home” for a cogent theory of freedom.

Intuition and Philosophical Methodology

Intuition serves a variety of roles in contemporary philosophy. This paper provides a historical discussion of the revival of intuition in the 1970s, untangling some of the ways that intuition has been used and offering some suggestions concerning its proper place in philosophical investigation. Contrary to some interpretations of the results of experimental philosophy, it is argued that generalized skepticism with respect to intuition is unwarranted. Intuition can continue to play an important role as part of a methodologically conservative stance towards philosophical investigation. I argue that methodological conservatism should be sharply distinguished from the process of evaluating individual propositions. Nevertheless, intuition is not always a reliable guide to truth and experimental philosophy can serve a vital ameliorative role in determining the scope and limits of our intuitive competence with respect to various areas of inquiry.

Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy

Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.

“For a New World”: On the practical impulse of Husserlian theory

The thesis of this article is that in Husserlian phenomenology there is no opposition between theory and praxis. On the contrary, he understands the former to serve the latter, so as to usher in a new world. The means for doing is the phenomenological reduction or epoché. It gives the phenomenologist access to the starting point, the “first things,” and orients his/her striving towards reason and the renewal of humanity. Careful attention to the significance of the epoché also sheds light on Husserl’s understanding of the relationship of phenomenology not only to philosophy but also to the other sciences. Though an exposition of the “phenomenology of the philosophical vocation” which Husserl sketched in the 1920s, e.g., in his Kaizo articles and lectures on first philosophy, the author seeks to shore up his thesis. For Walter Biemel     

论孟子哲学及其贡献

孟子认为,仁义价值等是人的本性。价值是人的标志。它具有首先性、主体性。诚是善良的人性本体的现实化。可是性善说显然无法自圆其说。这便是人性悖论。义内说表明,陈述同样具有主体性。主体对对象的把握方式是推恩。推恩是一种感应方式。被感应的对象,有时候被称为神。     

Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence

Some philosophers have recently defended anti-intellectualism with respect to knowledge and evidence. In this paper, I assess anti-intellectualism about evidence, which claims a relation between one's evidence and the practical benefits or costs of being right or wrong about the propositions supported by that evidence. Proponents of anti-intellectualism generally regard their view as not at all obvious, but nonetheless strongly supported by appeal to our intuitive judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases. Anti-Intellectualism is thus taken by its proponents to be a surprising truth. I show that, though peoples’ explicit judgments about the general issue of whether or not non-epistemic factors make an epistemic difference are often in line with anti-intellectualism, their judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases do not display a pattern that would clearly support anti-intellectualism about evidence. Thus, anti-intellectualism about evidence is not entirely surprising, and intuitive assessments of hypothetical cases do not clearly support its truth.     

Rethinking Transcendence: Heidegger,Plessner and the Problem of Anthropology

Abstract

In times of the Anthropocene, we are in need of philosophical anthropology, revisiting the question concerning the human condition. I suggest rethinking what one may call ‘human transcendence’ in terms of a responsivist paradigm. Drawing on Heidegger and Plessner, the idea is that we should think of the eccentric or ecstatic position of the human in terms of something we undergo, instead of it being a human capability or something we do. It is a gift, emplacing us to the time-space of responsive embodied existence. The paper will follow this agenda in five steps. Having introduced what I take to be the challenge for a timely ontology, I will unfold the problem entailed in the very idea of philosophical anthropology according to Heidegger. I then focus on Heidegger’s (hidden) rapprochement to Helmuth Plessner’s anthropology, recalling Plessner’s analysis of laughter as a bodily expression displaying the ‘eccentric positionality’ of the human. I suggest rephrasing this kind of transcendence in a responsivist paradigm: Humans are responsive beings.     

African and Islamic philosophy: Expanding the horizons of philosophical counselling

Philosophical counselling has traditionally utilized a limited number of philosophical traditions: Existentialism, Stoicism, and the employment of Socratic dialogues being the most common ones. Focusing on a limited number of philosophical views does not exploit the potential therapeutic value of many other philosophical traditions, and may enhance dogmatism. In this paper we illustrate the need for a wider philosophical toolkit by showing the potential value of two rarely-employed philosophical traditions: African and Islamic philosophy. From the plethora of issues in these philosophical traditions, we highlight the relevance of African philosophy to conflicts between social duties and individual desires, and the relevance of Islamic philosophy to conflicts between faith and reason. We then emphasize the relevance of these philosophies in the current social and political situation in the Western world in general, and in Europe in particular.