Les théories implicites de l’intelligence : une question de perspectives ?

IntroductionImplicit theories of intelligence are beliefs that people form regarding the malleability of intelligence. The so-called “growth” and “fixed” mindsets respectively view intelligence as a characteristic that can or cannot be changed. Psychology, as a science, also offers diverging responses. The developmental and differential traditions in the study of intelligence merely provide different answers because they do not focus on the same sources of variability nor on the same dimensions of intelligence.ObjectivesThe research question that guided the present studies was: Are people's naïve theories influenced by the same factors that drive developmental and differential psychologists to different conclusions?MethodIn Study 1, we first assessed participants’ (n = 509) reference norm orientation (i.e. whether they tend to focus on individual or social comparison), using a task in which they had to predict the school results of an hypothetical child. Then we administered a French version of Dweck's (2007) mindset scale. In study 2, we first asked participants (n = 530) to choose between two definitions of intelligence focusing either on its fluid or crystalized dimensions. Then we administered the French Mindset Scale and asked participants to justify their conclusion.ResultsBoth variables of interest (reference norm orientation and preferred definition of intelligence) had a significant effect on the participant's incremental beliefs.ConclusionThe results of the two studies as well as the qualitative analysis of participants’ arguments suggest that mindsets, like scientific theories, partly stem from the fact that the same question regarding intelligence malleability can be approached with two different perspectives.     

Expanding the moral circle: Inclusion and exclusion mindsets and the circle of moral regard

The human tendency to draw boundaries is pervasive. The ‘moral circle’ is the boundary drawn around those entities in the world deemed worthy of moral consideration. Three studies demonstrate that the size of the moral circle is influenced by a decision framing effect: the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy. Participants who decided which entities to exclude from the circle (exclusion mindset) generated larger moral circles than those who decided which to include (inclusion mindset). Further, people in an exclusion mindset showed “spill-over” effects into subsequent moral judgments, rating various outgroups as more worthy of moral treatment. The size of the moral circle mediated the effects of mindset on subsequent moral judgment. These studies offer an important first demonstration that decision framing effects have substantial consequences for the moral circle and related moral judgments.     

Stereotype threat affects the learning of sport motor skills

Studies have shown that stereotypical conditions can affect the performance of academic as well as motor skills (for a review see Chalabaev, Sarrazin, Fontayne, Boiché, & Clément-Guillotin, 2013). The objective of the present study was to investigate the influence of stereotype threat on the learning of a sport skill in women. Participants practiced 15 trials of a soccer dribbling task, and their learning was observed in immediate and delayed retention tests. Before practice, participants were divided into two groups which received instructions introducing the task as either involving athletic speed/power capacities, where women normally perform worse than men (stereotypical condition – ST), or as involving agility/coordination capacities, where women normally can perform similarly than men (nullified-stereotype condition – NST). They also filled out questionnaires measuring self-efficacy. Participants of the ST group showed significant lower motor performance and learning, as well as lower self-efficacy levels, than the NST group. The findings provide evidence that the learning of sport skills can be affected by stereotypical conditions. They add to the growing evidence of the impact of social-cognitive and affective factors on motor skill learning.     

The Impact of Power on Information Processing Depends on Cultural Orientation

Two studies show that different culturally based concepts of interpersonal power have distinct implications for information processing. People with a vertical individualist (VI) cultural orientation view power in personalized terms (power is for gaining status over and recognition by others), whereas people with a horizontal collectivist (HC) cultural orientation view power in socialized terms (power is for benefitting and helping others). The distinct goals associated with these power concepts are served by different mindsets, such as stereotyping others versus learning the individuating needs of others. Therefore, for high-VI individuals, making personalized power salient increases stereotyping in processing product information. That is, they recognize better information that is congruent with their prior product expectations, relative to their recognition of incongruent information. In contrast, for high-HC people, making socialized power salient increases individuating processes, characterized by better memory for incongruent information.     

Mindsets and pre-conscious open-mindedness to incidental information

Mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990) proposes that deliberative mindsets are marked by more open-minded processing of information, whereas implemental mindsets are characterized by more closed-minded processing. Accordingly, deliberative and implemental mindsets should differ in selective processing of incidental information when performing a central task. In three experiments, participants in deliberative and implemental mindsets performed a computer task while randomly presented incidental, unavoidable words. A subsequent recognition memory test assessed selective processing of these incidental words. Results revealed that deliberative mindsets led to superior recognition memory, suggesting increased open-mindedness to processing incidental information. Implications for mindset and goal theories are discussed.     

Psychometric properties of a French version of the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale

IntroductionInspired by Carol Dweck's work on naive theories of intelligence, the implicit theory of emotions refers to beliefs regarding the general functioning of emotions, specifically, their controllability. Some individuals view emotions as uncontrollable (entity theory), while others think that emotions can be modulated (incremental theory). These beliefs guide the emotional regulation strategies that individuals use and influence subjective well-being.ObjectiveThe present study explores the psychometric properties of the French version of the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale developed by Tamir et al. (2007).MethodOne hundred seventy-seven participants aged 18 to 72 years old (M = 34 years old) completed the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale in conjunction with two other questionnaires: subjective well-being and emotional regulation strategies.ResultsFactor analyses identified a one-dimensional structure; the internal reliability (alpha = .81) and test-retest reliability indices (r = .69) were satisfactory. The study replicated the main results of contemporary international studies concerning the mediating role of cognitive reappraisal and further documents the pivotal role of positive reappraisal in the association between implicit theories and well-being.ConclusionThe discussion highlights clinical and theoretical interests and the usefulness of the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale.     

Being of two minds: Switching mindsets exhausts self-regulatory resources

The human psyche is equipped with the capacity to solve problems using different mental states or mindsets. Different mindsets can lead to different judgment and decision making styles, each associated with its own perspective and biases. To change perspective, people can, and often do, switch mindsets. We argue, however, that mindset switching can be costly for subsequent decisions. We propose that mindset switching is an executive function that relies on the same psychological resource that governs other acts of executive functioning, including self-regulation. This implies that there are psychic costs to switching mindsets that are borne out in depleted executive resources. One implication of this framework is that switching mindsets should render people more likely to fail at subsequent self-regulation than they would if maintaining a consistent mindset. The findings from experiments that manipulated mindset switching in five domains support this model.