Voices of Dialogue and Directivity in Family Therapy With Refugees: Evolving Ideas About Dialogical Refugee Care

In this article, we reflect on our evolving ideas regarding a dialogical approach to refugee care. Broadening the predominant phased trauma care model and its engaging of directive expertise in symptom reduction, meaning making, and rebuilding connectedness, these developing dialogical notions involve the negotiation of silencing and disclosure, meaning and absurdity, hope and hopelessness in a therapeutic dialogue that accepts its encounter of cultural and social difference. In locating therapeutic practice within these divergent approaches, we argue an orientation on collaborative dialogue may operate together with notions from the phased trauma care model as heuristic background in engaging a polyphonic understanding of coping with individual and family sequelae of forced displacement. This locating of therapeutic practice, as informed by each perspective, invites us to remain present to fragments of therapeutic positioning that resonate power imbalance or appropriation in a therapeutic encounter imbued with a social context that silences refugees’ suffering. In a clinical case analysis, we further explore these relational complexities of negotiating directive expertise and collaborative dialogue in the therapeutic encounter with refugee clients.     

Self in time and language

Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the “core,” or “minimal self,” and the “extended,” or “narrative self.” Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, that is, the faculty of human beings to project themselves mentally backwards in time to relive, or forward to anticipate, events. Moreover, I propose that narrative language itself should be considered a product of a core brain network that includes mechanisms, such as mental time travel, mindreading, and visuo-spatial systems.     

Both sides of the story: explaining events in a narrative

Our experience of narrative has an internal and an external aspect--the content of the narrative’s representations, and its intentional, communicative aetiology. The interaction of these two things is crucial to understanding how narrative works. I begin by laying out what I think we can reasonably expect from a narrative by way of causal information, and how causality interacts with other attributes we think of as central to narrative. At a certain point this discussion will strike a problem: our judgements about what is a relevant possibility within the narrative’s story depend on our judgements of probability; but these latter judgements depend, in turn, on factors external to the world of the story, and cannot be explained in terms of causal relations available within the story. We need the external, author-centred perspective at this point. These different perspectives, the internal and the external, correspond to different types of explanations we may give of events in a story; I call these internal and external explanations. I show how these different explanations are made use of in two contrasting arthistorical projects. I use these examples as the basis for a generalisation about the structure of the two explanatory forms. Finally, I suggest some ways in which explanations of these two kinds relate to one another, and to our thinking when we are engaged by a narrative.

略述刘逢禄对《左传》的攻毁

在刘逢禄之前只有怀疑、否定《左传》的零星论点,还没有形成系统的思想,但这些论点是刘逢禄否定《左传》的先声。刘逢禄在经学史上首次提出了否定《左传》的系统思想:一是说明《左氏春秋》是与《晏子春秋》等类似的史书,从根本上消除《左传》与《春秋》的关联;二是指斥刘歆的作伪,攻击《春秋左传》是经刘歆作伪的产物。此论不免有牵强附会之说,但在清代经学史与后来的文化史上产生了巨大的影响。     

Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again

Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Kallio-Tamminen, 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this relation is yet to be shown. In this article we approached the question of causality by exploring functional integrity within the three SRN modules that are thought to underlie the three phenomenal components of Selfhood while these components were manipulated mentally by experienced meditators in a controlled and independent manner. Participants were requested, in a block-randomised manner, to mentally induce states representing either increased (up-regulation) or decreased (down-regulation) sense of (a) witnessing agency (“Self”), or (b) body representational-emotional agency (“Me”), or (c) reflective/narrative agency (“I”), while their brain activity was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). This EEG-data was complemented by first-person phenomenological reports and standardised questionnaires which focused on subjective contents of three aspects of Selfhood. The results of the study strengthen the case for a direct causative relationship between three phenomenological aspects of Selfhood and related to them three modules of the brain SRN. Furthermore, the putative integrative model of the dynamic interrelations among three modules of the SRN has been proposed.