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Tuomas E. Tahko 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):335-340
In this paper I offer a counterexample to the so called vagueness argument against restricted composition. This will be done
in the lines of a recent suggestion by Trenton Merricks, namely by challenging the claim that there cannot be a sharp cut-off
point in a composition sequence. It will be suggested that causal powers which emerge when composition occurs can serve as
an indicator of such sharp cut-off points. The main example will be the case of a heap. It seems that heaps might provide
a very plausible counterexample to the vagueness argument if we accept the idea that four grains of sand is the least number
required to compose a heap—the case has been supported by W. D. Hart. My purpose here is not to put forward a new theory of
composition, I only wish to refute the vagueness argument and point out that we should be wary of arguments of its form.
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Tuomas E. TahkoEmail: |
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Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):479-503
AbstractI focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimination of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at the same time. One problem for both arguments is that weak overdetermination isn't obviously objectionable. That point has been well made before. But I want here to go further than merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination arguments. I want to tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist weak overdetermination and explain why their conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their case on the same motivating principle, which I call the principle of additional causal powers. This principle, I argue further, should be rejected. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against those at whom the arguments are directed. 相似文献
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Simon Langford 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(5):613-630
According to philosophical orthodoxy, there are informative criteria of identity over time. Anti-criterialism rejects this orthodoxy and claims that there are no such criteria. This paper examines anti-criterialism in the light of recent attacks on the thesis by Matt Duncan, Sydney Shoemaker and Dean Zimmerman. It is argued that those attacks are not successful. Along the way, a novel strategy to defend anti-criterialism against the critics’ most challenging objection is developed. Under-appreciated difficulties for criterialism are also raised which, I claim, there is no obvious way to solve. It is concluded that anti-criterialism may be a much stronger rival to criterialism than is often supposed. 相似文献
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