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Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative
introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s
margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which
is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of
modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to
solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective
knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of
the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common
knowledge in situations of bounded rationality. 相似文献
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Richard Fumerton 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):67-76
In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a
foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal
life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of
what we think we know and justifiably believe.
相似文献
Richard FumertonEmail: |
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