Virtue and the Good Life in the Early Confucian Tradition

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self‐sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non‐moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non‐moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non‐moral goods in human life.     

Emotional Attachment and Its Limits: Mengzi,Gaozi and the Guodian Discussions

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi’s interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi’s view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi’s complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as “rightness,” or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history.     

试论孟子与士人精神

作为中国“轴心时代”的重要思想家,孟子希望以道德化政治,实现天下有道。他提出士人修养的“浩然之气”,在士人与君主的关系上主张“道高于君”,而对于广大普通民众则倡导“使先知觉后知,使先觉觉后觉”。在此基础上,孟子推出了四种士人典范。而在孟子这些思想中,一以贯之的乃是对德性的张扬,在“尊德性”与“道问学”之间,他明显偏重于前者,这是孟子关于士人精神的特色所在。在孟子的精神世界里,我们可以看到的更多的是一种道德信仰和勇气。正是从这个意义上讲,孟子是一位信仰道德的“宗教家”,而不是一位代表智性的“学问家”。     

"仁"与"未仁"的两难选择--孔、孟、荀评管仲解读

自孔子称管仲“如其仁”,之后的孟、荀却给出了不同的评价,后代儒者就面临诠释管仲之仁与未仁的两难选择。本文即联系诠释中所显现的问题,考察孔、孟、荀何以会给出各自不同的评价,试图还原先秦儒家面对现实管仲时所体现出的评价原则,梳理孔、孟、荀由此而展开的思维理路,并为理解先秦儒家的核心理念及运用原则提供补益。     

Mencius,Hume, and the virtue of humanity: sources of benevolent moral development

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we elucidate the moral psychology and what we might call the moral sociology of Mencius and of Hume, and we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that there are strong similarities between Mencius and Hume concerning some of the principal psychological sources of the virtue of humanity. Second, we show that there are strong similarities between the two concerning some of the principal social sources of the virtue of humanity. Third, we argue that there are related, though weaker, similarities between Mencius and Hume concerning some of the principal cognitive sources of the virtue of humanity. We conclude by suggesting that the number and nature of these similarities demonstrate the need for future research on the conceptual connections between Confucian and Humean moral philosophy, especially on the psychological and social sources of benevolent moral development.     

千年误读：驳孟子“迂阔”论

二千多年来孟子一直被视为“迂阔”的典型,历史的偏见至今未得到彻底的厘清。其实孟子是位坚定的现实主义者,其学术的基调是坚持从实际出发,其哲学的根本精神是强调实事求是。孟子反对脱离实际、超越现实可能性的社会经济政策;主张道德源于生活,摈弃与生活严重脱节的虚骄的道德言行;坚持条件论,强调事物存在的现实性,强调人能有所为,但不能无所不为。孟子的条件论为其思想的务实精神,奠定了哲学基础。     

《孟子》对戴震《原善》的影响

《孟子》在义理和话语两方面深深影响到戴震的《原善》。戴震将《易传》的“继善成性”与孟子的性善论区别为两个问题,前者是泛论,后者专论人性。受孟子断言“天之生物使之一本”的鼓舞,戴震严厉批评宋儒所谓性分义理、气质两种的学说犯了“二本”的错误。《原善》关于心的论述,关于“仁义礼智圣”和“条理”话语的使用,都鲜明表现出《孟子》的启发和影响。     

VIRTUE AS MASTERY IN EARLY CONFUCIANISM

This essay explores the interrelation of skills and virtues. I first trace one line of analysis from Aristotle to Alasdair MacIntyre, which argues that there is a categorical difference between skills and virtues, in their ends and intrinsic character. This familiar distinction is fine in certain respects but still importantly misleading. Virtue in general, and also some particular virtues such as ritual propriety and practical wisdom, are not just exercised in practical contexts, but are in fact partially constituted by the mastery of certain skills. This has implications for moral psychology, specifically how we might understand the acquisition of virtue, as well as its very nature. To try to make this claim plausible I analyze two case studies from early Confucianism: treatment of ritual propriety as a cardinal virtue, and Mencius's less carefully integrated treatment of excellence at moral discernment. I conclude by revisiting the question of the relations between skill and virtue, and exploring a few of the difficulties implied by my account of early Confucian ethics.     

做一个大写的人:我们在阅读中与《孟子》相逢

如果我们愿意在阅读中与《孟子》相逢,我们就应该立志去做一个大写的人。从道德理想主义层面看,《孟子》要求我们“证性善”,确立人之为人的性善之本;期盼我们“恶乡愿”,拒斥八面玲珑的伪善之方。从文化守成主义层面看,《孟子》呼唤我们“友古人”,经由对优秀文化传统的回想而求证本根之源;促使我们“辟邪说”,通过对异端邪说的批驳而澄清智慧之旅。有理想有文化的人,才会是一个大写的人。无论对于针砭欲望横流的当下世态,还是对于建构人皆尧舜的未来愿景,这种人格的理论意义和现实作用都是不可低估的。