Arguers as editors

People use editorial criteria to decide whether to say or to suppress potential arguments. These criteria constitute people's standards as to what effective and appropriate arguments are like, and reflect general interaction goals. A series of empirical investigations has indicated that the standards fall into three classes: those having to do with argument effectiveness, those concerned with personal issues for arguer and target, and those centered on discourse quality. The essay also sketches the affinities certain types of people have for the different criteria.     

右侧颞顶联合区及道德加工脑网络的功能连接预测社会性框架效应：来自静息态功能磁共振的证据

社会性框架效应指个体进行社会性决策时, 描述方式(即框架)对其选择倾向的影响。采用“伤害/帮助框架”范式, 本研究在行为上发现了显著的框架效应：被试在伤害框架下比帮助框架下, 更倾向于选择利他选项, 这可能是由于伤害框架凸显了伤害他人的后果及有意性, 从而提高了道德冲突水平。在神经活动上发现(1)静息态下, 右侧颞顶联合区(TPJ)的低频振荡振幅(ALFF)与框架效应强度存在显著正相关; (2)道德加工相关脑区构成的局部脑网络内部的功能连接强度(FC)能够有效预测框架效应强度。本研究首次利用静息态功能连接探讨个体的社会性决策受到语言表述方式影响的神经机制, 为进一步揭示社会决策中的个体差异提供了神经学证据。     

Blind justice: Fairness to groups and the do-no-harm principle

People are reluctant to harm some people in order to help others, even when the harm is less than the forgone help (the harm resulting from not acting). The present studies use hypothetical scenarios to argue that these judgments go against what the subjects themselves would take to be the best overall outcome. When the outcomes in question are income gains and losses for two groups of farmers, subjects judge the harm they would not impose through their action to be smaller than the harm they would impose through inaction. Some subjects refuse to reduce cure rates for one group of AIDS patients in order to increase cure rates more for another group, even when group membership was unknowable to anyone, so that, from each patient's point of view, the change would increase the probability of cure. Likewise, they resisted a vaccine that reduced overall mortality in one group but increased deaths from side effects in another group, even when, again, group membership was unknowable. Some people apply a do-no-harm principle to groups without apparent understanding of how such a principle might be justified in terms of its consequences. The capacity for such judgments makes them vulnerable to learning principles that have no justification at all.     

Living with Contradictions: The Taken-for-Granted in Israeli Political Discourse

Two apparently contradictory ideas are closely linked in Israeli political discourse: Israel is powerful and independent and Israel is vulnerable and dependent. This study used content analysis and focus groups, as well as existing survey data analyzed by others, to explore how this paradox has been reflected in newspapers and conversations during six different time periods from 1948 to 1996. The goal was not to explain the paradox but to examine its consequences for Israeli perceptions of U.S. policy in the Middle East—and, in the process, to explore Israeli self-images. The nature of U.S. strategic interests was originally treated as problematic and in need of political discussion, but in the past 25 years these interests have become taken for granted. Surprisingly, even after the end of the Cold War, a critical discourse moment in which a reexamination of U.S. interests in the Middle East would seem inevitable, the U.S. role remains taken for granted and largely unexamined. The strong/vulnerable paradox explains this absence of discussion: Examining U.S. interests too closely upsets the delicate balance that keeps the sense of vulnerability in check.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.     

Message sidedness in advertising: the moderating roles of need for cognition and time pressure in persuasion

Persuasion has been extensively researched for decades. Much of this research has focused on different message tactics and their effects on persuasion (e.g., Chang & Chou, 2008; Lafferty, 1999). This research aims to assess whether the persuasion of a specific type of message is influenced by need for cognition (NFC) and time pressure. The 336 undergraduates participated in a 2 (message sidedness: one-sided/two-sided) × 3 (time pressure: low/moderate/high) between-subjects design. Results indicate that two-sided messages tend to elicit more favorable ad attitudes than one-sided messages. As compared with low-NFC individuals, high-NFC individuals are likely to express more favorable ad attitudes, brand attitudes and purchase intention. Moderate time pressure tends to lead to more favorable ad attitudes than low time pressure and high time pressure. In addition, moderate time pressure is likely to elicit more favorable brand attitudes and purchase intentions than high time pressure, but does not elicit more favorable brand attitudes and purchase intentions than low time pressure. Furthermore, when high-NFC individuals are under low or moderate time pressure, two-sided messages are more persuasive than one-sided messages; however, message sidedness does not differentially affect the persuasion when high-NFC individuals are pressed for time. In contrast, one-sided messages are more persuasive than two-sided messages when low-NFC individuals are under low or high time pressure, and two-sided messages are more persuasive than one-sided messages when low-NFC individuals are under moderate time pressure.     

The road traveled,the road ahead,or simply on the road? When progress framing affects motivation in goal pursuit

The present research examined the dynamic interplay between the framing of one's progress from an initial state toward an end state (i.e., framed as the distance traveled from the initial state to the current state -‘to-date’ versus framed as the distance left from the current state to the end state -‘to-go’) and construal level in influencing motivation in goal pursuit. In three experiments we found that both state and chronic differences in experienced construal level modulate the impact of progress framing on motivation at a specific stage in goal pursuit, i.e., when consumers are halfway between the initial and end state, but is less consequential at the initial or end stages. This modulation shows that type of framing only affected motivation of people with an abstract, but not a concrete mindset. Under these conditions, progress framed in terms of to-date produced increased motivation compared to a to-go frame. Moreover, perceived goal distance was found to mediate the impact of progress framing on motivation for individuals with an abstract, but not a concrete mindset.     

眼睛注视线索对经济领域风险决策的影响：基于框架效应范式

采用基金投资框架任务,结合眼动技术考察眼睛注视线索与框架类型对风险决策的影响。结果发现：（1）消极眼睛注视线索促进了被试在损失框架下的风险寻求行为,控制组与积极、中性、消极眼睛组的行为结果无显著差异;（2）以均字注视次数为指标的眼动结果表明,积极眼睛组和中性眼睛组对确定损益的关注差异大于对风险损益的关注差异;消极眼睛组和控制组被试对损失的关注大于对收益的关注,对确定项的关注大于对风险项的关注,但两者不存在交互作用。消极眼睛注视线索可能改变了个体对风险性和确定性的感知,并因此影响了人们的风险决策行为,规避消极情绪线索可能有助于减少经济决策中的风险寻求行为。     

Extreme Outcomes Sway Risky Decisions from Experience

Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.