Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.     

Ultimacy and alternative possibilities

I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.

Revisionism about free will: a statement &; defense

This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility.

Integrating values and cognitive style in a model of right-wing radicalism

Research has shown that multi-factorial models of ideology not only account for political orientation but also highlight its core aspects (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Recently, Montuori (2005) argued that reasoning according to a “logic of disjunction that creates binary opposition” exacerbates what is termed the “totalitarian mindset” (p. 26). In this study we examined this hypothesis by testing a model in which a disjunctive binary logic mediates values and proxies for right-wing radicalism. Methods: 425 participants completed a survey on political orientation that included measures of social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. Personal values, egalitarianism, and beliefs in a free society were also assessed as they are motives typically associated with ideology. Lastly, we assessed disjunctive logic based on a scale derived from a comprehensive study of ambiguity intolerance markers. Results: A structural equation model in which beliefs in free society, egalitarianism, security, universalism and traditionalism predicted right-wing radicalism was tested with or without interposing a disjunctive logic factor. Our findings show that disjunctive logic played a major role in predicting behaviors associated with right-wing radicalism.