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Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
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Mohsen Javadi 《Topoi》2007,26(2):247-254
There are some texts about moral sentences in the Islamic logical literature especially in the logical books of Ibn Sina that
have been interpreted in completely opposite ways. Relying on these texts, some scholars take Ibn Sina to be proposing a non-cognitive
theory of ethics and to the contrary some scholars hold that he is a proponent of a sort of moral intuitionism. Reflecting
on the alleged textual evidence in Ibn Sina’s books, I propose a middle way in the interpretation that accepts the cognitive
status of the moral sentences but at the same time rejects intuitionism.
相似文献
Mohsen JavadiEmail: |
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Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):509-529
It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive,
intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose
of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all,
they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of
psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.
相似文献
Hilla Jacobson-HorowitzEmail: |
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