Is it sometimes better to receive than to give? Preferences for receiver roles over proposer roles in consumer behavior ultimatums

In the context of purchasing ultimatums, consumers may dislike the freedom of choice that comes with proposing offers due to their awareness that the other party may have better information than they do and the fact that the attractiveness of outside alternatives is uncertain. Indeed, across three studies, we find that people prefer to receive rather than propose offers. In Study 1, proposers reached fewer agreements and experienced less favorable attitudes (e.g., satisfaction, fairness, recommendation intentions), particularly when their offers were rejected. In Study 2, proposers experienced more uncertainty and cognitive depletion as compared to receivers, again particularly if the proposed offer was rejected. In Study 3, role preferences were explained by the existence of higher regret in the proposer role, particularly if the proposed offer was rejected. We conclude with a consideration of the theoretical and practical implications of our research for scholars, customers, and service providers.     

The pursuit of missing information in negotiation

A large body of research has focused on how people exchange and use information during the negotiation process. This work tends to treat information as if it all were readily available upon request. The current research investigated how delays in the pursuit of missing information can influence people’s ex-ante priorities and the final settlements they reach. Study 1 found that negotiators achieved more value on an issue after seeking missing information about that issue compared to when the same information was readily accessible. Study 2 found that the effect of searching for information on outcomes was mediated by changes in how important negotiators perceived the issue to be. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Longer-term consequences of anger expression in negotiation: Retaliation or spillover?

Negotiators often concede to angry partners. But what happens when they meet again? According to the spillover hypothesis, negotiators demand less from previously angry partners because they perceive them as tough. According to the retaliation hypothesis, negotiators demand more from previously angry partners because of negative impressions and a desire to get even. Experiment 1 showed that participants demanded less in later negotiations when their partner in a previous negotiation had expressed anger (rather than no emotion) and the later negotiation was with the same (rather than a different) partner. Consistent with the spillover hypothesis, this effect was mediated by inferences regarding the partner’s toughness. Experiment 2 showed that apologies reduce the negative effects of anger on impressions and desire for future interaction. Behavioral reactions were moderated by social value orientation: extending the established might/morality effect, prosocial participants responded cooperatively to an apology, whereas proselfs responded competitively.     

Saving the worst for last: The effect of time horizon on the efficiency of negotiating benefits and burdens

Three experiments explored the effect of outcome delays—longer time horizons for the realization of outcomes—on the efficiency of negotiated agreements. We hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between a longer temporal distance to the consequences of negotiated agreements and the efficiency of those agreements. Outcome delays did increase the efficiency of the negotiated agreements. In addition, type of resource, burden or benefit, moderated this relationship. Because negotiating for burdens is more difficult than negotiating for benefits in the present, the salutary discounting effects of outcome delays were greater for burdens. The multifaceted effects of time on negotiations are discussed.     

I feel,therefore you act: Intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotion on negotiation as a function of social power

We examine how emotion (anger and happiness) affects value claiming and creation in a dyadic negotiation between parties with unequal power. Using a new statistical technique that analyzes individual data while controlling for dyad-level dependence, we demonstrate that anger is helpful for powerful negotiators. They feel more focused and assertive, and claim more value; the effects are intrapersonal, insofar as the powerful negotiator responds to his or her own emotional state and not to the emotional state of the counterpart. On the other hand, effects of emotion are generally not intrapersonal for low-power negotiators: these negotiators do not respond to their own emotions but can be affected by those of a powerful counterpart. They lose focus and yield value. Somewhat surprisingly, the presence of anger in the dyad appears to foster greater value creation, particularly when the powerful party is angry. Implications for the negotiation and power literatures are discussed.     

Mother–child disputes as arenas for fostering negotiation skills

Valsiner's concepts of the zone of free movement (ZFM) and the zone of promoted actions (ZPA) were applied to mother-child disputes to study how mothers discharge their role as experts in negotiation. Twenty mothers of 3-5-year-olds each reported 20 disputes, 10 in which the mother was making a request and 10 in which she was refusing her child's request. The disputes were analysed sequentially using four models, preservation, copycat, reward/punishment, and provision of a rationale. The results showed that perseveration and copycat models were more likely to apply when there was negative affect. Mother's re-requests fitted the reward/punishment model whereas mother's refusals better fitted the provision of a rationale model. Information from follow-up interviews supported the notion that requests and refusals are being socialized differently. The results imply that, whereas children's requests and refusals are within the ZFM, only their requests are within the ZPA.     

Gender Differences in Virtual Negotiation: Theory and Research

Social roles create conflicting behavioral expectations for female negotiators; however, virtual negotiations reduce social pressures. This paper reviews theoretical explanations on why men and women might differ in negotiations that occur through email, telephone, or video. Forty-three negotiation studies comparing face-to-face and virtual negotiations were examined for gender differences. All studies were reported in English but not limited to US participants. While many reports omitted gender information, meta-analytic findings supported the prediction that women would be more hostile in virtual compared to face-to-face negotiations, as well as finding no hostility difference for men between virtual and face-to-face negotiations. While negotiators overall were more successful face-to-face than virtually, results separated by gender did not find this effect.     

Beyond negotiated outcomes: The hidden costs of anger expression in dyadic negotiation

This paper focuses on the hidden costs of expressing anger in negotiations. Two experimental studies show that an opponent’s expression of anger can elicit both concessionary and retaliatory responses by focal negotiators. In the first study, equal-power negotiators exhibited overt concessionary behaviors when their opponents expressed anger, but also sabotaged their opponents covertly. Feelings of mistreatment mediated the relationship between opponents’ anger expression and focal negotiators’ covert retaliation. In the second study, low-power negotiators made larger concessions when high-power opponents expressed anger, but they retaliated covertly against high-power negotiators. High-power negotiators were overtly demanding (and not concessionary) regardless of whether or not the opponent expressed anger, but also retaliated covertly against low-power opponents who expressed anger. The two studies suggest that the value-claiming advantages of expressed anger need to be weighed against the costs of eliciting (covert) retaliation. We discuss implications of the findings and provide recommendations for future research.