排序方式: 共有1条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1
1.
Simon Robertson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):263-277
A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and only if that is what you
have most reason to do. One challenge to this comes from what Jonathan Dancy calls ‘enticing reasons.’ Dancy argues that enticing
reasons never contribute to oughts and that it is false that if the only reasons in play are enticing reasons then you ought
to do what you have most reason to do. After explaining how enticing reasons supposedly work and why accepting them may appear
attractive, I firstly show why we are not committed to accepting them into our conceptual framework and then argue that no
reasons work in the way enticing reasons are claimed to. Thus we should reject the category of enticing reasons entirely.
相似文献
Simon RobertsonEmail: |
1