Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy

The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers.     

On the need of fundaments in psychoanalytic thinking

The questions concerning the foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge have been pressing from the beginning. Beside as a therapeutic practice, Freud conceived psychoanalysis as a science, maintaining that like other sciences psychoanalysis should have sound empirical and conceptual fundaments. Freud claimed that there is an inseparable bond (ein Junktim) between cure and acquiring knowledge in psychoanalysis. One of his aims in developing a metapsychology (analogously to metaphysics) was to explicate the conceptual structure of psychoanalytic knowledge. After Freud psychoanalysts have not reached a consensus in the questions concerning the foundations. What kind of foundations does psychoanalytic knowledge need? Are they to be found from the psychoanalytic practice and research on the couch, or rather from metapsychological constructions? In what way should psychoanalysis rely on external scientific research? The article addresses these questions, arguing that even though psychoanalytic work and knowledge do gain justification from various external sources, in the end psychoanalysis stands on its own foundations. It is further argued that especially under the prevailing plurality of theoretical and clinical approaches, psychoanalysis does not have – and does not need – a foundation that could not be further questioned. Thus a coherentist picture of psychoanalysis is defended.