Intuitionistic Autoepistemic Logic

In this paper we address the problem of combining a logic with nonmonotonic modal logic. In particular we study the intuitionistic case. We start from a formal analysis of the notion of intuitionistic consistency via the sequent calculus. The epistemic operator M is interpreted as the consistency operator of intuitionistic logic by introducing intuitionistic stable sets. On the basis of a bimodal structure we also provide a semantics for intuitionistic stable sets.     

Question-begging and infinite regress

InMetaphysics , Ch. 4, Aristotle speaks of both infinite regress and question-begging, but does not explicitly relate them. We get the impression that he thinks that to use one of these arguments to avoid the other is to jump from the frying-pan into the fire. This relationship is illustrated in terms of the ignorant belief that everything can be proved, and of attempts to prove the Law of Noncontradiction.     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.     

Learning from the law to address uncertainty in the precautionary principle

Environmentalists have advocated the Precautionary Principle (PP) to help guide public and private decisions about the environment. By contrast, industry and its spokesmen have opposed this. There is not one principle, but many that have been recommended for this purpose. Despite the attractiveness of a core idea in all versions of the principle—that decision-makers should take some precautionary steps to ensure that threats of serious and irreversible damage to the environment and public health do not materialize into harm—even one of the most widely endorsed principles needs considerable specification and refinement before it can be used. Moreover, the PP is an approach or guide to utilizing scientific evidence in social or legal decision-making contexts. In this it does not differ in kind from other approaches to using factual information such as in the law. The law provides some models for different strategies to guide decision-making under uncertainty when factual issues cannot be resolved with certainty. These in turn can help guide the formulation of different versions of PP and help clarify some presuppositions of the principle. Once some plausible versions of PP are articulated, I suggest some applications to existing environmental problems.     

An Operational Logic of Proofs with Positive and Negative Information

The logic of proofs was introduced by Artemov in order to analize the formalization of the concept of proof rather than the concept of provability. In this context, some operations on proofs play a very important role. In this paper, we investigate some very natural operations, paying attention not only to positive information, but also to negative information (i.e. information saying that something cannot be a proof). We give a formalization for a fragment of such a logic of proofs, and we prove that our fragment is complete and decidable.     

Between place and territory: Young people's emotional geographies of security and insecurity in Brussels' deprived areas

While much of literature on place attachment describes it as an affective bond between a (young) person and place, with positive psychosocial consequences such as identification, rootedness and belonging, some authors are cautious and stress that an enhanced attachment to place, termed “territoriality”, may have negative consequences such as hostility towards outsiders and a sense of non-belonging elsewhere. In this paper, I ask how we should understand this difference and how the analysis of young people's emotional geographies of (in)security can bring light to this question. The paper finds that emotional geographies of (in)security are instrumental in understanding how a “positive” attachment to place may lead to a “negative” attachment to territory, how some young people emotionally attach to places and some are inclined to claim these places against outsiders (and also at the expense of other members of the community). This explicit appropriation of public spaces in the home neighbourhood is co-constituted by feeling secure inside and insecure outside the area. Territoriality may be a response to or an expression of ontological insecurity and of the inner unease that prompts them to strange avoidance and contorted strategies for manipulating spaces and setting boundaries designed to secure the self.     

2002年:中国医疗纠纷处理的重大转折

2002年4月1日开始实施的《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》,要求医院对医疗行为与损害的因果关系和不存在医疗过错承担举证责任,一时间,医院对此忿忿不平,百姓对此拍手叫好,4月15日,期待已久的《国务院医疗事故处理条例》缍正式颁布,与1987年颁布的《医疗事故处理办法》相比有了重大改变,中国医疗纠纷的处理在2002年发生了重大转折,对此进行了详细分析,与大多数人的观点不同,认为前者恰恰对医院有利,而后者对医院更为严格。     

Beweislastverteilung und Intuitionen in philosophischen Diskursen

Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.