An availability bias in professional judgment

When branches of a fault tree are pruned, subjects do not fully transfer the probability of those branches to the ‘all other’ category. This underestimation of the catch-all probability has been interpreted as an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ form of the availability bias. The present work replicates this underestimation bias with professional managers. It then demonstrates the effectiveness of a corrective tactic, extending the tree by generating additional causes, and also reveals that more easily retrieved short-term causes dominate the generation process. These results do not differ across managers' culture, education or experience. After evaluating such alternative explanations as category redefinition, we conclude that availability is a major cause, though possibly not the sole cause, of the underestimation bias.     

When the “Charm of Three” Fades: Mental Imagery Moderates the Impact of the Number of Ad Claims on Persuasion

Given the prevalence of imagery appeals in today’s marketplace, the current research studies the role of mental imagery in how consumers process and react to advertisements with different numbers of ad claims. Past research has proposed “three” as the magical number of ad claims that maximizes persuasion, with more than three ad claims increasing skepticism and reducing evaluation. In the current research, we replicate this so-called “charm of three” effect, but only when consumers do not engage in mental imagery; when they do, however, we find that the effect is moderated, in that more ad claims beyond three produces more favorable product evaluation. Additionally, we provide evidence that the moderating effect of mental imagery is driven by transportation and skepticism toward the ad claims, with mental imagery increasing transportation and decreasing skepticism when there are more than three ad claims. Our research contributes to a better understanding of the “charm of three” effect, its boundary conditions, and underlying mechanism.     

A NEW METHODOLOGY FOR CHRISTIAN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Science and religion are the two strongest influences on the conduct of human life, yet their respective truth claims frequently clash. To facilitate better communication between scientists and theologians on these rival truth claims, the author recommends that Christian theologians use the language and current methodology of science as far as possible so as to present the content of Church teaching in an idiom that would be intelligible not only to scientists but to the educated public as well. In this way, the rival truth claims might complement rather than compete with one another. That is, clothed in the language of science, the truth claims of religion would gain in rational coherence and intelligibility. Natural scientists in turn would have conversation partners better able to deal with philosophical and ethical issues arising out of new scientific discoveries.     

A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF PLURALISM IN TEXT INTERPRETATION

Abstract: I take a pragmatic approach to what interpreters do when they interpret and argue that critical pluralists have focused almost exclusively on one aspect of interpretation: the fact that it is an event taking place in a historical and cultural milieu that influences the many ways interpreters approach a given text. However, there is also in interpretation a pragmatic aspect: the fact that it is an act performed by individuals who, through the utterance of their statements, implicitly make claims, for example, regarding the truth of their interpretation. In the first part I explain what critical pluralists overlook and the consequences of such oversight. In the second part I indicate how the validity of interpretation can be assessed.     

Likelihoodism,Bayesianism, and relational confirmation

Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a “middle way” between Likelihoodism and Bayesianism. In the process, I will propose some new work for an old probability puzzle: the “Monty Hall” problem. Thanks to the participants of the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling (PPM) Seminar at the University of Konstanz (especially Stephan Hartmann, Franz Huber, Wolfgang Spohn, and Teddy Seidenfeld), for a very fruitful discussion of an early draft of this paper in July, 2004. Since then, discussions and correspondences with Prasanta Bandyopadhyay, Luc Bovens, Alan Hájek, Jim Hawthorne, Jim Joyce, Jon Kvanvig (and other participants of his “Certain Doubts” blog, which had a thread on a previous draft of this paper), Patrick Maher, Sherri Roush, Richard Royall, Elliott Sober, Dan Steel, and an anonymous referee of Synthese has been very valuable.     

Linking Trust to Trustworthiness

Abstract

Trust is valuable when placed in trustworthy agents and activities, but damaging or costly when (mis)placed in untrustworthy agents and activities. So it is puzzling that much contemporary work on trust – such as that based on polling evidence – studies generic attitudes of trust in types of agent, institution or activity in complete abstraction from any account of trustworthiness. Information about others’ generic attitudes of trust or mistrust that take no account of evidence whether those attitudes are well or ill placed can offer little or no help for those who aim to place or refuse trust well. Information about attitudes is evidently useful to those who aim to influence those who hold them, which explains why polls about attitudes are popular with political parties, advertisers and other campaigning organisations. But where we aim not to influence others, but to place and refuse trust intelligently we must link trust to trustworthiness, and must focus on evidence of honesty, competence and reliability.     

Symbolic Sequence Effects on Consumers’ Judgments of Truth for Brand Claims

We introduce symbolic sequence effects—the consequences of whether the sequence of the initial letters of a pair of words (e.g., a word representing a putative cause and another word representing a putative effect) conforms to the structure of symbolic sequences that are stored in the mind as overlearned natural language traces (“natural sequence”). We synthesize insights from psychophysics as well as numerical and natural language symbolic representations to demonstrate that consumers are able to unconsciously perceive the mere sequence of symbols contained in a brand claim, and that this sequence information influences judgments of truth. Across three experiments, we showed that when a brand claim is structured in a way that is consistent with the natural sequence of symbols (“A causes B” rather than “B causes A”), people experience feelings of sequential fluency, which in turn influences judgments of truth. This occurs despite the inability of participants to attribute the true source of the feelings. Our results suggest that carefully designed brand claims are likely to benefit from this natural sequencing. These findings provide important contributions to the literatures on processing fluency, branding, and advertising. These findings also have sobering societal implications and warn that fake news might be more persuasive if the perpetrators understand symbolic sequencing techniques.     

文化视域下文化神经科学学科主张与检讨

文化神经科学是在宏大的文化背景下来全面深入考察个体的"心理、行为与脑认知机制"之间规律的一门学科。文化神经科学所倡导的神经-文化交互作用模型表明该学科以融合视野引领心理学研究范式的变革成为可能。同时,从文化学视野来审视,亦折射出其在文化学层面的短板,即人文精神与文化意蕴在"文化"名义下日渐式微。     

Charles Darwin: Continuity,Teleology and Ideology

Climate change has mutated from being a physical phenomenon to be studied to an idea to be contested. The sites of adjudication between competing truth claims have therefore moved from the secluded academy and scientific peer review to the vociferous agora and the extended peer community. This move is illustrated here using the case of the shrinking glaciers of Mt Kilimanjaro. Both the British engineer Guy Callendar, in 1944, and the American campaigner Al Gore, in 2006, claimed that the primary cause of this glacial recession was rising world temperature. Both were passionate believers in the reality of human-induced global warming, but they had very different resources at their disposal to advance these beliefs. While Callendar's claim was revealed only to the editor of the science journal Nature, Gore's claims were visible to millions through his film An Inconvenient Truth. While the force of Callendar's claim was weighed and adjudicated by one peer reviewer, the validity of Gore's claim was tested very publicly in the British courts. Both claims about the cause of Kilimanjaro's retreating glaciers were found wanting. The paper argues that this simple, but powerful, comparison between identical claims-making drawn from two different eras of science, yet with contrasting processes of truth-adjudication, illuminates the different ‘post-normal’ world of science climate change now inhabits. The case study is used to reflect on the role of the extended peer community in establishing and validating scientific knowledge about climate change: who participates, how trust is stabilised and whether science is thereby democratised.     

Arguing about the likelihood of consequences: Laypeople's criteria to distinguish strong arguments from weak ones

High-quality arguments have strong and lasting persuasive effects, suggesting that people can distinguish high- from low-quality arguments. However, we know little of what norms people employ to make that distinction. Some studies have shown that, in evaluating arguments from consequences, people are more sensitive to differences with respect to the desirability of these consequences than to differences in the likelihood that these consequences will occur. This raises the question of whether people lack the criteria to distinguish high-quality from low-quality arguments in support of such claims. In an experiment, 196 participants without any training in argument theory rated their acceptance of 30 claims about the likelihood that a certain outcome would result from a certain action. These claims were supported by an argument from authority, or from cause to effect, or from example. Arguments were systematically manipulated to violate nine specific criteria. For seven out of the nine criteria violation decreased acceptance of the claim supported. These findings show that people can use argument type specific criteria to distinguish high- from low-quality arguments.