Relative costs and statistical power in the extreme groups approach

The relationship between variables in applied and experimental research is often investigated by the use of extreme (i.e., upper and lower) groups. Recent analytical work has provided an extreme groups procedure that is more powerful than the standard correlational approach for all values of the correlation and extreme group size. The present article provides procedures to optimize power by determining the relative number of subjects to use in each of two stages of data collection given a fixed testing budget.The opinions or assertions contained herein are those of the writers and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department.Edward F. Alf, Jr. is also affiliated with the Department of Psychology, San Diego State University.     

‘Three is better than two’: Increasing donations with the attraction effect

Five experiments (N_total = 2,503) tested the attraction effect and its boundary conditions in the context of helping behaviour. Participants could choose one donation appeal in a set of either two or three alternatives. The three alternatives set included a decoy – an alternative that resembled but was clearly inferior to a target (i.e., the most beneficial) alternative. A clear and consistent pattern emerged: Participants chose the target alternative more frequently and perceived it as more beneficial (and somewhat less costly) when the decoy was present compared to when it was absent. This finding was robust when the attribute ratings of the alternatives were unclear, when the target alternative offered a bundle of unrelated products, and when participants could refrain from donating altogether, or contribute any amount they wished. Our findings offer concrete and simple strategies that charities can implement at zero cost to increase giving and the perceived benefits that people’s good deed bring about to those in need.     

What in the world are the ways things might have been?

Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis, P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.

Consciousness and modality: on the possible preserved visual consciousness in blindsight subjects

In a recent paper, Brogaard (2011) presents counter-arguments to the conclusions of an experiment with blindsight subject GR. She argues that contrary to the apparent findings that GR’s preserved visual abilities relate to degraded visual experiences, she is in fact fully unconscious of the stimuli she correctly identifies. In this paper, we present arguments and evidence why Brogaard’s argument does not succeed in its purpose. We suggest that not only is relevant empirical evidence in opposition to Brogaard’s argument, her argument misconstrues necessary criteria to decide whether a conscious experience is visual or not visual.     

任务切换机制研究的理论争议与整合

任务切换是执行控制的一种重要功能。切换代价是量化执行控制持续时间的指标。并广泛应用于各个研究领域。但是切换代价在多大程度上体现了执行控制的作用,仍然还存在争论．当前主要存在任务设置重构、任务设置惯性和联结竞争三种理论。本文首先介绍了三种理论的基本观点和实验证据,以及对任务切换加工机制的分析;其次阐明了对三种理论进行整合的相关研究;最后分析了进一步研究的方向。     

Sunk-cost effects on purely behavioral investments

Although the sunk-cost effect is a well-documented psychological phenomenon in monetary investments, existing literature investigating behavioral investments (e.g., time, effort) has not replicated this effect except when such investments relate to monetary values. The current explanation for this discrepancy proposes that purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are unlikely to be observed because they are difficult to book, track, and balance in a mental account. Conversely, we argue that, through an effort-justification mechanism, people account for the amount of behavioral resources invested when selecting an alternative, in which case they may fall prey to purely behavioral sunk-cost effects. The results of two experiments support this prediction. Because many decisions involve behavioral investments, behavioral sunk-cost effects should be pervasive psychological phenomena.     

On the Observability of Purely Behavioral Sunk-Cost Effects: Theoretical and Empirical Support for the BISC Model

There is growing interest in whether and how sunk-cost effects for purely behavioral investments occur. In this article, we further discuss Cunha and Caldieraro's (2009) Behavioral Investment Sunk Cost (BISC) model and reconcile Otto's (2010) results with the BISC model predictions. We also report new data from two unpublished experiments that are consistent with the BISC model, and we discuss the conditions under which purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are likely to be observed.     

The effects of relationship context and modality on ratings of funniness

There is evidence to suggest that humour is an important part of mate choice and that humour may serve as an indicator of genetic quality. The current study investigated how rated funniness from a video clip was related to an individual’s attractiveness as a short-term or long-term partner. We additionally tested for the presence of an attractiveness halo effect on humour ratings by comparing ratings of funniness from video clips, audio-only presentations, and photographs. We found that funniness was most strongly correlated with attractiveness for short-term relationships, especially in videos of males. We also found that attractiveness was related to funniness ratings differently across video, audio-only clips, and photographs. Relative to their rated funniness in the audio-only condition, with no appearance cues, attractive individuals were rated as funnier in video clips than less attractive individuals. An additional study demonstrated that ratings of flirtatiousness and funniness were strongly correlated. Perceived similarity between producing humour and flirting may explain why humour is more preferable in a short-term partner as flirting may be seen to signal proceptivity. The effects of attractiveness on humour judgement may also be explained by an association with flirtation as flirting may be most enjoyable when directed by attractive individuals.     

Why modal fictionalism is not self-defeating

Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.