Inhibitory control and set shifting describe different pathways from behavioral inhibition to socially anxious behavior

Individuals with a behaviorally inhibited (BI) temperament are more likely to develop social anxiety. However, the mechanisms by which socially anxious behavior emerges from BI are unclear. Variation in different forms of top‐down control, specifically executive functions (EF), may play distinct roles and characterize differential pathways to social anxiety. Here 291 children were assessed for BI in toddlerhood (ages 2 and 3), parent‐reported inhibitory control and set shifting during middle childhood (age 7), and multidimensional assessment of socially anxious behavior completed during late childhood and early adolescence (ages 9 and 12). Structural equation modeling revealed that early variation in BI predicted the development of socially anxious behavior through either higher levels of parent‐reported inhibitory control or lower levels of parent‐reported set shifting. These data reinforce the notion that top‐down control does not uniformly influence relations between temperament and socially anxious behavior. These data suggest novel approaches to thinking about the role of EFs and social anxiety outcomes as children approach adolescence.     

Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated

Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in.     

Why Levelling Down could be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism

Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out.

SPECIES OF EMERGENCE

Abstract. The category of emergence has come to be of considerable importance to the science‐and‐religion dialogue. It has become clear that the term is used in different ways by different authors, with important implications. In this article I examine the criteria used to state that something is emergent and the different interpretations of those criteria. In particular, I argue similarly to Philip Clayton that there are three broad ranges of interpretation of emergence: reductive, nonreductive, and radical. Although all three criteria have their place, I suggest that the category of radical emergence is important both for science and theology.     

简论惠栋标帜"汉学"的易学特色

论文分"崇尚汉易家法"、"融通汉易师法"、"批评图书易学"种"学术价值与思想意义"四部分,论述了乾嘉著名易学大师惠栋的易学研究。论文指出:一、惠栋研究《周易》,重视汉易的家法,融通汉易师法,提倡复归汉代的象数易学,体现了他对传统易学的继承与超越;二、作为经学大师,惠栋企图借鉴汉代象数易学理论来指导易学研究,既是他诠释易学当代价值的认真尝试,也是他以独特的方式延续了象数易学的生命;三、惠栋梳理汉易各家源流、勾勒其象数学特点,祛除宋儒图书易学中的臆说的流弊,成为清代易学研究的一个成功典范,具有转变当时学风与确立十八世纪经学研究方向的意义。     

樟柳碱所致学习和记忆障碍动物模型的探讨

本实验采用水迷津法、步下法和步入法,用樟柳碱制备学习和记忆障碍的动物模型。结果表明,樟柳碱(10毫克/公斤)可使小鼠引起学习障碍,其表现为通过水迷津全程的时间延长,而且小鼠进入盲路的错误次数明显增多。樟柳碱(10毫克/公斤)可使小鼠引起记忆障碍,在樟柳碱的影响下,小鼠步下平台或步入暗箱的潜伏期明显缩短,并使它们的错误次数增多。本实验结果进一步表明,测定小鼠的记忆障碍,步入法似乎比步下法更为敏感。     

Objecting Morally

Just war theory entails that some wars may be morally unjustifiable, and hence citizens may be right to object morally to their government's waging of a war and to their being compelled to serve in it. Given the evils attendant upon even justified war, this fact sharply restricts any obligation to die for the state, and raises important questions about the appropriate state response to selective conscientious objectors. This paper argues that such people should be legally accommodated, and discusses objections to doing so, in particular, the possible erosion of the state's capacity to wage justified war, the unfairness of granting such exemptions from military service, and the impossibility of determining genuinely conscientious objection.     

Introduction: Law and Disobedience

This essay considers some major questions raised by civil and other forms of conscientious disobedience. What distinguishes that form of dissent? Can we recognise the legitimacy of a political system yet defy its laws? Is disobeying a democratic decision especially or entirely unacceptable, or can disobedience be an instrument of democracy? If a regime recognises rights, how should we regard disobedience that appeals to those rights in challenging the regime’s laws? How should reasons for obedience figure in our thinking about justified disobedience? The essay locates the contributions that make up this special issue of Res Publica within these debates about disobedience. It questions whether any general theory of justified disobedience can command agreement: the conditions that give rise to conscientious disobedience -- conflicting values and judgements -- seem to preclude consensus on when its use is justified.     

Scope Fallacies and the “Decisive Objection” Against Endurance

From time to time, the idea that enduring things can change has been challenged. The latest challenge has come in the form of what David Lewis has called a “decisive objection”, which claims to deduce a contradiction from the idea that enduring things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, when that idea is combined with eternalism. It is my aim in this paper to explain why I think that no argument has yet appeared that deduces a contradiction from a combination of eternalism and the idea that enduring things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, except ones that do so by committing scope fallacies.

Combining versus analyzing multiple causes: how domain assumptions and task context affect integration rules

In everyday life, people typically observe fragments of causal networks. From this knowledge, people infer how novel combinations of causes they may never have observed together might behave. I report on 4 experiments that address the question of how people intuitively integrate multiple causes to predict a continuously varying effect. Most theories of causal induction in psychology and statistics assume a bias toward linearity and additivity. In contrast, these experiments show that people are sensitive to cues biasing various integration rules. Causes that refer to intensive quantities (e.g., taste) or to preferences (e.g., liking) bias people toward averaging the causal influences, whereas extensive quantities (e.g., strength of a drug) lead to a tendency to add. However, the knowledge underlying these processes is fallible and unstable. Therefore, people are easily influenced by additional task-related context factors. These additional factors include the way data are presented, the difficulty of the inference task, and transfer from previous tasks. The results of the experiments provide evidence for causal model and related theories, which postulate that domain-general representations of causal knowledge are influenced by abstract domain knowledge, data-driven task factors, and processing difficulty.