Retrieval independence between parts and wholes in successive recognition tasks

Participants studied AB word pairs and completed three recognition tests. In one recognition test each A word was presented with two distractors that did not appear on the study list. In another recognition test each B word was presented with two distractors that did not appear on the study list. In a third recognition test an AB target was presented with two distractors composed of words not on the study list. Six different groups of participants each performed the recognition tests in a different order, so that all possible orders were tested. Recognition of the A, B, and AB targets for a given study pair were independent of each other when single-word recognition preceded double-word recognition. There was almost complete independence in the reverse order. Even when recognition judgements were restricted to those for which the participants were most confident, there was independence of recognition among the three tests. A pair recognition test served as an additional study trial for the individual words; however, the reverse was not the case. All of these results were predicted by a single three-parameter mathematical model derived from the hypothesis that single-word and double-word targets had independent representations in memory.     

Misdirected by the gap: the relationship between inattentional blindness and attentional misdirection

In several of our articles we have drawn analogies between inattentional blindness paradigms and misdirection. Memmert (2010) however, has criticized this analogy and urged for caution in assuming too much of a close relationship between these two phenomena. Here we consider the points raised by Memmert and highlight some misunderstandings and omissions in his interpretation of our work, which substantially undermine his argument. Debating the similarities and differences between aspects of misdirection and inattentional blindness is valuable and has the potential to highlight the utility of these two phenomena. However, it is important not to be misdirected by subtle differences between particular instances of each phenomenon, at the expense of failing to detect the opportunities that these phenomena present for extending our understanding of attention and awareness.     

Mind the gap: Misdirection, inattentional blindness and the relationship between overt and covert attention

The present commentary addresses two issues arising from Memmert’s (2010) paper. First, can the ‘misdirection’ and ‘inattentional blindness’ paradigms provide important insights into the relationship between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ attentional processes? Second, what are the most fruitful directions for research that seeks to combine these attentional paradigms in ecologically valid settings? We argue that although Memmert’s (2010) paper postulates several important differences between the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms, it may not emphasise sufficiently strongly the significant insights into attention that have been yielded by the former approach. To illustrate, we discuss the utility of the misdirection paradigm in providing an ecologically valid method to investigate the relationship between overt and covert attentional processes. Such naturalistic methods are required to ensure optimal integration of the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms within a general theory of attention.