The effect of very brief exposure on experienced fear after in vivo exposure

Two experiments tested the effect of exposure to masked phobic stimuli at a very brief stimulus onset asynchrony on reducing the subjective experience of fear caused by in vivo exposure to a feared object. In the main experiment, 35 spider-fearful and 35 non-fearful participants were identified with a questionnaire and a Behavioural Avoidance Test (BAT) with a live tarantula. One week later, they were individually administered one of two continuous series of masked images: spiders or flowers. They engaged in the BAT again immediately thereafter. They provided ratings of subjective fear at the end of each BAT (pre- and post-manipulation). Very brief exposure to images of spiders reduced the fearful group's and not the non-fearful group's experience of fear at the end of the BAT. This effect was replicated with another sample of 26 spider-fearful participants from the same population. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

Representational masking and the attentional blink

After successful detection of a target item within a stream of rapidly displayed visual stimuli, subsequent detection of an additional target is impaired for roughly 500 ms. This impairment is known as the “attentional blink” (AB). Previous studies have found that if either the first (Tl; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) or second target (T2; Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998) is not followed by a mask, the AB impairment is significantly reduced. Whereas low-level perceptual factors have been found to influence the efficacy of masking in the AB (e.g., Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997), the current experiment used a higher level (representational) manipulation, i.e., repetition blindness to reduce the efficacy of target masking in the AB. These findings contribute to the growing literature suggesting that masking plays more than a perceptual role in the AB phenomenon.     

The influence of a salient distractor in object-substitution masking

It remains unclear whether a salient distractor directly affects performance accuracy and the perceptual resolution of a target. In order to investigate this issue, the present study employed object substitution masking (OSM) to index perceptual hypothesis testing of a target. Trailing-mask duration of the four-dot mask was varied to investigate how the representation of the masked target decayed over time. Participants responded to the presence of a vertical line on a target ring that was isolated by a four-dot mask while an irrelevant salient distractor was presented in a subset of trials. The results revealed that the salient distractor only impacted performance when the mask and target offset concurrently (Experiment 1) or at short mask durations (Experiment 2). At longer mask durations performance in the distractor present condition was identical to performance in the distractor absent condition, suggesting that involuntary capture of attention did not affect OSM. These results show that the perceptual resolution of a masked target can operate independently of involuntary attentional selection.     

Unconscious integration of pointing relation between two masked arrows

In the present study, by using a briefly masked prime display paradigm, we investigated whether the pointing relation (same or different) between two unconsciously perceived arrows in the prime could be processed. Since only motor response priming can reflect unconscious processing of two arrows’ pointing-direction relation (i.e., a relational integration), we could distinguish the motor response priming from the visual priming in this study which in other studies were not separated. We also manipulated the prime-to-target stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) by using a 70?ms and a 180?ms SOA. In this experiment, two masked arrow signs pointing in the same or different directions (> > or > <) were simultaneously presented in the prime, followed by two arrow symbols also pointing in the same or different directions in the target. The participants were asked to decide whether the two arrows in the target were pointing in the same or different directions. The results did not show any visual priming effect, but did show that the unconsciously perceived pointing relation in the prime elicited a positive motor response priming effect in RT under the 70?ms SOA condition, and a negative motor response priming effect in accuracy under the 180?ms SOA condition. The results were discussed in terms of self-motor-inhibition (or mask-triggered inhibition) and attention mechanisms. Overall, this study indicated that the pointing relation between the two subliminal arrows in the prime could influence the subsequent responses to the target and suggested that people can integrate unconsciously perceived information.     

PRP-paradigm provides evidence for a perceptual origin of the negative compatibility effect

Visual stimuli (primes) that are made invisible by masking can affect motor responses to a subsequent target stimulus. When a prime is followed by a mask which is followed by a target stimulus, an inverse priming effect (or negative compatibility effect) has been found: Responses are slow and frequently incorrect when prime and target stimuli are congruent, but fast and accurate when prime and target stimuli are incongruent. To functionally localize the origins of inverse priming effects, we applied the psychological refractory period (PRP-) paradigm which distinguishes a perceptual level, a central bottleneck, and a level of motor execution. Two dual-task experiments were run with the PRP-paradigm to localize the inverse priming effect relative to the central bottleneck. Together, results of the Effect-Absorption and the Effect-Propagation Procedure suggest that inverse priming effects are generated by perceptual mechanisms. We suggest two perceptual mechanisms as the source of inverse priming effects.     

Changes in processing of masked stimuli across early- and late-night sleep: a study on behavior and brain potentials

Sleep has proven to support the memory consolidation in many tasks including learning of perceptual skills. Explicit, conscious types of memory have been demonstrated to benefit particularly from slow-wave sleep (SWS), implicit, non-conscious types particularly from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. By comparing the effects of early-night sleep, rich in SWS, and late-night sleep, rich in REM sleep, we aimed to separate the contribution of these two sleep stages in a metacontrast masking paradigm in which explicit and implicit aspects in perceptual learning could be assessed separately by stimulus identification and priming, respectively. We assumed that early sleep intervening between two sessions of task performance would specifically support stimulus identification, while late sleep would specifically support priming. Apart from overt behavior, event-related EEG potentials (ERPs) were measured to record the cortical mechanisms associated with behavioral changes across sleep. In contrast to our hypothesis, late-night sleep appeared to be more important for changes of behavior, both for stimulus identification, which tended to improve across late-night sleep, and for priming, with the increase of errors induced by masked stimuli correlating with the duration of REM sleep. ERP components proved sensitive to presence of target shapes in the masked stimuli and to their priming effects. Of these components, the N2 component, indicating processing of conflict, became larger across early-night sleep and was related to the duration of S4 sleep, the deepest substage of SWS containing particularly high portions of EEG slow waves. These findings suggest that sleep promotes perceptual learning primarily by its REM sleep portion, but indirectly also by way of improved action monitoring supported by deep slow-wave sleep.     

Unconscious semantic priming in the absence of partial awareness

In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words (i.e., could consciously perceive subword features that enabled reconstruction of whole words). Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux’s in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing (rather than partial awareness) of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words.     

Formation of semantic associations between subliminally presented face-word pairs

Recent evidence suggests that consciousness of encoding is not necessary for the rapid formation of new semantic associations. We investigated whether unconsciously formed associations are as semantically precise as would be expected for associations formed with consciousness of encoding during episodic memory formation. Pairs of faces and written occupations were presented subliminally for unconscious associative encoding. Five minutes later, the same faces were presented suprathreshold for the cued unconscious retrieval of face-occupation associations. Retrieval instructions required participants to classify the presented individuals according to their putative (1) regularity of income, (2) length of education, and (3) creativity value of occupational activity. The three instructions yielded more classifications consistent with a person’s occupation if the person had been subliminally presented with his written occupation versus a meaningless word (control condition). This suggests that consciousness is not necessary to encode, long-term store, and retrieve semantically precise associations between primarily unrelated items.     

Seeing the future: Natural image sequences produce “anticipatory” neuronal activity and bias perceptual report

This paper relates human perception to the functioning of cells in the temporal cortex that are engaged in high-level pattern processing. We review historical developments concerning (a) the functional organization of cells processing faces and (b) the selectivity for faces in cell responses. We then focus on (c) the comparison of perception and cell responses to images of faces presented in sequences of unrelated images. Specifically the paper concerns the cell function and perception in circumstances where meaningful patterns occur momentarily in the context of a naturally or unnaturally changing visual environment. Experience of visual sequences allows anticipation, yet one sensory stimulus also “masks” perception and neural processing of subsequent stimuli. To understand this paradox we compared cell responses in monkey temporal cortex to body images presented individually, in pairs and in action sequences. Responses to one image suppressed responses to similar images for ～500 ms. This suppression led to responses peaking 100 ms earlier to image sequences than to isolated images (e.g., during head rotation, face-selective activity peaks before the face confronts the observer). Thus forward masking has unrecognized benefits for perception because it can transform neuronal activity to make it predictive during natural change.     

Autistic camouflaging across the spectrum

Camouflaging may be characterized as a set of actions and strategies more or less consciously adopted by some autistic people to navigate the neurotypical social world. Despite the increased interest that this phenomenon has garnered, its nature remains elusive and in need of conceptual clarification. In this paper, we aim to put forward an inclusive view of camouflaging that does justice to its complexity while also reflecting the heterogeneity of autism as a condition. First, we offer an overview of the main characterizations of camouflaging. This overview shows that current characterizations fail to paint a cohesive picture, and that different accounts emphasize different aspects of the phenomenon. Second, we explore the analogy between camouflaging and passing, which we take to be illuminating to describe some forms of camouflaging, while probably obscuring the study of others. Third, we extend the discussion about camouflaging to currently understudied groups across the autistic spectrum – i.e., children, and adults with linguistic and/or intellectual disabilities. We argue that camouflaging in such groups may differ from what the current literature describes as typical instances of camouflaging. We conclude by revisiting the nature of camouflaging in light of such understudied groups, and we offer some suggestions on how to move research forward.