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Stephanie Patridge 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):181-193
Moralists hold that art criticism can and should take stock of moral considerations. Though moralists disagree over the proper
scope of ethical art criticism, they are unified in their acceptance of the consistency of valence thesis: when an artwork
fares poorly from the moral point of view, and this fact is art critically relevant, then it is thereby worse qua artwork.
In this paper, I argue that a commitment to moralism, however strong, is unattractive because it requires that we radically
revise our art critical practices in contexts where revision seems ill advised. I will consider two such cases, Pushkin’s
Eugene Onegin and Balthus’ Alice. When we further reflect on our actual art critical practices in cases like these, we find
that we do not have an unfailing commitment to the consistency of valence thesis. That is, some artworks are (artistically)
good because they are (morally) bad.
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Stephanie PatridgeEmail: |
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Alessandro Giovannelli 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):117-127
The goal of this paper is methodological. It offers a comprehensive mapping of the theoretical positions on the ethical criticism
of art, correcting omissions and inadequacies in the conceptual framework adopted in the current debate. Three principles
are recommended as general guidelines: ethical amenability, basic value pluralism, and relativity to ethical dimension. Hence
a taxonomy distinguishing between different versions of autonomism, moralism, and immoralism is established, by reference
to criteria that are different from what emerging in the current literature. The mapping is then proved capable of (1) locating
the various theories that have been proposed so far and clarifying such theories’ real commitments, (2) having the correct
relationship with actual art making and art criticism practices, and (3) showing the real weight of the alleged counter-example
to a moralist position of a work that succeeds artistically because of its immorality.
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Alessandro GiovannelliEmail: |
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Steven A. Jauss 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):285-298
According to what Robert Stecker dubs the “ethical-aesthetic interaction” thesis, the ethical defects of a literary work can
diminish its aesthetic value. Both the thesis and the only prominent argumentative strategy employed to support it the affective
response argument have been hotly debated; however, Stecker has recently argued that the failure of the ARA does not undermine
the thesis, since the argument “fails to indentify the main reason [the thesis] holds, when it in fact does.” I critically
examine Stecker’s objection to the familiar versions of the affective response argument and the line of support for ethical-aesthetic
interaction he proposes to install in their place. I conclude that neither is compelling; however, an important insight can
be salvaged from his positive proposal, and I argue that the insight does, in fact, point toward a novel defense of the thesis.
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Steven A. JaussEmail: |
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