Reduction of sadistic sexual arousal by olfactory aversion: a case study

A sexual sadist was treated by an olfactory aversion procedure for eight weeks. Pre-treatment assessment of sexual arousal showed high levels of response to sadistic stimuli as well as high arousal to non-sadistic heterosexual stimuli. In treatment the inhalation of the gas of an odoriferous chemical agent, valeric acid, was paired with slide presentations of sadistic materials while penile erection was monitored. The aversive stimulus immediately and permanently suppressed the response for the duration of treatment. In separate measurement sessions, with valeric acid absent, deviant response remained suppressed and nondeviant response was unaffected. Post-treatment reassessment revealed very low levels of response to sadistic stimuli. Follow-up sessions showed that the deviant response was absent eight months following the conclusion of treatment.     

Treatment of bisexual pedophilia by a biofeedback-assisted self-control procedure

A bisexual pedophile was treated for 88 days using a biofeedback procedure which displayed his erection response to sexually deviant stimuli on a closed-circuit television monitor. Told to develop a strategy of self-control using the biofeedback, his response to young boys and girls was treated sequentially in a multiple baseline design. His concurrent response to boys, girls and adult males was evaluated in separate generalization sessions. The treatment was successful in suppressing deviant response while maintaining nondeviant response in strength. Debriefing of the client following treatment revealed that he had used a self-developed technique of covert sensitization to suppress deviant response and had used the biofeedback to confirm and validate this self-control strategy.     

Multi-Modal CTL: Completeness,Complexity, and an Application

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (ctl) by extending the language with path quantifiers E ^δ and A ^δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

De l’opportunité d’une nouvelle loi sur la fin de vie ?

This paper deals with the end of life issue. It advocates for putting the legislation about end of life a part from bioethics laws and addresses some legal problems.     

John Polkinghorne on Three Scientist-Theologians

In 1996, John Polkinghorne published Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne. Responding to this book and his subsequent writing, I first summarize four topics on which we all agree: (1) critical realism; (2) holism, emergence, and levels of organization; (3) human nature; and (4) limitations in God's power. I then discuss our differences concerning: (1) classification schemes; (2) concepts of God; (3) laws of nature; (4) divine action; and (5) Christology. I then explore the contexts in which we were writing: our differing scientific disciplines, theological traditions, and academic institutions. Some concluding reflections concern our place in the interdisciplinary field of “science and religion.”     

A priori causal laws

Sober and Elgin defend the claim that there are a priori causal laws in biology. Lange and Rosenberg take issue with this on Humean grounds, among others. I will argue that Sober and Elgin don’t go far enough – there are a priori causal laws in many sciences. Furthermore, I will argue that this thesis is compatible with a Humean metaphysics and an empiricist epistemology.     

Plato's Theory of Punishment and Penal Code in the Laws

I argue that the degree to which a criminal should be punished is determined by three elements: a baseline amount that proportionally compensates the victim and an additional penalty that, first, reforms the criminal and, second, deters others from becoming unjust. My interpretation provides a solution to the interpretive puzzle that has most vexed commentators: the alleged tension between Plato's philosophical theory of punishment and the content of his penal code. I defend a two-step solution to the puzzle. First, on my interpretation, because of the broad role that deterrence must play, this alleged tension is—to a degree—merely apparent. Second, the actual tension can be explained by Plato's commitment to the rule of law, given the epistemic limitations of actual people.     

Idealizations and Concretizations in Laws and Explanations in Physics

The paper tries to provide an alternative to Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, it compares this reconstruction with the approaches of J. Woodward and C. Hitchcock, C. Liu and with the views of M. Thalos on analytic mechanics.

The inconceivability of zombies

I argue for the claim that if Lewis’s regularity theory of laws were true, we could not know any positive law statement to be true. Premise 1: According to that theory, for any law statement true of the actual world, there is always a nearby world where the law statement is false (a world that differs with respect to one matter of particular fact). Premise 2: One cannot know a proposition to be true if it is false in a nearby world (the epistemological safety principle). The conclusion that no law statement can be known to be true follows immediately from the two premises.     

The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance

David Lewis’s ‘Humean Supervenience’ (henceforth ‘HS’) combines realism about laws, chances, and dispositions with a sparse ontology according to which everything supervenes on the overall spatiotemporal distribution of non-dispositional properties (Lewis 1986a, Philosophical papers: Volume II, pp. ix–xvii, New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1994, Mind 103:473–490). HS faces a serious problem—a “big bad bug” (Lewis 1986a, p. xiv): it contradicts the Principal Principle, a seemingly obvious norm of rational credence. Two authors have tried to rescue Lewis’s ontology from the ‘big bad bug’ (henceforth ‘the Bug’) by rejecting realism about laws, chances, and dispositions (Halpin 1994, Aust J Phil 72:317–338, 1998, Phil Sci 65:349–360; Ward 2005, Phil Sci 71:241–261). I will argue that this strategy cannot possibly work: it is the ontology, not the realist thesis, that lies at the root of the problem.