A general scheme for the analytic decomposition of objective test scores: Illustrative demonstrations using the Rod-and-Frame test and the Müller-Lyer illusion

Objective tests of personality typically include a number of items or trials; the total score on the test is the sum of the subject's “correct” responses across all such trials. Normally, the trials are varied systematically across various facets of the test design, so that the total score represents a composite measure of accuracy averaged across these test facets. However, since only one score is computed for each subject, some potentially important kinds of individual differences—namely all those associated with each particular variation in the test design—are treated solely as measurement unreliability. Such a psychometric stance may serve to obscure more differentiated types of individual differences, with the result that composite scores from trials based on one type of experimental design may not be highly related to such scores from trials using a somewhat different design. The present paper presents a general procedure for scoring objective tests more analytically. To illustrate this general rationale, and to demonstrate its potential utility, data have been reanalyzed from two previous studies, one using the Rod-and-Frame test, the other the Müller-Lyer illusion. In both cases, the traditional global accuracy score did not correlate significantly with other theoretically related variables, while a number of component scores were quite highly related.     

Effect of CS-US pairings on shock-elicited aggression as a function of US intensity

In two experiments with paired rats, the effect of superimposing CS-US pairings on a baseline of shock-elicited aggression was studied. Baseline shocks (3.0 mA, 0.125-sec duration) occurred at a rate of 20 shocks per min throughout each session. In Experiment I, each independent group of two pairs of subjects received (in addition to baseline shocks) US shocks of 1.0, 3.0, or 5.0 mA and 5-sec duration, each shock signalled by a 1-min CS. At all three US intensities, aggression increased during the CS. In Experiment II, pairs of subjects received each unconditioned stimulus intensity in a within-subjects design. This procedure revealed a direct relationship between rate of responding and unconditioned shock intensity.     

What the Liar Taught Achilles

Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the semantic paradoxes of the Liar have long been thought to have metaphorical affinities. There are, in fact, isomorphisms between variations of Zeno's paradoxes and variations of the Liar paradox in infinite-valued logic. Representing these paradoxes in dynamical systems theory reveals fractal images and provides other geometric ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the paradoxes.     

On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

In Defence of Kripkenstein: On Lewis’ Proposed Solution to the Sceptical Argument

Abstract

In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke argues for an extreme form of meaning scepticism. One influential reply to Kripke’s arguments was developed by David Lewis. The reply developed by Lewis makes use of the notion of mind-independent relations of similarity and difference. The aim of the paper is to argue that Lewis’ reply is not satisfactory: the challenge to find a refutation of Kripke’s sceptical arguments remains unmet.     

Against Magnetism

Magnetism in meta-semantics is the view that the meaning of our words is determined in part by their use and in part by the objective naturalness of candidate meanings. This hypothesis is commonly attributed to David Lewis, and has been put to philosophical work by Brian Weatherson, Ted Sider and others. I argue that there is no evidence that Lewis ever endorsed the view, and that his actual account of language reveals good reasons against it.     

Francis Collins,the Skeptics,and Evidence for God

Skeptical Inquirer magazine has published an attempted refutation of Francis Collins' book, The Language of God. The refutation argues that Collins lacks scientific evidence for God and that Collins actually appeals not to evidence, but to personal belief. In refutation of this refutation, Ted Peters argues that Collins plays completely within the rules of scientific discourse while providing rational evidence—though not conclusive proof—for the existence of God as creator and moral lawgiver.     

Truthmakers and necessary connections

In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum.     

Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs

This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account.