Category discrimination by pigeons using five polymorphous features

Eight pigeons were trained to discriminate between sets of color photographs of natural scenes. The scenes differed along five two-valued dimensions (site, weather, camera distance, camera orientation, and camera height), and all combinations of the feature values were used. One value of each dimension was designated as positive, and slides containing three or more positive feature values were members of the positive stimulus set. Thus, each feature had an equal, low, correlation with reinforcement, and all features had zero correlations with each other. Seven of the 8 pigeons learned this discrimination, and their responding came under the control of all five features. Within the positive and negative stimulus sets, response rates were higher to stimuli that contained more positive feature values. Once discrimination had been achieved, reversal training was given using a subset of the slides. In this subset, only a single feature was correlated with reinforcement. All pigeons learned this reversal successfully and generalized it to additional photographs with the same feature content. After reversal, the original reinforcement contingencies were reinstated, and training was continued using all the slides except those that had been used in reversal. Reversal generalized to these slides to some extent. Analysis of the response rates to individual slides showed that, compared with prereversal training, only the feature that had been subjected to reversal contingencies showed a reversed correlation with response rate. The remaining features showed the same correlation with response rate as they had before reversal training. Thus, reversal on some members of a category following category discrimination training led to generalization to stimuli within the category that were not involved in the reversal, but not to features that were not reversed. It is therefore inappropriate to refer to the pigeons as learning a concept.     

Patterns of 4-month-old infant responses to hidden silent and sounding people and objects

Responses of 4-month-old infants to hidden people and objects were investigated with equated task demands. Twenty-one 4-month-old infants were administered a combined task, in which they were shown a sounding stimulus that continued to sound after hiding, an auditory task, in which sound was the only source of information about the position of the object in space, and a vision task, in which a silent stimulus was shown to the infants prior to hiding. Five infant behaviours were coded: reaching, gazing, body movements, vocalizations and smiles. The infants reached significantly more for hidden objects than for people, to whom they vocalized instead. They further smiled, and moved their bodies more towards their invisible mother than to the other stimuli. Thus infants responded differentially to people and objects whether the stimuli were soundless (so that there was no cue to their presence) or not. This suggested that infants appreciated (a) that an object had been hidden; (b) this object was either animate or inanimate; and (c) different procedures were appropriate for the retrieval of, or for interacting with animate and inanimate objects. Discussion centres on the underlying representational system that allows for such appreciation.     

From demonstration to theory in embodied language comprehension: A review

Recent findings in psychology, psycholinguistics, and neuroscience present a challenge to current amodal theories by suggesting that cognitive states are not disembodied in language comprehension. Accumulating behavioral evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on processing of language describing concrete and abstract concepts. The extant embodied theories that support either a strong or a moderate embodied view are then presented, as are the perspectives that define how the researchers discuss the role of sensory-motor grounding in language processing. The article concludes by discussing several lines of research that might help distinguish between various theoretical approaches and resolve some of the fundamental issues that fuel much of the debate in the field.     

Eye tracking provides no evidence that young infants understand path obstruction

In two experiments with 47 4-month-olds, we investigated attention to key aspects of events in which an object moved along a partly occluded path that contained an obstruction. Infants were familiarized with a ball rolling behind an occluder to be revealed resting on an end wall, and on test trials an obstruction wall was placed in the ball's path. In Experiment 1, we did not find longer looking when the object appeared in an impossible location beyond the obstruction, and infants did not selectively fixate the object in this location. In Experiment 2, after rolling one or two balls, we measured infants' fixations of a two-object outcome with one ball in a novel but possible resting position and the other in a familiar but impossible location beyond the obstruction. Infants looked longer at the ball in the possible but novel location, likely reflecting a looking preference for location novelty. Thus we obtained no evidence that infants reasoned about obstruction and identified a violation on that basis.     

Language Processing Differences Between Blind and Sighted Individuals and the Abstract Versus Concrete Concept Difference

In the property listing task (PLT), participants are asked to list properties for a concept (e.g., for the concept dog, “barks,” and “is a pet” may be produced). In conceptual property norming (CPNs) studies, participants are asked to list properties for large sets of concepts. Here, we use a mathematical model of the property listing process to explore two longstanding issues: characterizing the difference between concrete and abstract concepts, and characterizing semantic knowledge in the blind versus sighted population. When we apply our mathematical model to a large CPN reporting properties listed by sighted and blind participants, the model uncovers significant differences between concrete and abstract concepts. Though we also find that blind individuals show many of the same processing differences between abstract and concrete concepts found in sighted individuals, our model shows that those differences are noticeably less pronounced than in sighted individuals. We discuss our results vis-a-vis theories attempting to characterize abstract concepts.     

Prototypes of the “natural” concepts discovery

In works of Eleanor Rosch “natural” concepts was introduced that reflect a high correlated structure of features of objects of the external world. Prototypes of the “natural” concepts are clearest cases of objects that reflect this highly correlated structure. The same high correlated structure manifested in the “natural” phenotypical classification. To formalize this highly correlated structure, we define a special type of probabilistic causal relations and then probabilistic formal concepts as a cyclically connected probabilistic causal relations. Based on these definitions, we developed a method of prototypes discovery and illustrate it on the example of digits’ prototypes discovery.     

An expanded model for perceptual visual single object recognition system using expectation priming following neuroscientific evidence

Under numerous circumstances, humans recognize visual objects in their environment with remarkable response times and accuracy. Existing artificial visual object recognition systems have not yet surpassed human vision, especially in its universality of application. We argue that modeling the recognition process in an exclusive feedforward manner hinders those systems’ performance. To bridge that performance gap between them and human vision, we present a brief review of neuroscientific data, which suggests that considering an agent’s internal influences (from cognitive systems that peripherally interact with visual-perceptual processes) recognition can be improved. Then, we propose a model for visual object recognition which uses these systems’ information, such as affection, for generating expectation to prime the object recognition system, thus reducing its execution times. Later, an implementation of the model is described. Finally, we present and discuss an experiment and its results.     

Consciousness as a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality

The work demonstrates that brain might reflect the external world causal relationships in the form of a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality, which shows up as consciousness. The paper analyses and solves the problem of statistical ambiguity and provides a formal model of causal relationships as probabilistic maximally specific rules. We suppose that brain makes all possible inferences from causal relationships. We prove that the suggested formal model has a property of an unambiguous inference: from consistent premises we infer a consistent conclusion. It enables a set of all inferences to form a consistent model of the perceived world. Causal relationships may create fixed points of cyclic inter-predictable properties. We consider the “natural” classification introduced by John St. Mill and demonstrate that a variety of fixed points of the objects’ attributes forms a “natural” classification of the external world. Then we consider notions of “natural” categories and causal models of categories, introduced by Eleanor Rosch and Bob Rehder and demonstrate that fixed points of causal relationships between objects attributes, which we perceive, formalize these notions. If the “natural” classification describes the objects of the external world, and “natural” concepts the perception of these objects, then the theory of integrated information, introduced by G. Tononi, describes the information processes of the brain for “natural” concepts formation that reflects the “natural” classification. We argue that integrated information provides high accuracy of the objects identification. A computer-based experiment is provided that illustrates fixed points formation for coded digits.     

Comparative Perspectives on Solutions for the Problem of Other Minds

This paper aims to establish a dialogue between contemporary research on the problem of other minds and classical Chinese philosophical theories. It first explores the idea, inspired by the recent discovery of the mirror neuron mechanism, that a direct exchange of experience may occur between the observer and the observed. Next, it analyzes the ways in which the ancient Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi and Confucian thinkers reflected on the problem of other minds, which are quite similar to the idea inspired by the latest research on mirror neurons. In these thinkers’ views, knowledge of other minds is the result of mental activity and what it provides is, to a large extent, something related not to epistemology but rather to a situational understanding of other minds from the perspective of value theory. The author points out that this solution takes two aspects, humans’ innate nature and human experience, into consideration simultaneously. In terms of humans’ innate nature, the body of a human being is a body that represents the unity of man and nature, and it has something in common with the natural world, which lays a foundation for the perception of other minds. In terms of human experience, human beings have such actual needs as emotions, pursuits, and desires, and their behaviors need to conform to certain norms. It is in a body of this kind that the mind of human beings can be formed and enjoy the potential to develop. Effective interpersonal communication can thus be achieved.