Ambiguity attitudes in qualitative contexts: The role of prior beliefs

Most studies of ambiguity aversion rely on experimental paradigms involving monetary bets. Thus, the extent to which ambiguity aversion occurs outside of such contexts is much less understood, particularly when the situation cannot easily be reduced to numerical terms. The present work seeks to understand whether people prefer to avoid ambiguous decisions in a variety of different qualitative domains (e.g., work, family, love, friendship, exercise, study, and health), and, if so, to determine the role played by prior beliefs in those domains. Across three studies, we presented participants with 24 vignettes and measured the degree to which they preferred risk to ambiguity in each. We also asked them for their prior probability estimates about the likely outcomes in the ambiguous events. Ambiguity aversion was observed in the vast majority of vignettes, but at different magnitudes. It was predicted by whether the vignette involved gain or loss as well as by people's prior beliefs; however, the heterogeneity between people meant that the role of prior beliefs was only evident in an individual-level analysis (i.e., not at the group level). Our results suggest that the desire to avoid ambiguity occurs in a wide variety of qualitative contexts but to different degrees for different people and may be partially driven by unfavorable prior estimates of the likely outcomes of the ambiguous events.     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

Culture of distracted driving among intra-city commercial bus drivers in Ile-Ife,South-western Nigeria

This study investigated the culture of driving distractions among commercial bus drivers in Ile-Ife, Southwestern Nigeria. The aim was to identify the most prominent non-driving activity (N-DA) causing distraction to drivers. 16 independent research assistants were engaged in naturalistic recording of 128 commercial bus drivers in the study area. Among the variables selected for observation, passenger scouting (93%), fare collection (89.8%) and money counting (75%) were found to be the frequent N-DAs in their order of importance. These variables (passenger scouting, fare collection and money counting), however, have correlations with drivers having no conductor on-board. More so, relationships existed between certain N-DAs (call making, passenger scouting, fare collection sight-seeing and money counting) and loss of concentration by drivers on one hand; and between loss of concentration and the forms the loss of concentration took. It can be concluded from the findings that driving was disrupted and uncoordinated when combined with non-driving activities.     

参照依赖和损失规避对个体收入分配公平判断的影响

收入分配公平判断是人们对自己收入所得公平与否的主观评价。通过对参照点和收入金额的控制,探讨参照依赖和损失规避对收入分配公平判断的共同影响。结果发现,(1)民众的收入公平判断受参照点的影响,在有参照点的情景下比无参照点情景下更感觉不公平;(2)不同工资水平下,民众的公平判断具有显著差异,而且民众对低于平均工资的“受损”比高于平均工资同等金额的“受益”赋予的公平感的权重更大,即存在得失感受的不对称;(3)不同的工资参照点、多得和少得的分配结果共同影响民众的公平判断,即损失规避在参照依赖对公平判断的影响中起调节作用。     

Hyperactivity in Children: A Focus on Genetic Research and Psychological Theories

Hyperactivity has attracted a large amount of research interest in recent years. Here we review developments in genetic research and in research testing psychological theories of the condition. Family, adoptee and twin studies indicate a strong role for genetic factors in the etiology of hyperactivity. Evidence is emerging also from molecular genetic studies, implicating specific genes that may be involved. At the level of cognitive functioning, a divided, focused or sustained attention deficit does not seem to be a core deficit in hyperactivity. Although children with hyperactivity often perform poorly on certain executive function tasks, there is disagreement about the interpretation of these findings. The association reported in some studies between a slow inhibitory process and hyperactivity may reflect a generally slow, variable in speed and inaccurate pattern of responding. Hypotheses about psychological mechanisms such as state regulation or delay aversion provide alternative, and particularly encouraging, interpretations of the findings. We discuss the possible integration of the two lines of research—those of genetic research and research on psychological mechanisms.     

Distractor effect on the latent inhibition of conditioned flavor aversion in rats

Using a conditioned flavor aversion procedure with rats as subjects, the effect of the addition of a distractor stimulus on the magnitude of the latent inhibition effect was examined. Experiment 1 showed that latent inhibition to vinegar was attenuated by the addition of sucrose during preexposure. On the other hand, sucrose added during conditioning to vinegar did not attenuate latent inhibition. It was also found that the degree of latent inhibition to the vinegar-sucrose compound solution was less when vinegar alone was preexposed (i.e., when sucrose was added only during conditioning) than when the compound solution was preexposed (i.e., when sucrose was added both during preexposure and during conditioning). Experiment 2 gave similar results but with sucrose assigned as the target flavor and vinegar as the distractor. These findings are in full agreement with the generalization decrement account of latent inhibition.     

Loss Aversion,Intellectual Inertia,and a Call for a More Contrarian Science: A Reply to Simonson & Kivetz and Higgins & Liberman

Higgins and Liberman (2018) and Simonson and Kivetz (2018) offer scholarly and stimulating perspectives on loss aversion and the implications for the sociology of science of its acceptance as a virtual law of nature. In our view, Higgins and Liberman (2018) largely complement our conclusion that the empirical evidence does not support loss aversion. Moreover, in alignment with our call for a contextualized perspective, they provide an excellent discourse on how a more nuanced view of reference points and consumers’ regulatory focus enriches our understanding of the psychological impact of losses and gains. Simonson and Kivetz (2018) approached our perspective with skepticism, and, while they retain some skepticism, they express agreement on the larger point that loss aversion has been accepted too uncritically. Both commentaries point to a need for a critical reevaluation of prevailing paradigms. Here, we build on these perspectives, as well as our experience working on the topic of loss aversion, to call for structural changes to facilitate scholarly debate on science's status quo.     

Salience Versus Proportional Reasoning: Rethinking the Mechanism Behind Graphical Display Effects

Two experiments examined predictions from two separate explanations for previously observed display effects for communicating low‐probability risks: foreground:background salience and proportional reasoning. According to foreground:background salience, people's risk perceptions are based on the relative salience of the foreground (number of people harmed) versus the background (number of people at risk), such that calling attention to the background makes the risk seem smaller. Conversely, the proportional reasoning explanation states that what matters is whether the respondent attends to the proportion, which conveys how small the risk is. In Experiment 1, we made the background more salient via color and bolding; in contrast to the foreground:background salience prediction, this manipulation did not influence participants' risk aversion. In Experiment 2, we separately manipulated whether the foreground and the background were displayed graphically or numerically. In keeping with the proportional reasoning hypothesis, there was an interaction whereby participants given formats that displayed the foreground and background in the same modality (graphs or numbers, thereby making the proportion easier to form) saw the probability as smaller and were less risk averse than participants given the information in different modalities. There was also a main effect of displaying the background graphically, providing some support for foreground:background salience. In total, this work suggests that the proportional reasoning account provides a good explanation of many display effects related to communicating low‐probability risks, although there is some role for foreground:background salience as well. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Decisions Made by Group Representatives More Risk Averse? The Effect of Sense of Responsibility

We tested the hypothesis that a sense of responsibility drives group representatives' decisions to be more risk averse compared with decisions made by individuals. The hypothesis was supported when the monetary considerations (i.e., payoff inequality and the magnitude effect) were controlled for in the potential gain domain as well as in the potential loss domain. Evidence showed that this is because the group representatives were concerned about how they would view themselves (e.g., guilt and self‐blame) and also how they would be viewed by others (i.e., to avoid being blamed and looked down upon by others). This study provided new insights into understanding group representatives' decision making under risk. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.