Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘He's got his father's bias’: Parental influence on weight bias in young children

Our aim was to explore the role of parents in the transmission of stereotypical body size attitudes and awareness of weight loss strategies to preschool children. Participants were 279 3‐year‐old children and their parents, who provided data at baseline and 1 year later. Parents completed self‐report body size attitude and dieting measures. Child weight bias and awareness of weight loss strategies were assessed through interview. Over time, negative associations with large bodies and awareness of weight loss strategies increased. Fathers’ attitudes prospectively predicted boys’ weight bias and awareness of weight loss strategies. Among girls, parental attitudes were less predictive. Findings confirm the importance of fathers in the development of boys’ body attitudes and inform prevention programmes.     

The effects of self‐explaining when learning with text or diagrams

Self‐explaining is an effective metacognitive strategy that can help learners develop deeper understanding of the material they study. This experiment explored if the format of material (i.e., text or diagrams) influences the self‐explanation effect. Twenty subjects were presented with information about the human circulatory system and prompted to self‐explain; 10 received this information in text and 10 in diagrams. Results showed that students given diagrams performed significantly better on post‐tests than students given text. Diagrams students also generated significantly more self‐explanations that text students. Furthermore, the benefits of self‐explaining were much greater in the diagrams condition. To discover why diagrams can promote the self‐explanation effect, results are interpreted with reference to the multiple differences in the semantic, cognitive and affective properties of the texts and diagrams studied.     

Two ways of learning associations

How people learn chunks or associations between adjacent items in sequences was modelled. Two previously successful models of how people learn artificial grammars were contrasted: the CCN, a network version of the competitive chunker of Servan‐Schreiber and Anderson [J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 16 (1990) 592], which produces local and compositionally‐structured chunk representations acquired incrementally; and the simple recurrent network (SRN) of Elman [Cogn. Sci. 14 (1990) 179], which acquires distributed representations through error correction. The models' susceptibility to two types of interference was determined: prediction conflicts, in which a given letter can predict two other letters that appear next with an unequal frequency; and retroactive interference, in which the prediction made by a letter changes in the second half of training. The predictions of the models were determined by exploring parameter space and seeing howdensely different regions of the space of possible experimental outcomes were populated by model outcomes. For both types of interference, human data fell squarely in regions characteristic of CCN performance but not characteristic of SRN performance.     

Individual differences in reverse Hindsight bias: I never thought something like chernobyl would happen. Did I?

Hindsight bias was studied in the context of the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which took place on April 26th 1986. An individual difference factor which relates to the motivation to process information, need for cognition, was expected to moderate the occurrence of hindsight bias. Probability estimates of many casualties due to the use of nuclear power in The Netherlands were obtained from 212 individuals two months before the accident in Chernobyl. These estimates were compared with similar estimates made in hindsight by the same individuals five months after the accident. Loglinear Analyses reveal a systematic hindsight bias. However, the direction of the bias was contrary to expectations. In hindsight, individuals gave lower probabilities than they actually did two months before the Chernobyl accident. These results reveal a reverse hindsight bias. As hypothesized, need for cognition moderates hindsight bias: individuals low and medium in need for cognition express a systematic reverse hindsight bias, while individuals high in need for cognition do not. High need for cognition individuals also show higher literal consistency between the two measurements, which supports a memory explanation of the moderating effect of need for cognition.     

Effects of relative reinforcer frequency on complex color detection

Pigeons were trained under a discrete-trials detection procedure in which one of a set of color stimuli was presented on the center key and a single response turned off the stimulus and illuminated two side keys. Single responses to one or the other side key produced occasional reinforcers depending on the value of the color stimulus. In Experiment 1, one color-stimulus set comprised 559, 564, 569, and 574 nm, and right-key pecks were occasionally reinforced following presentations of members of this set. The other stimulus set comprised 579, 584, 589, and 594 nm, and left-key pecks were occasionally reinforced following presentations of members of this set. Across seven experimental conditions, the left/(left + right) relative reinforcer frequency was varied from .1 to .9. In Experiment 2, one stimulus set contained only one member, 574 nm, and right-key responses were occasionally reinforced following its presentation. Over 12 experimental conditions, two manipulations were carried out. First, the number of stimuli comprising the other stimulus set was increased from one (579 nm) to two (579 and 584 nm) to three (579, 584, and 589 nm) and to four (579, 584, 589, and 594 nm), and left-key responses were reinforced occasionally following center-key presentations of members of this set. Second, for each stimulus combination, the left/(left + right) relative reinforcer frequency was varied from .1 to .5 to .9 across three experimental conditions. The principal finding of Experiments 1 and 2 was that reinforcers and stimuli interacted in their effects on behavior. In Experiment 3, pairs of adjacent stimuli (5 nm apart) in the range 559 to 594 nm were presented in each experimental condition, and the left/(left + right) relative reinforcer frequency was held constant at .5. The data from all three experiments were analyzed according to a detection model describing performance in multiple-stimulus two-response procedures. This model provided independent measures of stimulus discriminability, contingency discriminability, and bias. The analysis showed that (a) consistent with the color-naming function, pigeons were better able to discriminate between higher nanometer values than lower nanometer values; (b) their ability to discriminate between the stimuli was independent of the number of wavelengths comprising each stimulus set; (c) they allocated delivered reinforcers very accurately to the previously emitted response; and (d) no consistent biases emerged.     

The interaction of stimulus and reinforcer control in complex temporal discrimination.

Six pigeons were trained in a discrete-trials signal-detection procedure to discriminate between a fixed-duration stimulus (5 s or 20 s) and a set of variable durations ranging from 2.5 s to 57.5 s in steps of 5 s. For each fixed-duration stimulus, the ratio of reinforcer frequencies contingent upon reporting the fixed versus the variable stimulus was systematically manipulated. Detection performance was well controlled by both the stimulus value and the reinforcer ratio. Both the discriminability between the fixed duration and the set of variable durations, and the discriminability between the fixed duration and each of the variable durations, were independent of the reinforcer-frequency ratio when discriminability was measured as log d. The sensitivity of response bias to reinforcement-ratio changes was independent of the value of the fixed duration, but was not independent of the discriminability of the variable durations from the fixed durations. Under current models, discriminability measures in complex temporal discrimination may be independent of biasing manipulations, but bias measures are not independent of stimulus values.     

Self-selection biases in correlational studies based on questionnaires

It is commonly held that even where questionnaire response is poor, correlational studies are affected only by loss of degrees of freedom or precision. We show that this supposition is not true. If the decision to respond is correlated with a substantive variable of interest, then regression or analysis of variance methods based upon the questionnaire results may be adversely affected by self-selection bias. Moreover such bias may arise even where response is 100%. The problem in both cases arises where selection information is passed to the score indirectly via the disturbance or individual effects, rather than entirely via the observable explanatory variables. We suggest tests for the ensuing self-selection bias and possible ways of handling the ensuing problems of inference.The author would like to thank members of the Psychology Department at UWA for references on the illustrative example, namely the effects of sex-stereotyping on achievements in mathematics; thanks are also due to the anonymous reviewers whose comments resulted in material improvements to the paper.     

Analysis of Religious Bias among Christian Students in Science

Christians are notably underrepresented in science in part due to long-standing public perceptions of science-religion incompatibility and antireligious bias in science. This research explores whether undergraduates at a Christian university perceive and impose anti-Christian cultural stigma in science. Survey results from 126 biology students revealed that though students generally perceived the culture of science to be anti-Christian, they perceived Christians to have equal opportunities for scientific achievement. Results from a quasi-experimental audit study, in which students evaluated one of two profiles for mock prospective Ph.D. applicants (Christian or undisclosed faith) showed that students did not project anti-Christian stereotypes in terms of competence, hireability, or likeability, but showed some evidence of pro-Christian favorability. Together, this study suggests that the affirmational community of a Christian University may alleviate some negative impacts of anti-Christian stereotypes in academic biology, even as students perceive discrimination against Christians in science and atheists as more scientifically competent.     

Resource scarcity aggravates ingroup bias: Neural mechanisms and cross-scenario validation

Previous studies examining the relationship between ingroup bias and resource scarcity have produced heterogeneous findings, possibly due to their focus on the allocation of positive resources (e.g. money). This study aims to investigate whether ingroup bias would be amplified or eliminated when perceived survival resources for counteracting negative stimuli are scarce. For this purpose, we exposed the participants and another confederate of the experimenters (ingroup/outgroup member) to a potential threat of unpleasant noise. Participants received some ‘relieving resources’ to counteract noise administration, the amount of which may or may not be enough for them and the confederate in different conditions (i.e. abundance vs. scarcity). First, a behavioural experiment demonstrated that intergroup discrimination manifested only in the scarcity condition; in contrast, the participants allocated similar amounts of resource to ingroup and outgroup members in the abundance condition, indicating a context-dependent allocation strategy. This behavioural pattern was replicated in a follow-up neuroimaging experiment, which further revealed that when contrasting scarcity with abundance, there was higher activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as well as stronger functional connectivity of the ACC with the empathy network (including the temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex) for ingroup compared to outgroup members. We suggest that ACC activation reflects the mentalizing process toward ingroup over outgroup members in the scarcity condition. Finally, the ACC activation level significantly predicted the influence of resource scarcity on ingroup bias in hypothetical real-life situations according to a follow-up examination.