Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) computer-generated diagnoses: How do they compare to clinician judgment?

During the past several decades, computers have achieved increasing prominence in psychological assessment procedures. This is particularly true for computer-based test interpretation and diagnosis. This study reports on a study designed to compare the accuracy of computer-based diagnoses with clinician-generated diagnoses. The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) was administered to 151 consecutively admitted inpatients at a large private psychiatric hospital. The computer-generated diagnoses were compared with those generated by admitting psychiatrists. The results indicated that the MCMI diagnostic impressions underestimated the severity of depressive disorders when compared with clinician diagnoses on Axis I. Specifically, clinicians diagnosed major depression much more frequently than did the MCMI. In addition, clinicians diagnosed anxiety disorders much less frequently than did the MCMI.     

An evaluation of the reliability of probability judgments across response modes and over time

Despite the importance of probability assessment methods in behavioral decision theory and decision analysis, little attention has been directed at evaluating their reliability and validity. In fact, no comprehensive study of reliability has been undertaken. Since reliability is a necessary condition for validity, this oversight is significant. The present study was motivated by that oversight. We investigated the reliability of probability measures derived from three response modes: numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. Unlike previous studies, the experiment was designed to distinguish systematic deviations in probability judgments, such as those due to experience or practice, from random deviations. It was found that subjects assessed probabilities reliably for all three assessment methods regardless of the reliability measures employed. However, a small but statistically significant decrease over time in the magnitudes of assessed probabilities was observed. This effect was linked to a decrease in subjects overconfidence during the course of the experiment.     

Upward versus Downward Anchoring in Frequency Judgments of Social Facts

Frequency estimation of social facts in two methods of judgment elicitation was investigated. In the “narrow-range” condition, subjects answered questions in the format: “Out of 100 incidents, how many belong to category X?” In the “wide-range” condition, the frequency for the same event was assessed with respect to “Out of 10,000”. Judged frequencies in the wide-range condition were divided by 100, and were compared with the corresponding judgments in the narrow-range condition. Such comparisons were made for low-frequency and high-frequency events. Previous research has shown that, for low-frequency events, judged frequencies are proportionally greater in the narrow-range than in the wide-range condition. These results reflect cognitive processes of implicit anchoring, whereby judged frequencies lie close to small numbers within the response ranges provided. I call this process “downward anchoring,” and predicted that this tendency would be replicated in the present study. Moreover, I predicted that assessments about high-frequency events would evoke similar cognitive processes operating in the opposite direction. By such “upward anchoring,” judged frequencies would lie close to relatively larger numbers within the given response ranges. Consequently, I predicted that judged frequencies for high-frequency events would be proportionally greater in the wide-range condition than in the narrow-range condition. These predictions were confirmed.     

Fallacies and moral dilemmas

The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on.     

Reflections on segregating and assessing areas of competence

Various complexities that arise in the application of legal and/or clinical criteria to the actual assessment of competence/capacity are discussed, and a particular way of understanding the nature of such criteria is recommended.     

Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both

In a recent issue of this journal, Winman and Juslin (34 , 135–148, 1993) present a model of the calibration of subjective probability judgments for sensory discrimination tasks. They claim that the model predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias observed in such tasks, and present evidence from a training experiment that they interpret as supporting the notion that different models are needed to describe judgment of confidence in sensory and in cognitive tasks. The model is actually part of the more comprehensive decision variable partition model of subjective probability calibration that was originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 26 , 32–53, 1980). The characteristics of the model are described and it is demonstrated that the model does not predict underconfidence, that it is fully compatible with the overconfidence frequently found in calibration studies with cognitive tasks, and that it well represents experimental results from such studies. It is concluded that only a single model is needed for both types of task.     

Athlete doping confrontation efficacy and confrontation likelihood

Evidence supports the role of coach doping confrontation efficacy (DCE; Sullivan et al., 2015) as a deterrent against athletes’ doping cognitions (Boardley et al., 2019; Sullivan & Razavi, 2017), but the role of the athlete has largely been ignored. Current anti-doping campaigns encourage athletes to report doping misconduct (i.e., whistleblowing), but some athletes would prefer to confront the athlete directly (Erickson et al., 2017). Thus, it is important to consider what may contribute to athletes’ likelihood to confront a doping teammate or opponent. The purpose of this study was to determine whether DCE could predict an athlete’s likelihood to confront a doping teammate or opponent. Additionally, doping moral disengagement (MD) was included as a possible moderator of this relationship. Surveys were completed by 155 college athletes (n_male = 145) to measure their perceived DCE, doping MD, likelihood to confront a teammate, and likelihood to confront an opponent. Separate linear regression analyses were run for the two targets of confrontation. In the teammate model, both DCE and doping MD were significant predictors of confrontation likelihood. DCE was the only significant predictor in the opponent model. Neither model presented with a significant interaction, suggesting no moderation effect. Results suggest perceived DCE is associated with a greater likelihood to confront a doping athlete, regardless of whether they are a teammate or opponent; however, moral disengagement plays a greater role if the athlete is a teammate. These findings imply that confrontation may be the first line of defense against doping before whistleblowing action is taken. Research should continue to explore antecedents and consequences of athlete doping confrontation, providing greater insight into the whistleblowing process.     

时序信息提取机制的探索

对时序信息加工的经典研究是采用新近性判断范型,结果发现其提取机制是以新近性为基础的逆向串行搜索过程。本研究采用新近性判断范型和早远性判断范型对时序信息的提取机制进行了深入的考察,结果表明：（ｌ）提取时序信息既存在逆向串行搜索,又存在顺向串行搜索;（２）早远性判断和新近性判断任务对不同部分时序信息恢复的效应不同,其中早远性判断易化早远部分,新近性判断易化新近部分──表现为对相应部分辨别力的提高和正确反应潜伏期的缩短;（３）在不同的时序信息提取任务中,被试会根据具体条件进行反转反应。     

Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings Foster Moral Learning and Improvement

In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering, reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly their more severe transgressions, and they reported having frequently thought about morally better ways in which they could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward counterfactuals; Studies 1–3). The more that participants reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3). Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after committing a moral transgression strengthened reported intentions for moral improvement—relative to resimulating the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these results for competing theoretical views on the relationship between memory and morality and for functional theories of counterfactual thinking.