Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle-based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character-principlism .
I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character-principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character-principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

文学阅读如何影响读者的心理理论

文学阅读不但能提高读者的文学修养, 还能影响其心理状态。然而, 文学阅读经验是否一定能提高读者的心理理论仍然存有争议。近年来有关文学阅读与心理理论关系的实验性探讨不断增加。鉴于此, 作者从文本体裁、测量手段和个体差异角度分析了争议产生的原因。在此基础之上, 归纳了文学阅读影响心理理论的潜在机制, 即镜像神经系统和默认网络很可能是文学阅读促进心理理论提高的重要神经基础。     

创造与伸展:奥古斯丁时间观的两个向度

奥古斯丁《忏悔录》中的“时间之间”受到后世哲学家们的广泛关注和高度评价,但往往只重视其中“心灵的伸展”这一向度．而忽视上帝的创造这一向度,忽视了永恒之维。事实上,上帝的创造和心灵的伸展这两个向度不可分割．前者规定后者,阐明时间的起源;后者反映前者,说明时间的存在和本质。后者受前者的制约。也就是说,心灵的伸展有一个界限,是不可超越的。当文德尔班强调奥古斯丁的形而上学是“内在经验的形而上学”时,他确认了奥古斯丁时间观的心灵向度;当吉尔松称之为“皈依的形而上学”时,则是强调“心灵伸展的界限”,即永恒上帝的创造。     

An fMRI study of the social competition in healthy subjects

Social interaction requires the ability to infer another person’s mental state (Theory of Mind, ToM) and also executive functions. This fMRI study aimed to identify the cerebral correlates activated by ToM during a specific social interaction, the human-human competition. In this framework, we tested a conflict resolution task (Stroop) adapted to a virtual situation of competition. The participants were instructed to play in order to win either against a human-like competitor (human-human competition) or against a non-human competitor (human-machine competition). Only the human-human competition requires ToM as this type of competition is performed under social interaction. We identified first the classical network of executive regions activated by Stroop. Secondly, we identified the social (human-human) competition regions, represented by the bilateral superior and inferior frontal gyri, the anterior cingulate, the insula, the superior and anterior temporal, the hippocampus, the fusiform gyrus, the cuneus and the precuneus. Finally, we identified the executive regions that were modulated by the human-human competition, i.e., the executive control regions additionally activated when mentalizing in the context of social competition. They constituted a network predominant to the right and composed of the superior and middle frontal, anterior cingulate, insula and fusiform gyrus. We suggest that our experimental paradigm may be useful in exploration of the cerebral correlates of social adjustments in several situations such as psychiatric disorders presenting executive and social dysfunctions.     

Differential recruitment of executive resources during mind wandering

Recent research has shown that mind wandering recruits executive resources away from the external task towards inner thoughts. No studies however have determined whether executive functions are drawn away in a unitary manner during mind wandering episodes, or whether there is variation in specific functions impacted. Accordingly, we examined whether mind wandering differentially modulates three core executive functions—response inhibition, updating of working memory, and mental set shifting. In three experiments, participants performed one of these three executive function tasks and reported their attentional state as either on-task or mind wandering at random intervals. We found that mind wandering led to poorer performance in the response inhibition and working memory tasks, but not the set-shifting task. These findings suggest that mind wandering does not recruit executive functions in a monolithic manner. Rather, it appears to selectively engage certain executive functions, which may reflect the adaptive maintenance of ongoing task performance.     

The covariation of independent and dependant variables in neurofeedback: A proposal framework to identify cognitive processes and brain activity variables

This methodological article proposes a framework for analysing the relationship between cognitive processes and brain activity using variables measured by neurofeedback (NF) carried out by functional Magnetic Resonance Imagery (fMRI NF). Cognitive processes and brain activity variables can be analysed as either the dependant variable or the independent variable. Firstly, we propose two traditional approaches, defined in the article as the “neuropsychological” approach (NP) and the “psychophysiology” approach (PP), to extract dependent and independent variables in NF protocols. Secondly, we suggest that NF can be inspired by the style of inquiry used in neurophenomenology. fMRI NF allows participants to experiment with his or her own cognitive processes and their effects on brain region of interest (ROI) activations simultaneously. Thus, we suggest that fMRI NF could be improved by implementing “the elicitation interview method”, which allows the investigator to gather relevant verbatim from participants’ introspection on subjective experiences.     

Theory‐of‐Mind development and early sibling relationships after the birth of a sibling: Parental discipline matters

This study investigated relations among children's Theory‐of‐Mind (ToM) development, early sibling interactions, and parental discipline strategies during the transition to siblinghood. Using a sample of firstborn children and their parents (N = 208), we assessed children's ToM before the birth of a sibling and 12 months after the birth, and sibling interactions (i.e., positive engagement and antagonism) and parental discipline strategies (i.e., child‐centred and parent‐centred discipline) at 4 and 8 months in the first year of siblinghood. Structural equation modelling analyses revealed that children's ToM before the birth of the sibling predicted children's positive engagement with the infant sibling, whereas children's antagonistic behaviours towards the infant sibling negatively predicted children's ToM at 12 months, but only when mothers used low levels of child‐centred discipline. These findings emphasize the role of parents in the development of young children's social‐cognitive understanding in the context of early sibling interactions.

Highlights

• This study investigated relations among firstborns' Theory‐of‐Mind (ToM), early sibling relationships, and parental discipline during the first year of siblinghood.
• Multigroup analyses showed that ToM predicted higher sibling positive engagement, and early sibling antagonism predicted poorer ToM when mothers used low child‐centred discipline.
• Parental discipline plays an important role in the development of young children's social understanding and sibling relationships as early as the first year of siblinghood.

     

Influencing the occurrence of mind wandering while reading

The current concerns hypothesis suggests that directing attention towards unfulfilled plans of the individual prior to a task would result in more off-task thoughts (or mind wandering). In this experiment, participants were asked to read a scientific text and self-report instances of mind wandering by indicating when they were experiencing task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) or task-related interferences (TRIs). Prior to reading, participants in the individual plans experimental condition were asked to reflect upon their short-term plans by making a “to do” list while participants in a control condition were asked to make a list of the components of an automobile. In support of the current concerns hypothesis, directing attention towards the short-term plans resulted in significantly more TUTs, but not TRIs. Furthermore, participants in the individual plans condition had significantly lower scores on an assessment of reading comprehension, and this relationship was mediated by the frequency of TUTs.