Perseverative responding in a violation-of-expectation task in 6.5-month-old infants

In the present research, 6.5-month-old infants perseverated in a violation-of-expectation task designed to examine their reasoning about width information in containment events. After watching a familiarization event in which a ball was lowered into a wide container, the infants failed to detect the violation in a test event in which the same ball was lowered into a container only half as wide as the ball (narrow-container test event). This negative result (which was replicated in another experiment) was interpreted in terms of a recent problem-solving account of infants' perseverative errors in various means-end tasks (Aguiar, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Perseveration and problem solving in infancy. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 27, pp. 135-180). San Diego, CA: Academic Press). It was assumed that the infants in the present experiments (1) did not attend to the relative widths of the ball and container in their initial analysis of the narrow-container test event, (2) categorized the event as similar to the familiarization event shown on the preceding trials, and (3) retrieved the expectation they had formed for that event ("the ball will fit into the container"), resulting in a perseverative error. This interpretation was supported by additional experiments in which different modifications were introduced that led to non-perseverative responding, indicating that 6.5-month-old infants could detect the violation in the narrow-container test event. The present findings are important for several reasons. First, they provide the first demonstration of perseverative responding in a violation-of-expectation task. Second, they make clear the breadth and usefulness of the problem-solving account mentioned above. Finally, they add to the evidence for some degree of continuity between infants' and adults' problem-solving abilities.     

The role of perceptual similarity of the task environments in children’s perseverative responding

Perseverative responding is often seen in children’s performance in a variety of contexts. One such context is symbolic comprehension in which 2- and 2½-year-olds demonstrate difficulty in appreciating the association of symbols (pictures and scale models) and their referents and show a high proportion of perseverative responding. Representational-level explanations of perseveration were explored in the current studies via examination of the impact of perceptual similarity of visual environments across trials. Across two experiments, children saw either a picture (Experiment 1) or a scale model (Experiment 2) of a hiding location of a room and were then encouraged to recover the toy from an identical room. Manipulating the perceptual similarity of the environments across successive trials affected performance and perseverative responding. These results highlight the critical role played by perceptual information not only in symbolic tasks but also in many other tasks and have important implications for theories of perseveration.     

A simple but powerful test of perseverative search in dogs and toddlers

Perseverative (A-not-B) errors during the search of a hidden object were recently described in both dogs and 10-month-old infants. It was found that ostensive cues indicating a communicative intent of the person who hides the object played a major role in eliciting perseverative errors in both species. However, the employed experimental set-up gave rise to several alternative explanations regarding the source of these errors. Here we present a simplified protocol that eliminates the ambiguities present in the original design. Using five consecutive object hiding events to one of two locations in a fixed order (“AABBA”), we tested adult companion dogs and human children (24 months old). The experimenter performed the hiding actions while giving ostensive cues in each trial and moved the target object to the given location in a straight line. Our results show that in the B trials, both 24-month-old children and dogs could not reliably find the hidden object, and their performance in the first B trials was significantly below that of any of the A trials. These results are the first to show that the tendency for perseverative errors in an ostensive-communicative context is a robust phenomenon among 2-year-old children and dogs, and not the by-product of a topographically elaborate hiding event.     

Refractoriness and the healthy brain: A behavioural study on semantic access

While many behavioural studies on refractory phenomena in lexical/semantic access have focused on the mechanisms involved in the oral production of names, comprehension tasks have been almost exclusively used in neuropsychological studies on brain damaged patients. We report the results of two experiments on healthy participants conducted by means of speeded word to picture matching tasks. They assess the effects of the same variables examined in the study of refractory access dysphasic patients: semantic distance and word frequency (experiment 1) and presentation rate and serial position effects (experiment 2). Semantic access patients usually show little effect of word frequency but a large semantic distance effect. However, critical in characterising the syndrome as ‘refractory’, effects of presentation rate and serial position should also be present. The experiments involved the use of a deadline response procedure. The critical manipulation was the absence of a Response Stimulus Interval (RSI) in the fast presentation rate conditions; slower presentation rates involved 1 s RSI. With these manipulations the typical behavioural pattern of performance provided by semantic access dysphasic patients was reproduced. Semantic distance effects were more powerful than word frequency effects (experiment1). Presentation rate effects were found and, most important for a “refractory” account of the effects, a serial position effect was obtained (experiment 2). These results provide the first evidence of such a broad range of refractory effects at the same time in comprehension tasks in healthy subjects and support a purely semantic account for the locus of refractoriness. Moreover, error analysis showed a predominance of perseverative errors with subsequent representations of the same target, supporting a failure of cognitive control mechanisms as the cause of refractory behaviour. The findings are discussed in the light of current models of lexical and semantic processing.     

Riding a wave of self-esteem: Perseverative tendencies as dispositional forces

Traits, defined in terms of dispositional forces, should be more consequential to the extent that the person favors old, activated behaviors to new ones. On the basis of this idea, the current studies measured individual differences in perseveration, defined in terms of tendencies toward response facilitation (i.e., RT speedup) when consecutive trials of choice reaction time tasks require repeated (versus switched) responses. Using global self-esteem as the trait measure of interest, we predicted and found that correlations between self-esteem and relevant outcome measures were particularly strong among individuals high in perseverative tendencies and particularly weak among individuals low in perseverative tendencies. The findings, involving three studies and 208 participants, provide a mechanism by which traits produce trait-relevant outcomes. Specifically, such trait-outcome relations are particular to those who display a tendency to repeat past responses in their cognitive transactions with the environment.     

Two types of perseveration in the Dimension Change Card Sort task

In the Dimension Change Card Sort (DCCS) task, 3-year-olds can sort cards well by one dimension but have difficulty in switching to sort the same cards by another dimension when asked; that is, they perseverate on the first relevant information. What is the information that children perseverate on? Using a new version of the DCCS, the experiments in this article reveal that there are two types of perseverators: those who perseverate at the level of dimensions and those who perseverate at the level of values (stimulus features). This novel finding has implications for theories of perseveration.     

Differential effects of inactivation of the orbitofrontal cortex on strategy set-shifting and reversal learning

Different subregions of the rodent prefrontal cortex (PFC) mediate dissociable types of behavioral flexibility. For example, lesions of the medial or orbitofrontal (OFC) regions of the PFC impair extradimensional shifts and reversal learning, respectively, when novel stimuli are used during different phases of the task. In the present study, we assessed the effects of inactivation of the OFC on strategy set-shifting and reversal learning, using a maze based set-shifting task mediated by the medial PFC. Long–Evans rats were trained initially on a visual-cue discrimination to obtain food. On the subsequent day, rats had to shift to using a response strategy (e.g., always turn left). On Day 3 (reversal), rats were required to reverse the direction of their turn (e.g., always turn right). Infusions of the local anesthetic bupivacaine into the OFC did not impair initial visual discrimination learning, nor did it impair performance on the set-shift. In contrast, inactivation of the OFC did impair reversal learning; yet, these rats ceased using the previously acquired response rule as readily as controls. Instead, rats receiving OFC inactivations made a disproportionate number of erroneous arm entries towards the visual-cue, suggested that these animals reverted back to using the original visual-cue based strategy. These findings, in addition to previous data, further support the notion that the OFC and medial PFC play dissociable roles in reversal learning and set-shifting. Furthermore, the lack of effect of OFC inactivations on the set-shift indicates that this type of behavioral flexibility does not require cognitive operations related to reversal learning.     

Perseverative and compulsive-like staring causes uncertainty about perception

Earlier studies have found that perseverative checking provokes memory distrust for checked stimuli, suggesting that compulsive checking is a counter-productive strategy to increase memory confidence. Obsessive Compulsive (OC) uncertainty also occurs for functions other than memory, like perception. Uncertainty about perception in OC patients gives rise to prolonged attending to the issues that patients feel uncertain about. In an experiment with 40 healthy volunteers, it was tested whether OC-like, perseverative (visual) attending induces OC-like experiences of dissociation and perceptual uncertainty. Participants had to look at an object (a gas stove or a light bulb) during a pre-test and a post-test. In between these tests, participants in the experimental condition were asked to stare at an object that was the same as the to-be-looked-at object during the pre/post-tests. Participants in the control condition stared at an object that was different from the object they looked at during pre/post-test. Both in the experimental and control conditions, dissociation was observed; the effects were equally strong. Critically, with regards to OC-like perceptual uncertainty, the effects were significantly stronger in the experimental condition. The findings indicate that OC-like perseveration induces distrust, not only about memory, but also about perception. To explain the results, we suggest that perseveration interferes with spreading of activation and that cognitive uncertainty (and possibly derealisation) is the experiential end-product of perseveration. It is suggested that all forms of OC perseveration share such interference and that all undermine confidence in cognitive operations.     

Compulsive perseveration: empirical criticism on the mood-as-input model

It has been proposed that the "Mood as Input" model provides an explanation of the perseverative nature of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) behaviour (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91). The model implies that task perseveration occurs when individuals (a) experience a bad mood and (b) ask themselves "did I do as much as I can?" In two earlier experiments with healthy participants (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91) it was found that when the allegedly critical conditions were met (negative mood and "did I as much as I can?" stop rule) perseveration occurred on a complex text-correction task. This finding was held to support a "mood as input" explanation of compulsive perseveration. It is important to note, however, that perseveration in clinical samples occurs for very simple "tasks" (e.g. closing a door or washing ones hands) and perseveration does not increase efficacy of performance. In the present study we compared the effects of the original task to effects of text correction tasks that were simpler and more OCD-like. The original effects were replicated: the combination of negative mood and the "did I do as much as I can" stop rule provoked perseveration. Meanwhile, "perseveration" was highly functional: the more "perseveration" the more text-errors were detected. Secondly, to the degree that tasks became simpler and more OCD-like, less checking occurred and the effects of the "did I do as much as I can?" stop rule on detection of errors became smaller. The findings raise questions about the validity of the paradigm as a model of OC perseveration.     

Repeated checking causes distrust in memory but not in attention and perception

Repeated checking to reduce memory distrust seems to be counterproductive: it increases memory distrust. Obsessive-compulsive (OC) patients tend to be uncertain about other cognitive domains as well, like attention and perception. In an experiment with 70 healthy participants, we tested whether perseverative checking induces distrust not only in memory, but also in attention and perception. Participants were administered a computer task in which they had to activate, deactivate, and check threat-irrelevant stimuli, and rate their confidence in memory, attention, and perception in a pre-test and post-test. In between these tests, the relevant checking group performed 20 checks of the same stimuli used in the pre- and post-test. The irrelevant checking group performed 20 checks of different stimuli. Although memory accuracy improved in both groups, repeated checking reduced confidence in memory, vividness, and detail in the relevant checking group, but not in the irrelevant checking group. A trend was found towards a decline in attentional confidence in the relevant checking group only. Perception was not affected by repetitive checking. A replication study revealed similar results of relevant checking on meta-memory, however, the trend for attentional distrust was not confirmed. The results suggest that perseveration may be domain specific, i.e., only the cognitive processes that are subject to perseveration are affected.