The design and use of the Bioethics Consultation Form

The emergence of the ethics consultation as a means to resolve moral crises in clinical medicine has revealed the need for a worksheet that would facilitate intake and analysis. The author developed the Bioethics Consultation Form as an attempt to remedy this need. The form is arranged in an outline format and is a useful asset to ethics committee discussions and record keeping. The first section covers basic intake data concerning the patient's medical and personal information, advance directives, and values, as well as the values of the physician and family. After the intake section is completed with the above data, the ethics consultant then turns to the analysis section. This second section allows for (1) the discussion of conflicting values, (2) the identification of priorities, and (3) the elucidation of ethical norms relevant to the case.The Bioethics Consultation Form was adopted by the Patient Care Advisory committee of the Franklin Square Hospital Center in Baltimore, Maryland in 1986. The methodology in the use of the form will be discussed. Further, the potential spectrum of consultative cases that can be analyzed using the form will be highlighted.     

Differential predictability of preferences and choices

A combined multi-attribute utility and expectancy-value model has repeatedly been found to yield a worse fit to choices than to preference ratings. The present study investigated two possible explanations for this finding. First, people's belief-value structures may change in the choice task as they try to find the best alternative. Second, a difficult choice task may cause the decision maker to use simplifying heuristics. In the first of two experiments, subjective belief-value structures were measured on two occasions separated by about one week. Immediately before the second measurement, different groups of subjects performed a choice task, gave preference ratings, or performed a control task. The results did not support an interpretation of the greater difficulty of predicting choices in terms of changes in belief-value structures. However, the notion of simplifying heuristics received support by the finding that adopting simpler versions of the original model improved the predictions of the choices. In the second experiment, beliefs were measured immediately before or after each of a series of choices or preference ratings. The results indicated that although temporary changes in beliefs may occur, they can hardly provide a full account of the differential predictability of preferences and choices.     

Nonconvergence,improper solutions,and starting values in lisrel maximum likelihood estimation

In the framework of a robustness study on maximum likelihood estimation with LISREL three types of problems are dealt with: nonconvergence, improper solutions, and choice of starting values. The purpose of the paper is to illustrate why and to what extent these problems are of importance for users of LISREL. The ways in which these issues may affect the design and conclusions of robustness research is also discussed.     

Political Extremism and a Generalized Propensity to Discriminate Among Values

Research exploring the psychological differences between people supporting extreme versus moderate ideologies is growing. However, this research has rarely examined the domain of values. Here, we explore this domain by assessing the possibility that political extremists discriminate more among values compared to moderates, namely, that extremists exhibit strong commitment toward some values at the expense of other values, whereas moderates would acknowledge a multiplicity of values as equally important. First, we propose a model positing that a value discriminability parameter captures a general tendency to discriminate among values. Second, we test empirically the prediction that, compared to moderates, political extremists exhibit a higher discriminability parameter. This prediction is supported by four studies (including one based on the European Social Survey where representative samples from 29 European countries are examined) where participants reported their ideological orientation and rated the importance of basic human values (we focused on basic values because these transcend the political domain, thus highlighting general effects). Specifically, in all studies we observed a positive correlation between political extremism and residual variability in ratings, a hallmark of a higher discriminability parameter. These findings highlight the value domain as critical to understanding differences between political extremists and moderates.     

“What matters to us”: The portrait values questionnaire to measure couple values

No previous studies have analyzed values as qualities of relational microsystems, such as the romantic couple. Based on Schwartz's Theory of Human Values, this study examines the psychometric properties of the Portrait Couple Values Questionnaire (PCVQ). It measures four couple value dimensions: conservation, openness to change, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence. Five hundred and forty-six Italian respondents (54.1% women), aged 41.52 years (SD = 7.19; range 23–63) and having a couple relationship, have filled in an anonymous online questionnaire. The results show the good psychometric properties of the PCVQ. The Confirmatory Factor Analysis Magnifying Glass Strategy shows good indexes of fit for each value dimension, except for the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) for openness to change, thus confirming that the PCVQ measures the four values with satisfactory internal consistency. The Multidimensional Scaling results, by showing a Stress-1 index of 0.07, confirm the circular structure of values because the four value dimensions are in the position predicted by Schwartz's model. Participants' personal and couple values are highly but not perfectly correlated, suggesting that couple values are a related but distinct construct compared to personal values. This study's contribution lies in introducing an innovative construct into the literature on values and couples, proposing a scale to assess it.     

B.F. SKINNER AND THE GRAND INQUISITOR

Abstract. B.F. Skinner allures us with the possibilities of turning the stones of materialistic rewards into the bread of human values. He tempts us by assuring success in achieving our goals through behavioral science, if only we give up our autonomy. He offers the power of complete control over our behaviors, on condition that we relinquish responsibility for our lives to a technological elite. Is B. F. Skinner a flesh-and-blood Grand Inquisitor? This essay tries to persuade the reader that Skinner's offers are worth considering.     

Fallacies and moral dilemmas

The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

An historical preface to engineering ethics

This article attempts to distinguish between science and technology, on the one hand, and engineering, on the other, offering a brief introduction to engineering values and engineering ethics. The method is (roughly) a philosophical examination of history. Engineering turns out to be a relatively recent enterprise, barely three hundred years old, to have distinctive commitments both technical and moral, and to have changed a good deal both technically and morally during that period. What motivates the paper is the belief that a too-easy equation of engineering with technology tends to obscure the special contribution of engineers to technology and to their own professional standards and so, to obscure as well both the origin and content of engineering ethics.     

内隐记忆研究的实验方法探索：启动效应计量方法的改进思路及其实验研究

以实验鉴定了常规的启动效应计量方法的有效性程度,并为客观地计量启动效应,创用了“超意识广度法”、“二次比较法”等．结果发现：（１）如被试数量较少,以不同补笔率为“基线值”所求得的启动效应之间发生显著差异的可能性存在;（２）超意识广度法能克服“阈下呈现刺激法”“分散注意法”的不足,为内隐记忆提供有利的识记情境;（３）“二次比较法”能为正常人内隐记忆的存在提供更为直接、可靠的证据,并能客观、精确地计量启动效应。