Metacognitive components of writing: Construction and validation of the Metacognitive Components of Planning Writing Self-inventory (MCPW-I)

IntroductionWriting and metacognition play an essential function in the learning process, in that writers engage arduous cognitive efforts by selecting and organizing ideas, then reviewing and readjusting them.ObjectiveThe present research aimed to construct and validate a self-report instrument to measure some specific metacognitive processes implicated in writing planning. Two categories of metacognitive components were considered: metacognitive knowledge and self-regulation strategies.MethodBased on exploratory and confirmatory analyses, the Metacognitive Components of Planning Writing Self-inventory (MCPW-I) was constructed and validated. This instrument is composed of three factors: Metacognitive Conditional Knowledge – MCK (6 items), Covert Self-regulation – CSF (4 items), and Environmental self-regulation – ESF (5 items). 1022 undergraduates students engaged in various programs of a French university filled in the inventory.ResultsThe alpha coefficients indicated a reliable internal consistency and the test-retest reliability showed a good temporal stability. Correlational analyses revealed that the CRS factor was related to ESR and MCK factors, and these last two were not correlated with each other. After the analysis of variance, the responses relative to ESR and MCK dimensions differed according to gender, but no differences relatively to the academic disciplines considered was found. Concerning the predictive validity, CSF and MCK were correlated with writing performance.ConclusionThe results confirm the validity and reliability of the MCPW-I which constitutes a new research tool for the study of metacognitive processes of writing.     

Metacognitions in proneness towards hallucinations and delusions

The objectives of the present study were to examine the degree of co-existence of hallucinations and delusions in the nonclinical population. In addition, we wished to investigate the role of metacognitions in hallucinations and delusions. Finally, we explored the relative roles of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs in proneness to hallucinations and delusions. Three hundred and thirty-one nonclinical participants completed instruments assessing: hallucination-proneness (Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale; LSHS), delusion-proneness (21-item version of the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory; PDI-21) and metacognitive beliefs (Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire; MCQ). Participants were successively grouped according to their scores on the LSHS and the PDI-21. Results revealed that hallucination-proneness was positively and significantly associated with delusion-proneness. Furthermore, hallucination-prone and delusion-prone participants scored significantly higher on some sub-scales of the MCQ compared to non-prone participants. Finally, multiple regression analysis revealed that positive and negative beliefs were good predictors of proneness towards hallucinations and delusions.     

Inter-individual variability in metacognitive ability for visuomotor performance and underlying brain structures

Metacognition refers to the ability to discriminate between one’s own correct and incorrect decisions. The neurobiological underpinnings of metacognition have mainly been studied in perceptual decision-making. Here we investigated whether differences in brain structure predict individual variability in metacognitive sensitivity for visuomotor performance. Participants had to draw straight trajectories toward visual targets, which could unpredictably deviate around detection threshold, report such deviations when detected, and rate their confidence level for such reports. Structural brain MRI analyses revealed that larger gray-matter volume (GMV) in the left middle occipital gyrus, left medial parietal cortex, and right postcentral gyrus predicted higher deviation detection sensitivity. By contrast, larger GMV in the right prefrontal cortex but also right anterior insula and right fusiform gyrus predicted higher metacognitive sensitivity. These results extend past research by linking metacognitive sensitivity for visuomotor behavior to brain areas involved in action agency (insula), executive control (prefrontal cortex) and vision (fusiform).     

Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition?

This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.     

Pseudoneglect: evidence for both perceptual and attentional factors

When neurologically normal individuals bisect a horizontal line as accurately as possible, they reliably show a slight leftward error. This leftward inaccuracy is called pseudoneglect because errors made by neurologically normal individuals are directionally opposite to those made by persons with visuospatial neglect (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). In the current study, normal right-handed observers bisected horizontal lines that were altered to bias line length judgments either toward the right or the left side of the line. Non-target dots were placed on or near the line stimuli using principles derived from a theory of visual illusions of length called centroid extraction (Morgan, Hole, & Glennerster, 1990). This theory argues that the position of a visual target is calculated as the mean position of all stimuli in close proximity to the target stimulus. We predicted that perceptual alterations that shifted the direction of centroid extraction would also shift the direction of line bisection errors. Our findings confirmed this prediction and support the idea that both perceptual and attentional factors contribute to the pseudoneglect effect.     

Self-evaluation and self-perception: The role of attention in the experience of anxiety

Abstract

Self-awareness promotes the experience of anxiety in two ways. It does so directly, by enhancing awareness of the emotional state itself, and by initiating the self-evaluation process that is necessary for anxiety to occur. It also does so indirectly, by constraining some behaviors and inhibiting others. In particular, it increases accuracy of self-perception, and, in so doing, retards the process of self-delusion. This is important, because the latter process has been shown to have a salutary effect on mental health, acting as a buffer against dysphoric states such as depression and anxiety.     

Do social norms,false belief understanding,and metacognitive vocabulary influence irony comprehension? A study of five- and seven-year-old children

This study explores the effects of violating socially shared versus situationally defined norms on the understanding of ironic statements in 70 Italian-speaking five- and seven-year-old children. We also considered the possible relationships between irony understanding, receptive and metacognitive vocabulary, and false belief understanding. The results showed that violating socially shared norms does not benefit younger children's understanding of irony, although it does help older children's understanding. Ironic utterances that violate situationally defined norms were understood similarly across the two age groups. First- and second-order false belief understanding did not predict children's ability to interpret irony, although metacognitive vocabulary did predict interpretation for the seven-year-old group in instances of violating a situationally defined norm.     

Maintaining Life Satisfaction: The Role of Positive Cognitive Bias

Recent research into population standards of life satisfaction has revealed a remarkable level of uniformity, with the mean values for Western populations clustering at around three-quarters of the measurement scale maximum. While this seems to suggest the presence of a homeostatic mechanism for life satisfaction, the character of such a hypothetical device is uncertain. This paper proposes that well-being homeostasis is controlled by positive cognitive biases pertaining to the self. Most particular in this regard are the positive biases in relation to self-esteem, control and optimism. Past controversies in relation to this proposition are reviewed and resolved in favour of the proposed mechanism. The empirical data to support this hypothesis are discussed in the context of perceived well-being as an adaptive human attribute.     

“To‐be‐forgotten” statements become less true: Memory processes involved in selection and forgetting lead to truthfulness changes of ambiguous sentences

What happens when people try to forget something? What are the consequences of instructing people to intentionally forget a sentence? Recent studies employing the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm have shown that to‐be‐forgotten (TBF) items are, in a subsequent task, emotionally devaluated relative to to‐be‐remembered (TBR) items, an aftereffect of memory selection (Vivas, Marful, Panagiotidou & Bajo, 2016). As such, distractor devaluation by attentional selection generalizes to memory selection. In this study, we use the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm to test the effects of memory selection and inhibition on truth judgments of ambiguous sentences. We expected the relative standing of an item in the task (i.e., whether it was instructed to be remembered or forgotten) to affect the truthfulness value of that item, making TBF items less valid/truthful than TBR items. As predicted, ambiguous sentences associated with a “Forget” cue were subsequently judged as less true than sentences associated with a “Remember” cue, suggesting that instructions to intentionally forget a statement can produce changes in the validity/truthfulness of that statement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show an influence of memory processes involved in selection and forgetting on the perceived truthfulness of sentences.     

Do positive illusions predict overconfidence in judgment? A test using interval production and probability evaluation measures of miscalibration

We address the question as to whether judgmental overconfidence, as assessed by probability miscalibration, is related to positive illusions about the self. We first demonstrate that judgmental overconfidence measured with interval production procedures can be considered a trait, due to correlations observed in miscalibration scores in two sets of general‐knowledge questions of varying difficulty administered at different times. In addition, the hard‐easy effect operated in different ways on overprecision and self‐placement of one's performance relative to others: The more difficult the calibration task, the greater the over precision but the greater the under placement of one's performance. Finally, there was no evidence that miscalibration was related to dispositional optimism and self‐efficacy. A second study extended these results by including further measures of disposition to experience positive illusions such as unrealistic optimism, a general tendency to consider oneself “better‐than‐average,” and two indexes of dispositional perception of control. The positive illusion measures showed considerable inter‐correlations, but did not correlate with miscalibration on the interval production task, and correlated negatively with optimism concerning societal risks. A final study replicated this pattern of findings, but showed that disposition to positive illusions did predict miscalibration on the same questions measured with a probability evaluation technique. Our research demonstrates that “overconfidence” is not a unitary construct, but a series of overlapping ones. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.