Are there degrees of belief?

John Maynard Keynes claimed that not all probabilities were comparable. Frank Ramsey argued that they were, and that Keynes's views to the contrary rested on a confusion of degree of entailment and degree of belief. We will argue that Keynes and Ramsey largely talked past each other, and yet that there are issues of great significance underlying their dispute. In particular, the simple principle of maximizing expected utility may be seen in a new light as one step of a rich and complex process.     

Proofreading errors in good and poor readers

Seven-year-old children classified as good and poor readers carried out a proofreading task on two passages varying in level of difficulty. Misspellings were introduced by transposing two adjacent letters in the work "the," other three-letter words, and longer words. While both groups of readers were able to identify the correct spelling of the misspelled words on a spelling test, poor readers made significantly more proofreading errors. Word length had a significant effect on performance, indicating that sensitivity to word configuration is important for successful proofreading. The pattern of proofreading errors did not reflect underlying differences which might relate to strategies used by the two groups in normal reading. The results are compared with those from other proofreading and letter detection experiments in order to highlight methodological implications when such tasks are used to verify hypotheses concerned with normal reading strategies.     

Irrelevance: Strengthening the Bayesian requirements

Bayesians standardly identify irrelevance with probabilistic irrelevance. However, there are cases where e is probabilistically irrelevant to h but intuitively e is relevant to h. For instance, ‘Die A came up 1 and die B came up 1, 3, 5 or 6’ is probabilistically irrelevant to ‘Die A came up odd and die B came up even’, yet, intuitively, it is not, irrelevant to that claim, in the sense that ‘Sydney has a harbour Bridge’ is irrelevant to it. In the context of decision making this notion of irrelevance combined with such rules as ‘Do not expend resources on irrelevant evidence’ leads to bad results. A stronger notion of irrelevance fitting our intuitions and the contexts of decision making is proposed: e is irrelevant to h if and only if every part of e is probabilistically irrelevant to every part of h. However, we need to take care in determining what counts as part of a statement.     

Falling In and Out of Love with Philosophy

In this article, principally through autobiographical remarks, some observations concerning philosophical temperament are made, the example of Gerd Buchdahl as a textual interpreter of classic philosophical texts is invoked, and the position of philosophy in relation to history of science is explored, in particular in the work of Kuhn and Foucault. The article concludes with a reminder of the overall history of philosophy at Cambridge through a discussion of the history of the moral sciences.