Traction-energy balancing adaptive control with slip optimization for wheeled robots on rough terrain

On rough terrain, excessive wheel slippage is easily generated by changes of surface conditions such as soil types and geometries. It induces considerable loss of wheel traction and battery energy. To prevent this, wheeled robots should consistently recognize the current situation generated between wheel and surface. And also wheeled robots are required to optimally control wheel motion in limited wheel traction and battery capacity. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel wheel control algorithm based on slip optimization of traction and energy, which is adaptive to change of surface condition. Proposed wheel control algorithm is called Traction-Energy Balancing Adaptive Control (TEB) in this paper and TEB assigns optimized rotation speed to each wheel by observing wheel slip ratio which is a key parameter of TEB. As functions of TEB, TEB is largely divided into three main parts; (1) slip optimizer (2) slip controller (3) SC-compensator. In the slip optimizer, two optimal slip models were derived as a function of slip ratios regarding maximum traction and tractive efficiency using experimental data about wheel-terrain interaction in three types of soil (grass, gravel and sand). And the optimal slip models were employed in order to determine a desired slip value of wheel with observation of a change in actual robot velocity as control input in the slip controller. For optimal slip control, the proposed slip controller is based on conventional PID controller with compensating disturbance in the controller (SC-compensator) which occurs by change of surface shapes. In the SC-compensator, radial function networks (RBFN) was applied in the slip controller and RBFN was of help to readjust previously set PID gains depending on occurred slip error. Finally, TEB was experimentally verified by controlling a real robot having four wheels on various terrain types.     

How do affected interests support global democracy?

In this paper, I critique one way of arguing for global democracy on grounds of affected interests and defend another. A famous argument for global democracy, which I call the Demos-Based Argument, attempts to justify global democracy based on the claim that affected interests vindicate individual claims to democratic participation or representation. I analyze and evaluate the Demos-Based Argument and consider different ways of interpreting and justifying its crucial premise: the Principle of Affected Interests. The result is that the argument fails. One lesson of the discussion of the Demos-Based Argument is that the most promising, though eventually unsuccessful, justification of the Principle of Affected Interests is utilitarian. Given the failure of the Demos-Based Argument, the question suggests itself if there is another way to argue for global democracy on utilitarian grounds. I will outline a promising alternative argument for global democracy, which I call the Direct Argument. Like the Demos-Based Argument, the Direct Argument is based on affected interests and ultimately on utilitarianism, but unlike the former, the Direct Argument avoids the detour over stating a criterion for individual claims to democratic participation and representation.     

Computational exploration of metaphor comprehension processes using a semantic space model

Recent metaphor research has revealed that metaphor comprehension involves both categorization and comparison processes. This finding has triggered the following central question: Which property determines the choice between these two processes for metaphor comprehension? Three competing views have been proposed to answer this question: the conventionality view ( Bowdle & Gentner, 2005 ), aptness view ( Glucksberg & Haught, 2006b ), and interpretive diversity view ( Utsumi, 2007 ); these views, respectively, argue that vehicle conventionality, metaphor aptness, and interpretive diversity determine the choice between the categorization and comparison processes. This article attempts to answer the question regarding which views are plausible by using cognitive modeling and computer simulation based on a semantic space model. In the simulation experiment, categorization and comparison processes are modeled in a semantic space constructed by latent semantic analysis. These two models receive word vectors for the constituent words of a metaphor and compute a vector for the metaphorical meaning. The resulting vectors can be evaluated according to the degree to which they mimic the human interpretation of the same metaphor; the maximum likelihood estimation determines which of the two models better explains the human interpretation. The result of the model selection is then predicted by three metaphor properties (i.e., vehicle conventionality, aptness, and interpretive diversity) to test the three views. The simulation experiment for Japanese metaphors demonstrates that both interpretive diversity and vehicle conventionality affect the choice between the two processes. On the other hand, it is found that metaphor aptness does not affect this choice. This result can be treated as computational evidence supporting the interpretive diversity and conventionality views.     

论朱熹对"继善成性"说的规范

"继善成性"是易学哲学的重要问题.朱熹解释"继善成性"总体上不是为字义的通顺,而在为他的理学本体论作论证.理上气下的基本原则通过易学的语言进一步得到贯彻.善与性、天与人、未发与已发、天理流行与人物成性等,虽也体现了天人之间的密切关联,但又不能将一般天理与已具形质的人性混淆起来."继善成性"说的优长,就在于它将由天至人的生成序列,解释为一个以天道为本而构筑本性的思辨逻辑,同时兼顾个体形质生成带来的特殊性.而本性只是"存"而非"成",以卫护本然之性纯善无恶的假定.     

The (near) necessity of alternate possibilities for moral responsibility

Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.

The Argument from Moral Experience

It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.

Global Distributive Justice

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's "duty of assistance to burdened societies" cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice.     

汉语并列式合成词的词汇通达

汉语并列式合成词具有三种类型,这三种类型内部不同的词素组合在心理词典中则需要不同的词汇通达时间。实验结果表明,在对汉语并列式合成词的词汇通达过程中,第一成分并不总是起决定作用;同样,并列式合成词中的两个成分在词汇通达过程中并不总是同等重要。实验证明,语义透明度对并列式合成词的词汇通达起重要作用。实验还发现,在心理词典中对并列式合成词的词汇通达需要一个证实原则。     

From stratospheric ozone to climate change: Historical perspective on precaution and scientific responsibility

The issue of the impact of human activities on the stratospheric ozone layer emerged in the early 1970s. But international regulations to mitigate the most serious effects were not adopted until the mid-1980s. This case holds lessons for addressing more complex environmental problems. Concepts that should inform discussion include “latency,’ ‘counter-factual scenario based on the Precautionary Principle,’ ‘inter-generational burden sharing,’ and ‘estimating global costs under factual and counter-factual regulatory scenarios.’ Stringent regulations were adopted when large scientific uncertainty existed, and the environmental problem would have been prevented or more rapidly mitigated, at relatively modest incremental price, but for a time delay before more rigorous Precautionary measures were implemented. Will history repeat itself in the case of climate change?     

Frege,Boolos, and Logical Objects

In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of logical objects (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the eta relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the eta relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted Comprehension for Logical Objects and banishes encoding (eta) formulas from Comprehension for Properties. The relative mathematical and philosophical strengths of the two theories are discussed. Along the way, new results in the theory of abstract objects are described, involving: (a) the theory of extensions, (b) the theory of directions and shapes, and (c) the theory of truth values.