Wilhelm Reich's self‐censorship after his arrest as an enemy alien: The chilling effect of an illegal imprisonment

After discussing Wilhelm Reich's place in psychoanalysis, the article explores his arrest as an ‘enemy alien’ in December 1941. Reich's emotional responses to his imprisonment (which was illegal and which lasted nearly a month) are explored. A number of scholars have suggested that many European radical psychoanalysts refrained from sharing their former political ideas once they emigrated to the United States. Following a brief discussion of this pattern of ‘silencing,’ it is argued that Reich's withholding certain documents from publication was due to a self‐imposed censorship, motivated in part by the fear of further governmental interference with his life and work. This fear, however, did not extend to his discussion of his newly developed theory of orgone energy.     

The eco-cognitive model of abduction: Ἀπαγωγή now: Naturalizing the logic of abduction

Abduction (ἀπαγωγή, in ancient Greek, often translated as “leading away” or “reduction”) is a procedure in which something that lacks classical explanatory epistemic virtue can be accepted because it has virtue of another kind: Gabbay and Woods [15] contend (GW-schema) that abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character. From this perspective abductive reasoning is a response to an ignorance-problem; through abduction the basic ignorance – that does not have to be considered a total “ignorance” – is neither solved nor left intact. Abductive reasoning is an ignorance-preserving accommodation of the problem at hand. Is abduction really ignorance-preserving? To better answer this question I will introduce (and take advantage of) an eco-cognitive model (EC-Model) of abduction. It will be illustrated that through abduction, knowledge can be enhanced, even when abduction is not considered an inference to the best explanation in the classical sense of the expression, that is an inference necessarily characterized by an empirical evaluation phase, or an inductive phase, as Peirce called it. To further deepen the eco-cognitive character of abduction a simple genealogy of logic is provided: Aristotle clearly states that in syllogistic theory local/environmental cognitive factors – external to that peculiar inferential process, for example regarding users/reasoners, are given up. Indeed, to define syllogism Aristotle first of all insists that all syllogisms are valid and contends that the necessity of this kind of reasoning is related to the circumstance that “no further term from outside (ἔξωθɛν) is needed”, in sum syllogism is the fruit of a kind of eco-cognitive immunization. At the same time Aristotle presents a seminal perspective on abduction: the second part of the article considers the famous passage in Chapter B25 of Prior Analytics concerning ἀπαγωγή (“leading away”), also studied by Peirce. I contend that some of the current well-known distinctive characters of abductive cognition are already expressed, which are in tune with the EC-Model. By providing an illustration of the role of the method of analysis and of the middle terms in Plato's dialectic argumentation, considered as related to the diorismic/poristic process in ancient geometry – also, later on, emphasized by Proclus – I maintain that it is just this intellectual heritage which informs Aristotle' Chapter B25 on ἀπαγωγή. Even if, in general, Aristotle seems to sterilize, thanks to the invention of syllogistic theory, every “dialectic” background of reasoning, nevertheless in Chapter B25 he is still pointing to the fundamental inferential role in reasoning of those externalities that substantiate the process of “leading away” (ἀπαγωγή). Hence, we can gain a new positive perspective about the “constitutive” eco-cognitive character of abduction, just thanks to Aristotle himself. Finally, the paper presents an excursus on Aristotle's enthymemes from signs, disregarded by Peirce, but extremely important to stress the Aristotelian treatment of what I have called selective abduction. A forthcoming companion paper [35] will further deepen the EC-Model of abduction stressing stricter logical aspects: the first result will be that, contrarily to the classical logical view, relevance and plausibility in abductive reasoning have to be relativized and so the epistemologically embarrassing concepts of irrelevance and implausibility exculpated: they are not always offensive to reason.     

Science,philosophy, and religion today: Some reflections

The new developments of science have opened a new field of dialogue between science and theology as well as a further integration between science and philosophy. This new field is shown in its historical background and with its current theoretical issues.     

Naturalizing logic: Errors of reasoning vindicated: Logic reapproaches cognitive science

A complete revision of mainstream logic is an urgent task to be achieved. This revision will be able to bring logic into a creative rapprochement with cognitive science. This can be achieved by trying to do for logic what over forty years ago Quine and others attempted for epistemology. It is necessary to propose a “naturalization” of the logic of human inference. This paper deals with an examination of how the naturalization process might go, together with some indication of what might be achieved by it. To assist the reader in understanding the naturalization of logic I will take advantage of my own research on the concept of abduction, which vindicates the positive cognitive value of the fallacy of the affirming the consequent thanks to the so-called EC-model (Eco-Cognitive model), and of the recent book Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference (2013) [86], by John Woods. While this paper certainly aims at promoting the research program on the naturalization of logic, it also further advocates the placement of abduction in the research programmes of logic, and stresses to what extent our contemporary philosophical and logical tradition is indebted towards Charles Sanders Peirce, a thinker often praised for his productivity but whose quality and importance are too often overlooked.