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《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2016,(1):137-151
This paper discusses Penelope Maddy's (b.1950) naturalistic philosophy of mathematics,which is one of the most influential forms of post-Quinean naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics.Two defining features of Maddy's theory,namely the methodological autonomy of mathematics and the equivalence of Thin Realism and Arealism,are analyzed,and some criticisms of them are posed from within the naturalistic line of thought itself.In the course of this analysis and criticism,the paper will also consider Maddy's objections to the Quinean Indispensability Argument,which are the starting point of her own version of naturalism. 相似文献
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Lieven Decock 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):231-250
Quine's views on indispensability arguments in mathematics are scrutinised. A weak indispensability argument is distinguished
from a strong indispensability thesis. The weak argument is the combination of the criterion of ontological commitment, holism
and a mild naturalism. It is used to refute nominalism. Quine's strong indispensability thesis claims that one should consider
all and only the mathematical entities that are really indispensable. Quine has little support for this thesis. This is even
clearer if one takes into account Maddy's critique of Quine's strong indispensability thesis. Maddy's critique does not refute
Quine's weak indispensability argument. We are left with a weak and almost unassailable indispensability argument.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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