Expectations about numerical events in four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, Eulemur mongoz, Lemur catta and Varecia rubra)

Although much is known about how some primates—in particular, monkeys and apes—represent and enumerate different numbers of objects, very little is known about the numerical abilities of prosimian primates. Here, we explore how four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, E. mongoz, Lemur catta, and Varecia rubra) represent small numbers of objects. Specifically, we presented lemurs with three expectancy violation looking time experiments aimed at exploring their expectations about a simple 1+1 addition event. In these experiments, we presented subjects with displays in which two lemons were sequentially added behind an occluder and then measured subjects duration of looking to expected and unexpected outcomes. In experiment 1, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of only one object than at an expected outcome of two objects. Similarly, subjects in experiment 2 looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of three objects than at an expected outcome of two objects. In experiment 3, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of one object twice the size of the original than at an expected outcome of two objects of the original size. These results suggest that some prosimian primates understand the outcome of simple arithmetic operations. These results are discussed in light of similar findings in human infants and other adult primates.This revised version was published online in March 2005 with corrections to Fig. 6.     

Analog number representations in mongoose lemurs (Eulemur mongoz): evidence from a search task

A wealth of data demonstrating that monkeys and apes represent number have been interpreted as suggesting that sensitivity to number emerged early in primate evolution, if not before. Here we examine the numerical capacities of the mongoose lemur (Eulemur mongoz), a member of the prosimian suborder of primates that split from the common ancestor of monkeys, apes and humans approximately 47–54 million years ago. Subjects observed as an experimenter sequentially placed grapes into an opaque bucket. On half of the trials the experimenter placed a subset of the grapes into a false bottom such that they were inaccessible to the lemur. The critical question was whether lemurs would spend more time searching the bucket when food should have remained in the bucket, compared to when they had retrieved all of the food. We found that the amount of time lemurs spent searching was indicative of whether grapes should have remained in the bucket, and furthermore that lemur search time reliably differentiated numerosities that differed by a 1:2 ratio, but not those that differed by a 2:3 or 3:4 ratio. Finally, two control conditions determined that lemurs represented the number of food items, and neither the odor of the grapes, nor the amount of grape (e.g., area) in the bucket. These results suggest that mongoose lemurs have numerical representations that are modulated by Webers Law.     

Reciprocal recognition of sifaka (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Propithecus verreauxi verreauxi</Emphasis>) and redfronted lemur (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Eulemur fulvus rufus</Emphasis>) alarm calls

Redfronted lemurs (Eulemur fulvus rufus) and Verreaux's sifakas (Propithecus verreauxi verreauxi) occur sympatrically in western Madagascar. Both species exhibit a so-called mixed alarm call system with functionally referential alarm calls for raptors and general alarm calls for carnivores and raptors. General alarm calls also occur in other contexts associated with high arousal, such as inter-group encounters. Field playback experiments were conducted to investigate whether interspecific recognition of alarm calls occurs in both species, even though the two species rarely interact. In a crossed design, redfronted lemur and sifaka alarm calls were broadcast to individuals of both species, using the alarm call of chacma baboons (Papio cynocephalus) as a control. Both species responded with appropriate escape strategies and alarm calls after playbacks of heterospecific aerial alarm calls. Similarly, they reacted appropriately to playbacks of heterospecific general alarm calls. Playbacks of baboon alarm calls elicited no specific responses in either lemur species, indicating that an understanding of interspecific alarm calls caused the responses and not alarm calls in general. Thus, the two lemur species have an understanding of each other's aerial as well as general alarm calls, suggesting that even in species that do not form mutualistic associations and rarely interact, common predator pressure has been sufficient for the development of heterospecific call recognition.     

A socioecological perspective on primate cognition,past and present

The papers in this special issue examine the relationship between social and ecological cognition in primates. We refer to the intersection of these two domains as socioecological cognition. Examples of socioecological cognition include socially learned predator alarm calls and socially sensitive foraging decisions. In this review we consider how primate cognition may have been shaped by the interaction of social and ecological influences in their evolutionary history. The ability to remember distant, out-of-sight locations is an ancient one, shared by many mammals and widespread among primates. It seems some monkeys and apes have evolved the ability to form more complex representations of resources, integrating “what-where-how much” information. This ability allowed anthropoids to live in larger, more cohesive groups by minimizing competition for limited resources between group members. As group size increased, however, competition for resources also increased, selecting for enhanced social skills. Enhanced social skills in turn made a more sophisticated relationship to the environment possible. The interaction of social and ecological influences created a spiraling effect in the evolution of primate intelligence. In contrast, lemurs may not have evolved the ability to form complex representations which would allow them to consider the size and location of resources. This lack in lemur ecological cognition may restrict the size of frugivorous lemur social groups, thereby limiting the complexity of lemur social life. In this special issue, we have brought together two review papers, five field studies, and one laboratory study to investigate the interaction of social and ecological factors in relation to foraging. Our goal is to stimulate research that considers social and ecological factors acting together on cognitive evolution, rather than in isolation. Cross fertilization of experimental and observational studies from captivity and the field is important for increasing our understanding of this relationship. This contribution is part of the Special Issue “A Socioecological Perspective on Primate Cognition”.     

Can brown lemurs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Eulemur fulvus</Emphasis>) learn to deceive a human competitor?

In the present study we asked whether lemurs could learn to manipulate information in order to deceive a human competitive trainer. Four brown lemurs were trained to communicate about the location of a hidden reward to a cooperative trainer, who rewarded the subject if he indicated the baited bowl. Next, a competitive trainer was introduced who kept the reward for himself if the subject indicated the baited bowl. In a first experiment, sessions were randomly assigned to be with either the cooperative or competitive trainer. No subject was able to show an efficient tactic with both trainers. In a second experiment, the participation of the two trainers was randomized across the trials for each session. When trials were mixed, one subject significantly chose baited location when interacting with the cooperative trainer, and reliably increased his choices of the unbaited location when presented with the competitive trainer. As with most other primate species tested under the same paradigm, associative learning may explain deceptive pointing by lemurs in this study.